Prof. Mark Rounsevell

Overview

Since the first establishment of the scientific evidence for climate change, there has been a political focus on reducing GHG emissions to mitigate the problem. Increasingly however the realisation has come that the world is already committed to some level of climate change, which leads to the imperative of understanding climate change impacts and planning adaptation strategies to these impacts. The pathways along which governments pass in gathering scientific evidence and negotiating mitigation treaties is tortuous and riddled with potholes.

Assistance in this complex and often fraught process comes from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in gathering evidence and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in leading the climate negotiations. In this discussion we will explore how effective these institutions are in achieving their different goals, and how alternative models might, or might not, do better. We will do this by exploring the past evolution of these institutions and discussing where we are now, and what is the potential for the future.

The IPCC process

Since it published its first Assessment Report in 1995, the IPCC has been held up as a shining example of how a collective of scientists can inform policy debates affecting the global environment. The 4^th Assessment report even won the IPCC the Nobel Peace prize, jointly with Al Gore. The Assessment reports are commissioned by governments worldwide (hence the Intergovernmental Panel title) to cover climate change science, impacts, adaptation and vulnerability to climate change and climate mitigation. The 4^th Report whilst winning many plaudits, including the Peace prize, was held up to detailed scrutiny and criticism by some. The famous ‘climate-gate’ and ‘glazier-gate’ episodes, and personal attacks on the integrity of contributing scientists, left a stain on the IPCC’s reputation even though the supposed errors or dubious practices were largely subsequently disproven.

The hype and pressure put on the 2009 climate summit in Copenhagen raised awareness of the climate change debate considerably. The release of stolen emails from the Climatic Research Unit of the University of East Anglia in the run up to Copenhagen created huge media attention and provided ammunition for “sceptics” who caused mass doubt in the public about climate change science. Moreover, the IPCC fourth assessment report came under fire, notably for their claim, now shown to be wrong, that the Himalayan glaciers could melt by 2035. This corresponded with a large increase in “sceptics” speaking out against climate change in the media and on the web. This clearly had an effect on public opinion about the legitimacy of climate science and even the integrity of climate scientists. A poll conducted by the BBC between November 2009 and February 2010 showed a 10% increase in people who did not believe in climate change and a 6% increase in people who believe that it is happening, but only due to natural causes.

So, now that the IPCC has released its 5^th Assessment report , nearly 20 years after the first report, and with the recent Paris COP21 outcomes, perhaps it’s time to take stock of the IPCC process itself

. To what extent has the IPCC really contributed to climate mitigation policy? Is it still fit for purpose, or are there alternative models that might better achieve the ultimate aim of addressing the climate change problem? The IPCC is likely to continue in some shape or form, but what this should be in supporting the drive to limit the climate change problem is not so clear.

Background reading:

http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf The IPCC Summary for Policy makers of Working Group 2 of the 5^th Assessment Report.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/8388485.stm a viewpoint from Prof Mike Hulme (UEA) and Dr. Jerome Ravetz (Innovation and Society (InSIS) at Oxford University)

http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100202/full/463596a.html IPCC flooded by criticism

IPCC: Cherish, tweak or Scrap? Nature 463, 730-732 11 February 2010

IPCC Seeks ‘Broader Community Engagement’ to Correct Errors Science 12 February 2010

http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/327/5967/780-a Stop Listening to Scientists?

Mark Rounsevell is Professor of Rural Economy and Sustainability within the School of GeoSciences. His research focuses on the effects of environmental change on rural and urban landscapes with an emphasis on the development and application of agent-based, social simulation models. Models are combined with the development of scenarios to explore the response of individuals and society to different environmental change drivers in the future

Dr Laura Jeffery

Dr Laura Jeffery

Until the end of the 20^th century, most Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) were relatively small-scale conservation zones in coastal waters. The past decade has seen a proliferation in the designation of ever larger MPAs. Mega MPAs measuring over 100,000km² now already comprise the vast majority of the total area covered by MPAs worldwide. But why are the world’s powerful leaders – including Clinton, Bush, and Obama – competing to create ever larger MPAs?

The states party to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) have agreed on a target to protect 10% of the world’s oceans by 2020. Mega MPAs clearly help governments as they seek to reach this (repeatedly deferred) target, but do they offer effective protection? Proponents argue that the smaller border-to-area ratio of mega MPAs means that the area of well-protected ocean in the middle is increased while the border zones exposed to external threats are reduced. But critics point to a range of problems associated with mega MPAs:

Challenges to surveillance and enforcement: Size and remoteness pose particular challenges for effective surveillance and enforcement of mega MPAs, where surveillance vessels cannot effectively patrol such large areas, and remote sensing technologies cannot track illegal fishing vessels that do not have satellite tags. Environmental NGOS (eNGOs) have reported widespread illegal fishing within numerous MPAs, including illegal shark fishing in the Galapagos Marine Reserve (Ecuador).

Diverting attention from real challenges: Most mega MPAs have been designated in remote areas with little human habitation, but this means they are not ideally located to address the real challenges facing the world’s oceans, such as overfishing, tourism, and pollution. A good example of this is the Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument designated around the uninhabited and relatively unexploited northwest Hawaiian Islands (USA).

Vulnerability to commercial interests: Seeking to meet ambitious targets without threatening economic growth, governments are likely to protect areas that already have low economic value. Australia’s Coral Sea Commonwealth Marine Reserve, for instance, covers deep water that sees little fishing activity at present, and leaves the most valuable commercial fishing areas unrestricted.

Undermining social justice: By banning resource use within vast areas, mega MPAs risk undermining social justice in terms of equitable access to economic livelihoods. The UK’s Chagos Marine Protected Area, for example, seems to have been designed to entrench UK sovereignty over an Indian Ocean territory also claimed by Mauritius, safeguard the security of the US military base on Diego Garcia, and harm the displaced islanders’ campaign for their right of return to the Chagos Archipelago.

Diverting resources from existing MPAs: Promoting mega MPAs may divert attention and resources from improving the management and effectiveness of existing or smaller MPAs. On the other hand, however, mega MPAs such as the Chagos MPA and South Georgia and Sandwich Islands (UK/Argentina) were designated alongside a network of smaller coastal MPAs around the UK mainland; Australia’s Coral Sea Commonwealth Marine Reserve was designated alongside smaller MPAs in areas of high resource use.

Discussion Questions

• Can national solutions such as mega MPAs effectively address global challenges?
• How can remote mega MPAs be effectively monitored and enforced?
• Does vulnerability to commercial interests undermine mega MPAs?
• Do remote mega MPAs divert attention from the real issues?
• Do mega MPAs undermine social justice?
• Do mega MPAs divert resources from smaller MPAs and MPA networks?
• Can MPA networks and Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) offer effective solutions?

Indicative Readings:

• MPA News. International news and analysis on marine protected areas published by the University of Washington.
• De Santo, E.M. 2013. Missing marine protected area (MPA) targets: How the push for quantity over quality undermines sustainability and social justice. Journal of Environmental Management 124: 137-146.
• Leenhardt, P, B. Cazalet, B. Salvat, J. Claudet & F. Feral. 2013. The rise of large-scale marine protected areas: conservation or geopolitics? Ocean & Coastal Management 85, A: 112-118.
• Singleton, R.L. & C.M. Roberts. 2014. The contribution of very large marine protected areas to marine conservation: giant leaps or smoke and mirrors? Marine Pollution Bulletin 87: 7-10.

Dr Laura Jeffery is Lecturer in Social Anthropology in the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh, and has research interests in island ecologies, human–environment relations, and the politics of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). She has recently published on WikiLeaks evidence in judicial review of the Chagos MPA, debates about environmental guardianship of the Chagos Archipelago, and ‘coconut chaos’ and the politics of restoration ecology.

Dr Annalisa Savaresi

The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has been ratified by virtually all states in the world. The Convention acknowledges that the adverse effects of global climate change are a common concern of humankind, and undertakes to achieve ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’

Such a level should be achieved ‘within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.’ Therefore, the Convention does not set out to halt climate change altogether, but to contain its impact and allow human and natural systems to adapt to its effects. Over twenty years after its adoption, however, the UNFCCC has achieved little in the way of concrete results. Greenhouse gas emissions are higher than ever and parties are far from being on a path to reaching the objective of the Convention. So what went wrong?

The main instrument adopted to achieve the objective of the UNFCCC, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, has been riddled with controversy. With the Protocol, a relatively small group of developed countries undertook binding emission reduction targets that were to be reviewed over time. After the elapse of the first commitment period in 2012, however, it has proven impossible to negotiate new targets for some important players, such as Japan, New Zealand and the Russian Federation, whereas others, like Canada and the US, are not parties to the Protocol. This situation has left the European Union and a few other developed countries, like Australia, Norway and Switzerland, in the uncomfortable position of being the sole parties with emission reduction targets under the climate regime. Emission reductions in these countries alone, however, are greatly inadequate to achieve the objective of the Convention. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has on several occasions clarified that to achieve such an objective, both developed and developing countries need to reduce their emissions.

With political will behind the Kyoto Protocol faltering, and in the hope to bring the US and Canada back to the negotiation table, UNFCCC parties have embarked upon the difficult process of negotiating a new climate agreement. This process has suffered numerous set-backs, most notably, at the 2009 climate conference in Copenhagen, where it almost collapsed. Negotiations continue to this day and are expected to conclude in Paris in 2015. The road to Paris is nevertheless laden with obstacles and limited progress has so far been made towards the elaboration of a text for the new agreement. With yet another disappointing inter-sessional meeting just concluded in Bonn, it seems timely to reflect on how climate negotiations could be made more effective.

Some authors have come up with suggestions. In a 2011 paper, Bodansky suggests that some aspects of the climate change issue, such emissions in the transport sector, be addressed in other international fora, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The advantage of relying upon these fora lies in that they already count the states that most matter in these sectors amongst their members, and also have specialist expertise enabling to address technical questions in a more efficient and expeditious way than the UNFCCC. Isolating certain sources of emissions and delegating the adoption of internationally coordinated measures to specialist international fora therefore definitely sounds like a promising approach. So far, however, experiments with this strategy have delivered mixed results. While the IMO has already adopted standards on energy efficiency of international shipping, the ICAO is struggling to develop a global market-based mechanism to addressing international aviation emissions. Thus reaching agreement in these specialist fora is not necessarily easier than under the UNFCCC. Much anticipation presently surrounds the consideration of proposals to phase down hydrofluorocarbons (which are major of greenhouse gases) under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.

Another approach to increase efficiency in international climate governance is proposed by Vihma and Kulovesi, who suggest to improving the UNFCCC process with procedural reforms. Procedural wrangling has characterized the history of the UNFCCC and even blocked meetings of the Convention’s bodies. One matter that has attracted much attention is that of majority voting. Presently decision-making under the climate regime is carried out on the basis of consensus, as no agreement could be reached on the adoption of rules on voting. While UNFCCC parties have shown little political appetite for addressing the matter of voting, the UNFCCC Secretariat has recently been asked to prepare a paper evaluating options on the frequency and organization of sessions. This largely technical debate on how frequently the Convention’s bodies meet and where may have some important implications for how its parties will work in future.

Finally, coalitions of willing state and non-state actors are increasingly establishing transnational initiatives, bypassing the stalemate affecting international climate negotiations with bottom-up climate governance endeavours. In this vein, the recent UN Climate Summit saw the launch of a flurry of bottom-up initiatives, including:

• Global Mayors Compact to fight climate change, a coalition of more than 2,000 cities;
• Global Energy Efficiency Acceleration Platform, supported by several national and subnational governments and businesses;
• Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, established under the auspices of the World Bank with the support of governments and businesses;
• New York Declaration on Forests, whereby a coalition of developed and developing countries, subnational governments, companies, indigenous peoples’ and civil society organizations pledged to halve global loss of natural forests by 2020 and reduce it to zero by 2030;
• Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture, a multi-stakeholder coalition of states, civil society and international and scientific organisations for the incorporation of climate change considerations in food and agriculture systems.

Thus, while climate negotiations continue at a glacial pace, other international fora and coalition of willing state and non-state actors show some timid signs of progress. The underlying question, however, is whether these alternatives are capable of delivering adequate action to tackle the climate problem.

Background reading:

Vihma, A. and K. Kulovesi. Strengthening global climate change negotiations: improving the efficiency of the UNFCCC process (2012), available at: http://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:701694/FULLTEXT01.pdf

Bodansky, D. Multilateral climate efforts beyond the UNFCCC (2011) available at: http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/Regime-brief.pdf

Bodansky, D. and Rajamani, L. Evolution and governance architecture of the climate regime (2012) available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2168859

The Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, Institutions for International Climate Governance (2010) available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/HPCA-Policy-Brief-2010-01-Final.pdf

The Economist, Climate change: theatre of the absurd (2012) http://www.economist.com/news/21567342-after-three-failures-years-un-climate-summit-has-only-modest-aims-theatre-absurd

GRIST, Is there any hope for international climate talks? (2014) http://grist.org/climate-energy/is-there-any-hope-for-international-climate-talks/

New York Times, Climate realities (2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/21/opinion/sunday/climate-realities.html?_r=0

Dr Annalisa Savaresi specialises in European, international and comparative environmental law. Her research interests include climate change, forestry, environmental liability and the relationship between human rights and the environment. She is member of the IUCN World Commission on Environmental Law and writer for the Earth Negotiation Bulletin, published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development. Since 2013, she has been Research Fellow to the BENELEX project, responsible for legal research in the areas of climate change and forest biodiversity.