By Professor Elizabeth Bomberg, Deputy Director of GESA and Professor of Environmental Politics, School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh

Thanks to a collaboration fund between the Universities of Sydney and Edinburgh, sponsored by the Partnership Collaboration Awards Programme, our two associated institutes (Sydney Environment Institute and Edinburgh’s Global Environment and Society Academy) were able to host an excellent workshop this summer on ‘Sustainable Materialism.’ Our focus was on flows of materials (including food, energy, clothing), through our everyday lives and if/how these flows and practices represent a new type of environmentalism.  The delegates gathered at the Edinburgh Centre for Carbon Innovation (ECCI) in Edinburgh were amazingly diverse, representing disciplines of politics, environmental science, ecology, law, arts, architecture, literature, music, economics, sociology and more.  Eleven papers analysed the people and groups engaged in environmental practices – food movements, community energy, sustainable crafting and fashion – and explored their motivations, forms, diversity and impact on social change.

After co-organiser David Schlosberg introduced the main theme of sustainable materialism,  Gordon Walker examined social practice theory, suggesting how a focus on practice as a unit of analysis (cycling, gardening, etc.)  provides a nice antidote to the more traditional  individualist, behavioural framings of action. His paper successfully applied the approach to understanding the shared commitment to sustainable practices, and he made a very good case for its use. However, the ensuing discussion probed the role of agency, motivations and identity, all of which remain somewhat ambiguous in social practice applications.

Next up was a  series of super case studies: Sherilyn MacGregor on ‘urban commoning’ in Moss Side, Manchester, and Lisa Heinz on sustainable fashion.  The main discussion questions here concerned neoliberalism: what shapes ‘sustainable’ fashion choices; do they really challenge consumerism?  Similarly, to what extent do local initiatives simply compel overburdened communities to take on work that the state used to provide (clearing up alleys)?  Do such practices represent a ‘slippery slope’towards the commodification of sustainable activities?  , MacGregor recognised the danger, but her robust response also outlined the empowering character of the alley greening as a counter to paternal council approach to behaviour change.

An architectural dimension featured next with Lee Stickells on green buildings in the 1970s counterculture in Australia, and Tahl Kaminer on collective ownership of Israeli kibbutzim.  Amazing visuals in both cases.  These presentations promoted fascinating discussion about: land ownership (relevant also to the Scottish case) how to define ‘the collective’ as well as tricky questions of coloniser and colonised land and how/whether we could think of these examples in a decolonised perspective.  Another foundational question (did design affect collective practice or vice versa?) prompted broader discussions of the relationship between space and time, and structure and agency.

Session 4 explored micro-practices. These included community sustainability projects and the economic localisation of product and consumption they bring (presented by Wouter Spekkink);  an in-depth study of radically de-centralised, small-scale egg initiatives (Arunima Malik) and a study of community energy and its putative links to energy justice by Annalisa Savaresi.  The discussion included eggcellent questions and egg puns galore (Walker was the main culprit) but also a serious discussion of the key role of intermediators (in local markets and energy especially) and a critique of the ‘romantisation of the local’ (that is, the tendency to conflate ‘local’ with ‘sustainable’).

The last session stepped back again and allowed us to compare practice-based environmentalism with a more traditional type of environmental action (Joost de Moor). That in turn led us to explore the challenges for social movement scholars and how they might better understand relations between everyday life and social change (Luke Yates).  A rich discussion followed, including fundamental questions such as what is ‘political’ (both ‘troublemaking’ and ‘service provision’?), the processes of disengagement from national (or global) to the local, and a tendency to view ‘political’ narrowly. David labelled the latter as pure hogwash (delicately put), bemoaning the perception that ‘if you’re not protesting you’re not doing politics’. In short, media and researchers’ focus on ‘protest events’ and social movement organisations misses huge swathe of political activity, yet that neglect may in part be down to participants themselves:  people’s own political activity is invisible to them.

It was amazing how much was packed into one day. Moving forward, the group would like to synthesise the cases and findings discussed then take these further, exploring in more depth what are the implications for taking the material as a starting point of social change. An edited volume of papers is planned, along with a follow-up roundtable at an upcoming conference.

Elizabeth Bomberg  wishes to thank MSc student and workshop participant Laura Berry for notes on the workshop.

Note: this blog appears courtesy of Sydney Environment Institute

Elizabeth Bomberg is Professor of Environmental Politics at the University of Edinburgh, Deputy Director of the Global Environment & Society Academy, and Co-Director of the MSc programme in Global Environment Politics and Society.  Her primary teaching and research activity falls into the broad area of comparative environmental politics, with particular substantive emphasis on climate change, faith-based activism, shale politics and community energy.  Elizabeth’s recent publications have appeared in Environmental Politics,  Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning, Local Environment and Science of the Total Environment

Dr Annalisa Savaresi

Overview

Since the first establishment of the scientific evidence for climate change, little progress has been made in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to mitigate the problem. The pathways along which governments pass in gathering scientific evidence and negotiating climate change mitigation measures is tortuous and riddled with potholes. Assistance in this complex and often fraught process comes from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). For several years, this body has gathered evidence aimed to support the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in identifying the causes and projected impacts of climate change, as well as possible action to avert it. In this discussion we will explore how effective the interplay between these institutions has been, and what is the outlook for the future, in the aftermath of the historical adoption of the Paris Agreement at the 21^st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 21) held in December 2015.

The IPCC process

Since it published its first Assessment Report in 1995, the IPCC has been held up as a shining example of how a collective of scientists can inform policy debates affecting the global environment. The 4^th Assessment report even won the IPCC the Nobel Peace prize, jointly with Al Gore. The Assessment reports are commissioned by governments worldwide (hence the Intergovernmental Panel title) to cover climate change science, impacts, adaptation and vulnerability to climate change and climate mitigation. The 4^th Report whilst winning many plaudits, including the Peace prize, was held up to detailed scrutiny and criticism by some. The famous ‘climate-gate’ and ‘glazier-gate’ episodes, and personal attacks on the integrity of contributing scientists, left a stain on the IPCC’s reputation even though the supposed errors or dubious practices were largely subsequently disproven.

The hype and pressure put on the 2009 climate summit in Copenhagen raised awareness of the climate change debate considerably. The release of stolen emails from the Climatic Research Unit of the University of East Anglia in the run up to Copenhagen created huge media attention and provided ammunition for “sceptics” who caused mass doubt in the public about climate change science. Moreover, the IPCC fourth assessment report came under fire, notably for their claim, now shown to be wrong, that the Himalayan glaciers could melt by 2035. This corresponded with a large increase in “sceptics” speaking out against climate change in the media and on the web. This clearly had an effect on public opinion about the legitimacy of climate science and even the integrity of climate scientists. A poll conducted by the BBC between November 2009 and February 2010 showed a 10% increase in people who did not believe in climate change and a 6% increase in people who believe that it is happening, but only due to natural causes.

So, now that the 5^th Assessment report has just been released (see web address), nearly 20 years after the first report, perhaps it’s time to take stock of the IPCC process itself. To what extent has the IPCC really contributed to climate mitigation policy? Is it still fit for purpose, or are there alternative models that might better achieve the ultimate aim of addressing the climate change problem? The IPCC is likely to continue in some shape or form, but what this should be in supporting the drive to limit the climate change problem is not so clear.

Questions:

To what extent has the IPCC really contributed to addressing the problem of climate change?

Is the IPCC still fit for purpose, or are there alternative models that might better achieve its goals?

To what extent do governmental climate negotiations take account of scientific evidence?

Background reading:

http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf The IPCC Summary for Policy makers of Working Group 2 of the 5^th Assessment Report.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/8388485.stm a viewpoint from Prof Mike Hulme (UEA) and Dr. Jerome Ravetz (Innovation and Society (InSIS) at Oxford University)

http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100202/full/463596a.html IPCC flooded by criticism

IPCC: Cherish, tweak or Scrap? Nature 463, 730-732 11 February 2010 (attached)

IPCC Seeks ‘Broader Community Engagement’ to Correct Errors Science 12 February 2010 (attached)

http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/327/5967/780-a Stop Listening to Scientists?

International climate change negotiations

Ever since 1992, Parties to the UNFCCC have attempted to agree on measures to deal with GHG emissions in a way to prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system. According to the IPCC, such a level requires keeping the increase in global average temperature below 2° C, as compared with pre-industrial times. The UNFCCC, however, has struggled to keep the world within the limits indicated by the IPCC. The main instrument adopted to stabilize GHG concentrations under the Convention, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, imposed emission reduction targets only on developed countries. With growing emissions in developing countries, like China and India, however, scientists have warned that only reducing emissions in developed countries is not enough. Since 2007, therefore, UNFCCC Parties have been entangled in difficult negotiations on further measures to reduce global GHG emissions.

In December 2015, COP21 brought to a conclusion this long cycle of negotiations, by adopting a new climate treaty, the Paris Agreement. The agreement enshrines a reference to the 2°C goal identified by the IPCC, and even an aspirational reference to a 1,5°C goal. In order to achieve this outcome, the agreement requires all Parties, and not just developed ones, to make efforts to reduce their emissions and to submit information on the details. In doing so, the Paris Agreement consolidates a bottom-up pledge and review approach to climate change action. This approach entails that Parties unilaterally declare action they intend to undertake to reduce their emissions, to be subjected to an international review process, both at the individual and at the aggregate level. Implementation of the agreement will furthermore be assisted by an expert-based, facilitative compliance mechanism. And while it is already clear that Parties’ pledged action remain far from consistent with the 2° C goal, in theory at least there will be means to revise and increase the level of ambition.

Though not perfect, the Paris Agreement can be regarded as an expression of political will to tackle climate change in a way that brings together actors at all levels, in conformity with the all-encompassing nature of efforts required to address this epochal problem. In this regard, the Paris Agreement seemingly marks the emergence of a cooperative spirit that breaks away from the rancorous rhetoric that has long characterized international climate diplomacy. Whether the Paris Agreement will prove fit for purpose, and how it will be implemented, remains to be seen. In this regard, the adoption of the agreement is just the beginning of a new regulatory season in which States will flesh out the rules for its implementation. This new regulatory season will begin in 2016 and will reveal whether COP21 has indeed marked a new beginning. At least for the time being, however, the outlook for international climate governance is certainly the most hopeful it has been for quite some time.

Questions:

Is the Paris Agreement a success?

What are its main advantages and disadvantages?

What questions does it leave undressed?

Background reading:

Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Outcomes of the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris (2015) http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/cop-21-paris-summary-12-2015-final.pdf

Daniel Bodansky Reflections on the Paris Conference (2015)

http://opiniojuris.org/2015/12/15/reflections-on-the-paris-conference/

The Economist, The Paris Agreement Marks an Unprecedented Political Recognition of the Risks of Climate Change (2015) http://www.economist.com/news/international/21683990-paris-agreement-climate-change-talks

UK Committee on Climate Change, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly of the Paris Agreement (2015) https://www.theccc.org.uk/2015/12/21/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-of-the-paris-agreement/

David Victor, Why Paris Worked: A Different Approach to Climate Diplomacy (2015) http://teachingclimatelaw.org/compendium-of-commentary-on-the-paris-agreementcop21/

Dr Annalisa Savaresi

address the greatest challenge to ever face humankind, by adopting a new climate agreement.

The Paris agreement is expected to bring states out of the impasse that has long affected international climate governance. Eversince the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, states have attempted to agree on measures to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’ The international scientific body entrusted to assess climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), has indicated that such a level entails keeping below a 2° C increase in global annual average temperature compared with pre-industrial times.

Over twenty years after its adoption, however, the UNFCCC has struggled to keep the world within the limits indicated by the IPCC. In fact, global emissions of greenhouse gases have anything but diminished. So what went wrong?

States’ capacity to tackle climate change greatly differs. The main instrument adopted to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere under the UNFCCC, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, fundamentally acknowledged this gap. Building upon a static distinction between developed and developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol imposed binding emission reduction targets only on the first. With ever growing emissions in emerging economies, like China and India, however, the IPCC has repeatedly flagged that both developed and developing countries need to reduce their emissions.

To make matters worse, political will behind the Kyoto Protocol has faltered. After the elapse of the first commitment period in 2012, it has proven impossible to negotiate new targets for some important players, such as Japan, New Zealand and the Russian Federation, whereas others, like Canada and the US, are not parties to the Protocol at all. This situation has left the European Union and a few other developed countries, like Australia, Norway and Switzerland, in the uncomfortable position of being the sole UNFCCC parties with emission reduction targets.

With political will behind the Kyoto Protocol fading away, and in the hope to induce more parties to reduce their emissions, in 2007 UNFCCC parties embarked upon the difficult process of negotiating a new climate agreement. These negotiations potentially opened the way to a new geometry of commitments, based on a clean slate on differentiation between parties. The adoption of a legally binding agreement that includes emission reduction commitments for all parties, however, was but one of the possible outcomes opened up by the new negotiation scenario.

This negotiation process has suffered numerous setbacks and almost collapsed at COP15 in 2009 in Copenhagen. COP21 is meant to be the end of this long negotiation cycle. The road to Paris has nevertheless been laden with obstacles and, just a few weeks away from COP21, parties remain far from reaching any agreement.

Negotiations under the body entrusted to draft the text of the Paris agreement, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), have abundantly shown that states’ views on a host of fundamental issues still significantly diverge.

The veritable bone of contention has undoubtedly been the question of differentiation. States greatly differ on how to distribute the burdens concerning climate change mitigation, as well as the means to tackle it, by providing capacity-building, finance and technology to those in need.

On the one end of the spectrum, numerous developed and developing countries converge on the need to move beyond a ‘bifurcated approach’ to differentiation, even though not on how this ought to be done. On the other end, however, some developing countries vehemently oppose even considering moving beyond existing differentiation parameters. For example, while some ‘progressive’ developing countries have suggested encapsulating South-South cooperation in the Paris agreement, with willing developing countries assisting others in tackling climate change, others maintain that this remains exclusively the prerogative of developed countries.

Even more critically, states are struggling to find consensus on an overarching architecture to capture their ‘intended nationally determined contributions’ (INDCs) in the Paris agreement. INDCs are meant to provide information on what each country intends to do to tackle climate change post 2020. At the aggregate level, however, INDCs submitted ahead of COP21 remain far from a level of ambition consistent with the 2°C goal. Yet, ADP negotiations have failed to produce agreement on a process to review and adjust INDCs in order to enable the achievement of the goal.

Faced with this impasse, at the recently concluded session of the ADP, many evoked memories of the difficult negotiations that preceded COP15 in 2009. There are, admittedly, fundamental differences between the process that preceded COP15 and that preceding COP21.

Ahead of COP15 it was impossible to formally adopt a negotiating text for a new climate agreement. As a result, delegates had to work with a voluminous text of over 200 pages, based on an unofficial compilation of parties’ submissions. As no progress on text negotiations could be made, COP15 was haunted with rumours about a possible ‘Danish text’ that the presidency might table at the eleventh hour. The ensuing break-down in trust and mismanagement of the diplomatic process led COP15 to conclude with a non-inclusive, untransparent, last-minute political agreement, known as the Copenhagen Accord, which marked the low-point in the history of climate negotiations.

By comparison, ahead of COP21, the ADP was able to formally adopt a negotiating text. A quick glance at the 31 page draft agreement text emerged from the last session of the ADP seemingly suggests that the outlook for COP21 is more favourable than that for COP15.

Yet, appearances can be deceitful. While in fact formally negotiations are in a much better position than they were six years ago, politically the situation is just as hopeless. Work under the ADP has unequivocally shown that consensus on how to collectively tackle climate change remains distant. With a common vision hardly in sight, the work of the ADP has eloquently demonstrated the futility of technical negotiations, without prior political consensus on the core elements and features of the Paris agreement.

UNFCCC parties have learnt important lessons from the Copenhagen debacle. In Paris, they will do everything they can to avoid repeating the same mistakes. They now have but a handful of weeks to consider their options, including opportunities to engage at the political level at the pre-COP convening from 8-10 November in Paris. How they will manage to get to an agreement, and what this will consist of, remains to be seen. What seems already clear is that, while COP21 may avert diplomatic disaster, it may well once again fail to put the world on a path to avert dangerous anthropogenic climate change.

You can hear more from Dr Savaresi:

Wednesday Novemeber 11th: 18:00-19:00, What is COP21 all about? By Dr. Annalisa Savaresi. Lecture theatre 5, Appleton Tower

“For more information on COP21 and what the University of Edinburgh is doing about climate change, see Edinburgh Action for the Climate.”

Edinburgh Action for the Climate | The University of Edinburgh www.ed.ac.uk Harnessing expertise at the University of Edinburgh to influence and inform the global debate around climate change.

Dr Apolline Roger

In 1994, French beekeepers started to blow the whistle on the abnormal behaviour and disappearance of their bee colonies foraging on sunflowers and maize. Quickly, beekeepers considered “Gaucho”, a new neonicotinoid authorised the same year for the treatment of sunflower and maize seeds, as the prime suspect.

Were these two events linked by a causal relation or purely coincidental? Neonicotinoids are chemicals which attack the nervous system of all insects, and thus can have a lethal impact on bees. They were nonetheless authorised, under the condition that they are not to be used over a dose previously identified by the industry, and accepted by the regulator, as being non-lethal for bees. However, french beekeepers observations questioned the scientific grounds of this decision. Was the non-lethal dose correctly identified? Furthermore, do neonicotinoid insecticides have chronic sub-lethal effects on bees which were not foreseen when they were authorised?

In 2008, a perfect storm of dry and windy weather, inappropriate technology, and late sowing resulted in the production of a cloud of toxic neonicotinoid dust from insecticide treated maize seeds which severely poisoned 12,000 bee colonies in Germany.

Is this accident teaching us more than the existence of an acute lethal risk in dust clouds released when sowing seeds treated with neonicotinoids?

As always in times of uncertainty, science was called on to bring clarity. In the context of the growing mobilisation of beekeepers and civil society against neonicotinoids, public and business research flourished. The increased knowledge that resulted from this effort has, however, not offered a clear-cut answer to the political question: should public authorities act to protect bees from neonicotinoids?

 Answering this question requires an interdisciplinary reflection involving toxicology, ecotoxicoly, insectology, ecosystem science, biology, bee managers’ knowledge, sociology, as well as political and legal sciences. What follows does not pretend to develop this exhaustive approach, but rather seeks to give some reflections and facts to ground the interdisciplinary discussion between GESA master students. The questions we will explore are: (1) What is the societal impact of any restriction on the use of neonicotinoid? (2) What actions would effectively protect bees from neonicotinoids? (3) Are the actions taken so far appropriate?

1) What is the societal impact of restriction on the use of neonicotinoids?

 Neonicotinoids have several economic and health benefits, some which are confirmed and some which are claimed, all of which have to be taken into account when considering their restriction.

Economic benefits

Firstly, neonicotinoids are a profitable and massive market for EU industries. They are present in 120 countries and are the most used insecticide worldwide. The biggest producer of neonicotinoid insecticides are European industries: Bayer and BASF (Germany) and Syngenta (Switzerland). Imidracloprid, one of the several neonicotinoid subclasses, is the best selling insecticide worldwide. Bayer is one of its main producers, through products like “Gaucho”. Imidracloprid grossed 824 million dollars in 2010 for Bayer only.

Other economic benefits have to be added to these impressive revenues. At farm level, neonicotinoids require less work from farmers. Indeed, neonicotinoids’ main modus operandi relies on the treatment of the seed itself, even though they can also be sprayed or be used as soil treatment. The seeds are “coated” with the insecticide, which will therefore be diffused internally by the vascular systems of the growing plan. This treatment is holistic; the whole plant is impregnated. It is also systematic; all fields are treated, even when there is no identified threat. The farmer does not need to control the health of his field and to spray it during growth.

More generally, another advantage of this newest generation of insecticides is that they are very efficient in meeting their target. Even though the accounting of the benefits for agriculture is difficult to faithfully establish, the gains resulting from the protection of crops against pest have to be taken into account. However, the efficiency of neonicotinoids might be impaired in the long term by their systemic use. Indeed, their application on all seeds might speed up pest resistance. This issue might be worsened by the wide use of the insecticide, which is broadening with the gradual expiration of patents.

Health and environmental benefits?

Secondly, neonicotinoids are claimed to be safer than the insecticides they replace, such as the highly hazardous organochlorines and organophosphates. It comes first from the fact that they are supposed to target the nervous system of insects, which differs from the nervous system in mammals and other animals. They are therefore claimed to be safer for humans and the environment. In addition, seed-coating is seen as safer than spraying because it limits the environment and farmer’s exposure. The dust cloud accidents might however bring this claim into question.

Any decision to restrict the use of neonicotinoids therefore has to take into account the impact on the agrochemical industry, the economy and agriculture – in particular food production. In addition, it must consider the availability of a safer alternative. Indeed, situations where bee health would be obtained at the cost of human health or serious environmental destruction should be avoided. Restrictions are therefore complex decisions which require to balance essential and potentially contradictory interests. This is why they should be adopted only when there is a reasonable guarantee that they will effectively improves bee’s health.

 2) What actions would effectively protect bees from neonicotinoids?

As discussed, neonicotinoids were placed on the market in the mid-90s under the condition that they would be used only at doses identified as not lethal for bees. Should they be authorised but submitted to stricter conditions? Should they, or some of their uses, be entirely prohibited? To be able to answer these questions, a public authority needs to have information on the routes of exposure and on the risks associated with each of these routes. Whereas the former are quite well known, the latter are the target of intense controversy which is partially due, as we will see, to the inadequacy of the risk assessment framework used to identify the impact on bees.

Understanding bee populations decline: the routes of exposure to neonicotinoids

The first route of exposure is the sowing process of neonicotinoid coated seeds. As we saw, the manipulation of seeds when sowing can indeed create a cloud of dust containing high level of insecticides. The cloud can be lethal for honeybees flying through it. What should the reaction be to this known risk? Should seed coating be prohibited? Should the sowing equipment and process be improved to prevent the creation of a cloud? Should sowing of coated seeds be allowed only at times and in locations identified according to bees needs; for example by avoiding blooming period or proximity to plants which attract bees?

The other routes of exposure are all related to food gathering and consumption. Foragers bring contaminated substances back to the hive which will then be used to feed the whole colony (through the form of pollen, jelly, honey, etc.). Firstly, honeybees will be exposed to the low neonicotinoid doses present in nectar and pollen of plants grown from treated seeds or soils, for example sunflowers and maize. However, treated plants are not the only contaminated ones. Neonicotinoids are very persistent. Depending on climate conditions, they can remain in the soil for more than one year. The residues can therefore be absorbed by the succeeding non-treated crop, but also by weeds and wild flowers growing in the area. Secondly, other sources of food can be a source of exposure. Guttation drops, the “sudation” of plants like maize, can contain a high dose. Honeydew, the liquid secreted by some insects feeding on plant sap, might also expose honeybees to the chemical. Finally, high fructose corn syrup, used as winter feed, can also contain low doses of neonicotinoid.

Understanding neonicotinoids impact: the controversial low dose effects

The risk of exposure through food sources differs from the “cloud” accidents. Rather than an acute risk with quick lethal consequences, it involves a chronic exposure to low doses potentially causing cumulative, long-term and synergistic sub-lethal effects.

These effects are the point of contention which deeply divides or challenges scientists. Do neonicotinoids have low dose effects at all? Can low doses of neonicotinoids be linked to bee population decline and colony collapse disorder in particular?

Industry research tends to reject the responsibility of neonicotinoids and to emphasise the multifactorial causes. It also questions the relevance of laboratory studies (which found effects at low doses) and emphasise the positive results of their field studies. On the other hand, some public research found impacts of low doses on bees cognitive abilities (orientation, communication, foraging), in particular when looking at the combination of low doses from different sources, with deadly impacts for the hive. They also established a synergistic effect between neonicotinoids and certain fungicides, the combined exposure to which have adverse impact on bees (bees, like humans, can be jointly exposed to a chemical cocktail of more than 100 chemicals). Other studies showed a synergistic effect between neonicotinoids and bees pathogens or pests. Neonicotinoids are thought to weaken bee’s immune systems; therefore making them more vulnerable. They are also thought to reduce their capacity to produce the enzyme used to sterilise jelly; opening the hives to infection. Furthermore, bees affected by pests and pathogens need more energy, therefore they consume more food, leading to exposure to a higher dose of chemicals. However the results of these studies are denounced by the industry as not being ground in “sound science”. The core of the debate does not focus on the results per se, but on the methods used to obtain them. The knowledge on the bee/neonicotinoid relations is highly dependant on the risk assessment framework used to analyse the impact of the chemicals. The determination of this framework is therefore a highly strategic, politicised and lobbied process. It has resulted in the inadequacy of the methods used to deliver the scientific knowledge grounding the first authorizations of neonicotinoids.

The fuel of scientific controversy: an inadequate risk assessment framework

The scientific debate on bees is poisoned by an unsuitable and out-dated risk assessment framework which focuses on:

– the determination of the lethal dose rather than chronic, long-term and sub-lethal effects;

– on the identification of a causal link between one source/one effect rather than combined and synergistic effects;

Furthermore, the risk assessment framework was created for sprayed chemicals and is therefore not adapted to the specific risks of seed coating. These weaknesses, recognised by EU authorities, are resulting in ignorance on the long term and chronic effects of neonicotinoids, as well as on their cumulative and synergistic effects. The scientific debate is also made even more complex by the fact that field studies on bees & chemicals are extremely hard to organise in light of the foraging radiance. How can the substances to which the bees are exposed be precisely controled? How can it be ensured that the control group is not exposed to any chemicals? However, some new approaches, involving radio-frequency identification equipment attached to each forager, might help to obtain a real life vision of the multifactorial causes of bee populations decline.

For public authorities, however, these questions remain: How can they justify a restriction to economic freedom when faced with contradictory research? How do they justify such a restriction when the neonicotinoids are known as not being the sole cause and are not, for certain, the main cause of bee populations decline?

3) Are the actions taken so far appropriate?

Several principles are supposed to guide EU public authorities in their decision making process in risk regulation.

– Prevention principle: environmental actions should, as much as possible, prevent the risk rather than react to its consequences;

– Proportionality principle: the action should not be more restrictive than necessary to achieve the objective pursued;

-Precautionary principle: this principle provides a justification for public action in situations of scientific complexity, uncertainty and ignorance, where there is a potentially serious or irreversible threats to health and/or the environment. The risk cannot be purely hypothetical, public authorities have to justify their decision using an appropriate strength of scientific evidence.

EU institutions and Member States have to respect these principles. The US recognises the first two, but has a different approach to precaution than the EU. The variety of reactions to the bees/neonicotinoids controversies shows the complexity of the identification of the appropriate public action on the matter.

– The US has not adopted any restriction but is actively promoting research to further understand the multifactorial causes of bee populations decline.

– Germany recommended best practices and better information on sowing equipment and process in order to prevent the formation of toxic dust clouds. It also temporarily prohibited Clothianidin, a subclass of neonicotinoid.

– The EU (and therefore its Member States) has implemented, since 2013, a regulation (Regulation 485/2013) which prohibits the use of 3 neonicotinoids subclasses (Clothianidin, thiamethoxam, imidacloprid. Fipronil was recently added) as a seed or soil treatment for crops attractive to bees and for cereals (except winter cereals). For crops, foliar treatment (sprays) is authorised but only after flowering. For all the other plants, these 4 neonicotinoids can be used but their environmental impact has to be monitored. Only professional uses are authorised. Best practices have to be implemented for equipment and sowing processes.

Other neonicotinoids are not subjected to specific requirements.

Are these actions appropriate? Should they be more restrictive? Less restrictive? What are the alternatives?

Discussion questions:

• Should public authorities prohibit the usage of neonicotinoid insecticides despite their economic and societal benefits?
• Should public authorities prohibit the usage of neonicotinoid insecticides despite the contradictory scientific results related to their role in the bees population decline?
• Should public authorities prohibit the usage of neonicotinoid insecticides even though they are known as not being the sole cause of bees population decline?
• Are the actions taken so far appropriate? Should they be more restrictive? Less restrictive? What are the alternatives?

Indicative Readings:

• Maxim L., van der Sluijs J. “Seed-dressing systemic insecticides and honeybees” in EEA Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation 369. http://tinyurl.com/oaflhfg
• Kleinman D.L., Suryanarayanan S. “Dying bees and the social production of ignorance” Science, technology & human values 4 (2012) 492.
• Reynard B.W. “The producer-pollinator dilemma: neonicotinoids and honeybee colony collapse”, 2012 http://repository.upenn.edu/mes_capstones/50/

Dr Rebecca Marsland

We care about bees. Bees are unusual insects in that we humans find them so appealing. The publicity about the decline of bee populations has led to people donning bee costumes and lobbying parliaments about pesticides, the planting of wild meadows and the lobbing of wild flower ‘seed bombs’ into uncultivated ground. Urban beekeeping is fashionable, and bumblebee sightings are recorded on Twitter. Bees contribute to our economy through pollination: one third of the plants that we eat are insect pollinated. Bees are also important for other species. We do not care about other insects (pollinating or otherwise) in the same way as we do about bees, even though other insect species are also under threat. Perhaps we can see bees as the pandas of the insect world: they are charismatic and draw attention to problems that also endanger many other insects.

Why is it that the decline of bee populations has led to such an outpouring of human activity and emotion? The environmental philosopher Freya Matthews (2011) argues that this is because bees are essential to the human story: first because bees are a keystone species – without them the biosphere will decline, and the biosphere itself is a story we tell to give our place in the world meaning. Second because interconnections on which the biosphere depends can be seen in miniature in the beehive. Without the beehive, then, there is no meaning.

The reasons why bee populations are in decline are multiple. Despite the publicity about Colony Collapse Disorder (in which an entire colony of honeybees suddenly disappear from the hive), this is only the most recent of threats to bees’ ability to thrive over the last century. Over the last fifty years a range of pathogens have threatened bee health: the fungal infection Nosema, American Foulbrood, European Foulbrood, the Acarine tracheal mite, Kashmir bee virus, Israeli acute paralysis virus, black queen cell virus, deformed wing virus and Kagugo virus. Most significant of these pathogens is the varroa mite (aptly named Varroa destructor), a parasite of honeybees which reduces their ability to fend off a range of viruses, bacteria and fungal infections.

The varroa mite is a product of globalisation and mobility. These mites are natural parasites of the Asian honeybee (Apis cerana), which has adapted to the varroa mite over time. It spread to the European honeybee (Apis mellifera) in the 1950s and there are now few colonies where it cannot be found. Without treatment (using chemical miticides) European honeybee colonies will quickly die. Left to their own devices, European honeybees might develop a resistance to the varroa mite, but the centrality of these honeybees to human economies is such that we cannot afford to wait the twenty years that this might take (Spivak 2011: 35).

Modern agricultural practices are also a threat to bees. Whilst honeybees, bumblebees and wild bees are necessary to pollinate one third of the world’s crop species, our farming techniques are making it more difficult for them to survive. Pesticides, which are sprayed on crops to kill nuisance species, can also kill bees. When large areas of land are devoted to growing just one crop there is only forage for bees for short seasons. These seasons of plenty are followed by famine. This is exacerbated with the use of herbicides on agricultural land (and in public and private gardens) which deplete the wild flowers on which bees feed. Many bees are undernourished.

The pollination ‘services’ of bees also leads to stress, especially in the USA where migratory beekeepers are paid by farmers to transport truckloads of hives of honeybees to pollinate their crops. Hannah Nordhaus (2011) has described the most extreme example of this is in Central Valley in California. There, 800,000 acres of land are devoted to almond cultivation. It is said that 80% of the world’s almonds are cultivated in Central Valley, and that one third of all the honeybees in the USA are transported to Central Valley in January and February. The population density of bees is intense which exposes them to a wide range of diseases. The farmers treat the almond blossom with pesticides that can be harmful to bees. Finally, the bees have a longer working year. Normally bees are dormant over winter, but in order to pollinate the almond blossom, they must be woken up and fed sugar syrup and pollen to convince them that it is spring and to start working again. It is thought that this disruption of the annual rhythm could be causing harm to the superorganism of the hive. It is ironic that without the almond crops migratory beekeepers in the USA would not be able to make a living, because competition resulting from cheap imports of honey from China mean that they do not get a sufficient income from sales of honey alone.

Globalisation plays an important role in these threats to bee populations. When bee colonies die, beekeepers need to buy new honeybees, and so there is now a global business in honeybees which are transported around the world. Bumblebees are also global travellers. Glasshouse grown tomatoes are tastier if they are pollinated by bumblebees, and so across the world tomato farmers import commercially-reared bumblebees which are distributed by just a few companies. When bees travel, there is a risk that they carry with them pathogens: small hive beetle is the latest threat. Originating in South Africa, and now reported in the USA and Italy, British beekeepers say that without import restrictions, it is only a matter of time before it reaches the UK. Small hive beetle destroys honeybee comb, brood and stores, and currently there is very little that can be done to control it.

It is clear that human activity has made a large contribution to the decline of bees. So how can we humans protect them? Much of the scientific work being carried out to understand threats to bees is framed as if bees lived in one world (nature) and humans occupied another (culture). What would happen if we reframed some of the questions we asked about bees and included humans and other species in our thinking? What if we ‘look up and around, at least for a moment and were reminded that there are always other things in the vicinity [of bees], lots of them, and not just one.’ (Bingham 2006: 484) What would we see? All sorts of human beings come into the picture – beekeepers, in all their complexity (commercial beekeepers, urban beekeepers, hobby beekeepers, ‘natural’ beekeepers), policy makers in rural affairs and agriculture, town and parks planners, scientists, consumers (of honey and the foods pollinated by bees), gardeners, farmers, activists, chemical companies, the military (Kosek 2010), food marketing boards (the successful marketing of blueberries and almonds as superfoods has increased demand for honeybee pollination of these crops). What kinds of economies do these different humans create, and how do these economies effect the lives of bees? What contradictions lie in the use of chemicals – they are not only used by farmers, but also by beekeepers to kill varroa mites, and gardeners to reduce the amount of grass before planting wild flower meadows. How are our landscapes changing –might cities become wildlife trails, and farms the centre of industry?

Since the ancient Greeks, honeybee society has inspired our political philosophy and shaped the way we think about ourselves. Contemporary beekeeping practices have created the contemporary honeybee (Kosek 2010). What kinds of future worlds can we imagine for bees and humans, if we view forms of life as a collective, instead of occupying separate zones of nature and culture?

References cited

(* recommended for the reading group)

Bingham, N. (2006). “Bees, butterflies, and bacteria: biotechnology and the politics of nonhuman friendship.” Environment and Planning A 38: 483-498.

Kosek, J. (2010). “Ecologies of Empire: On the New Uses of the Honeybee.” Cultural Anthropology 25(4): 650-678.

*Mathews, F. (2011). “Planet Beehive.” Australian Humanities Review 50(May).

Nordhaus, H. (2011). The Beekeeper’s Lament. How one man and half a billion honey bees help feed America, Harper.

*Spivak, M., et al. (2011). “The plight of the bees.” Environmental Science and Technology 45(1): 34-38.

Dr Rebecca Marsland is a Lecturer in Social Anthropology at the University of Edinburgh. She currently holds an ESRC Transforming Social Science grant for a research project called Beelines which explores on human-bee relations. For more information about Beelines see: http://www.san.ed.ac.uk/research/grants_and_projects/current_projects/beelines

You can also follow Beelines on Twitter: @Beelines_ed