Catherine Barbour

Brazilians lack the British obsession with weather.  I often start conversations by commenting on how sunny it is, only to remember that every day is sunny in Brasilia.  Talking about water is perhaps the closest equivalent. Most Brazilians have an opinion on the subject – whether about the standing water that breeds zika- and dengue-spreading mosquitoes, regional droughts, or poor sanitation.

The subject hit the international headlines last year when Sao Paulo, a city of 20 million people, nearly ran out of water.  By the end of the dry season in September, the city’s main reservoir was running on dregs, or “volume morto”.  Water pressure was reduced and poor households frequently went hours without supply.  Thankfully, reserves have risen since then and the worst crisis was avoided. A strong El Nino has helped here (though not in southern states and nearby Uruguay and Paraguay, where 150,000 people were displaced by Christmas floods). Experts think Sao Paulo will probably need to use back-up supplies again this year nevertheless.

Cantareira Reservoir running low in 2015, photo by Evelson de Freitas, Estadão de São Paulo.

It seems odd that Brazil, which has more fresh water than any other country, should experience water shortages.  The problem is that resources are concentrated in the low-populated Amazon region.  The northeast has experienced years of devastating drought, and the southeast (where Sao Paulo and Rio are) has had a run of below-average rainfall. Pipes connect the regions but pumping water across distances equivalent to London-Istanbul is prohibitively expensive.

Climate change and environmental degradation are exacerbating the problem.  The dry northeast may see rainfall drop another 20%.  Sao Paulo and the southeast expect more rainfall, but intensely, punctuated by years of drought. Rainforest loss means less transpiration for the “flying rivers” that bring rain down south.  And illegal urban construction near rivers prevents rainfall from being absorbed.  Replanting trees near rivers would be a cheaper way to preserve rainfall than big infrastructure projects linking water basins, but demand for urban land is high, and laws aren’t always enforced.

Water scarcity also affects the economy through energy prices. Around three-quarters of Brazil’s electricity is generated by hydro.  Last year’s water shortage in the southeast was exacerbated by political decisions to run hydro (the cheapest form of generation) more intensively to keep electricity bills down before the November 2014 elections.  If there are further droughts because of climate change, Brazil’s hydro capacity may be reduced.  To maintain a low carbon power supply and meet its international climate commitments, Brazil will need to achieve all itsambitions to develop solar and wind power.  (Nuclear is theoretically possible but the only plant under development is stalled by corruption investigations).

This is a real pressure on Brazil’s emissions. Between 2011 and 2014, emissions from power generation increased 171% even though generation only increased by 11%.  The increase (admittedly from a very low base) was because of the shift to thermal.

Meanwhile, water and sanitation services are poor.  More than half of Brazilians don’t have their sewage collected.  A tiny percent of waste water is treated and returned into the water system, which means there’s more pressure on freshwater sources (and more energy spent pumping water around the network).  Access to piped water hasincreased significantly (from 78% to 94% of the population between 1990 and 2015), but there is insufficient investment in maintenance, and more than a third of water is lost in leakage.

The culture of water use is starting to change.  Paulistanos talked obsessively about water last year, sharing tips on how to use less.  There are some easy savings – the average Brazilian used 167 litres per day in 2014, compared 121l in Germany.  The culture of showering twice a day probably won’t stop though, unless pipes actually run dry – Brazilians are notoriously clean and often find foreigners smelly!

Source: Euromonitor, 2015

References

Destatis – Statistiches Bundesamt, ‘Use of drinking water remained constant in 2013’, webpage viewed 11 March 2016. https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/Environment/EnvironmentalSurveys/WaterSupplyIndustry/Current.html

Euromonitor 2014, Global Bathing Habits, Datagraphic Survey

Girardi, G 2015, ‘Site monitora em tempo real emissões de CO2 do setor elétrico no Brasil’, Estadão de São Paulo, 19 November

Hirtenstein, A 2015, ‘Brazil Seeks to Boost Solar Industry to Match Wind, BNDES Says’, Bloomberg, 28 October

IPCC 2014, Central and South America, chapter 27 in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 1499-1566.

Lada, B 2016, South America autumn forecast: Brazil drought to ease; Early rains to soak Colombia to Chile, Accuweather.com, 2 March, viewed 11 March 2016.  http://www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/2016-south-america-autumn-forecast-drought-eases-brazil-rain-colombia-to-chile/55603181

Ministerio de Minas e Energia 2014, Energia no Bloco dos Brics: Ano de Referencia 2013

OECD 2015, Environmental Performance Review: Brazil 2015, OECD Publishing, Paris

Time 2015, A Megacity Without Water: Sao Paulo’s drought, online video, 13 October, viewed 11 March 2016. http://time.com/4054262/drought-brazil-video/

WHO/UNICEF 2015, Water Supply Statistics.

The increase of percentage of renewable energy utilisation is based on both the increment of renewable energy production and the reduction of consumption as a whole. In particular, for solar energy, the target that Morocco has presented in its 2015 INDC refers to an increase in production of 14% until 2020.

Morocco has abundant wind and solar resources. According to a study by Dii (2013), wind, photovoltaic and concentrated solar thermal power industrial sectors could add up to 5% of GDP by 2030. However, as the same report suggests, this progress is dependent on the continuing financial support of the national and international organisations directly implicated in green energy investment. The use of more environmentally friendly sources of energy could halve the current  imports of fossil fuels by 2030, which currently represents 8% of the GDP, according to a study by Agénor et al (2015). The same study also indicated that fuel import costs as a proportion of the total value of exports have increased from 25% in 2003 to over 55% in 2012.

For Morocco, following the path of renewable energy is therefore a way to stay competitive and reducing their dependency on importations. This priority has been addressed by the National Government which developed “Solar Plan” as one of their seven base strategies in 2009. Solar Plan’s major objective if the creation of five major sites of solar energy production as well as “training, technical expertise, research and development, the promotion of an integrated solar industry and potentially the desalination of sea water”. (http://www.maroc.ma/en/content/solar-plan)

“Sunshine Map” (Source: http://masen.org.ma/index.php?Id=15&lang=en#/_)

As part of Solar Plan activties, in February 2016 a new milestone is reached with the inauguration of Ouarzazate Concentrated Solar Power with a capacity of 140 MW of power generation. (http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P122028/ma-ouarzazate-concentrated-solar-power?lang=en&tab=results)

The video bellow provides additional information on Ouarzazate Concentrated Solar Power, which is the first of the five sites of energy production to be inaugurated.

In 2010, the road to solar energy in Morocco was punctuated by the official beginning of Medgrid, which is a consortium of 21 industrial groups set up to promote the development of electricity networks in the Mediterranean basin with the purpose of exporting renewable energy to Europe.(http://pulse.edf.com/en/medgrid-mediterranean-electricity-network). The video bellow is an interview with Jean Kowal, Deputy Director General of Medgrid.

Since the climatic conditions of northern african countries allow for a cheaper solar energy production than in other countries in Europe, Medgrid can be an answer for both southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean in terms of clean energy. (http://pulse.edf.com/en/medgrid-mediterranean-electricity-network)

In practice, there is already in place a link for the transfer of 1,400 MW between Morocco and Spain using submarine cables along the Strait of Gibraltar, and the plan is to increase it by 4,000 MW. (http://blogs.worldbank.org/energy/renewable-energy-export-import-win-win-eu-and-north-africa) The transfer of energy between Morocco and the Iberian Energy market is already in place, and relies on the different peak times of production and demand.

For Morocco, solar energy is therefore not only a way to reduce the dependency of the importation of commodities for energy production, but also a potential source of revenue by exporting it to the countries in the northern shore of the mediterranean. In practice, the project involves major investment in not only solar production centres but also on electricity highways across continents.

Morocco seems to be looking at its own resources to feed growing demands in terms of energy. In a country particularly vulnerable to climate change such as Morocco but with strong potential for solar and wind energy production, taking the green energy road is the best way to face the future.

References

Agénor, P.-R., El Aynaoui, K. 2015. Morocco: Growth Strategy for 2025 in an Evolving International Environment. OCP Policy Center. Rabat.

Dii. 2013. Les énergies renouvelables au Maroc : Un secteur porteur de croissance et d’emplois. Report presented in Casablanca, 22 May.

EDF Pulse Official Webpage. Available in http://pulse.edf.com/en

Morocco’s INDC. 2015. Online. Available inhttp://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Morocco/1/Morocco%20INDC%20submitted%20to%20UNFCCC%20-%205%20june%202015.pdf

Morocco’s Official Government Webpage. Available inhttp://www.maroc.ma/en

World Bank official webpage. Available in http://www.worldbank.org

If, as according to superstition, wood provides reassurance when touched, then the Climate Change Act 2008 performs the same consoling function when it comes to Brexit and UK climate policy. “We won’t be serious about tackling climate change without the guiding hand of the EU”, people may fret, only to contemplate the solid legal fact of the Act and find their fears subsiding. And yes it’s true that the Act, regardless of EU membership status, commits the country to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050. But however ambitious this seems, the reassurance offered looks less and less solid the longer and harder you look.

For a start, although the 2050 goal seems to lock Britain in long-term, in the global context of achieving net zero emissions some time before 2100, it leaves fifty years unaccounted for. As Charlotte Burns of the University of York points out, one justification for the stringent carbon budgets in the Act was that the UK would be required to meet them anyway under EU law. Out of the EU, and outside its obligations, it follows that carbon legislation for post-2050 may not be so tough. Then there’s the possibility we don’t adhere to the Act in the period to 2050. Even within the EU there are concerns about whether we will meet our carbon budgets. Out of the EU this lack of commitment could transform into something much worse: a watering down of the Act or even, as UKIPand some Tories advocate, repeal.

It’s worth remembering too that the UK’s climate change mitigation efforts aren’t just determined by our own Act: renewables targets are set by European directive. Under theRenewables Directive, 15% of all energy consumed in the UK must come from renewable sources by 2020 – and another policy commits the the EU as awhole to meeting 27% of final energy consumption through renewables by 2030. Although support for renewables is implicit in the Climate Change Act, EU legislation makes it explicit and clearly signposts the direction of travel for the industry. Without it, Britain’s green industry would have only the mixed messages of the UK government, investor confidence would be further undermined and a question mark placed and over its future.

The position of renewables could also suffer because of Brexit’s implications for energy security. Decreased interconnectivity of supply, reduced harmonisation of energy markets and less investment in the UK by multinational companies could all be consequences of leaving according to a House of Commons briefing paper. The resulting increase in energy insecurity would “increase focus on all aspects of UK generation” it is thought. In other words it may become more important to generate enough electricity by whatever means – including via gas and coal – than to meet renewables goals.

Brexit also means participation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme would no longer be compulsory. The 1,000 or so UK installations which currently take part could in theory continue to do so under a new voluntary agreement, but it is equally possible they will simply exploit a new freedom to emit once outside the cap and trade scheme.

Beyond all this, of course, is the fact that global warming is (no surprises here) a global problem. It’s important for the UK, as the 15^th largest emitter, to cut emissions, but we also need other countries to do the same. In the past Britain has challenged the EU to up the emission-cuts ante, pushing back the horizon of ambition. Outside the EU there is little chance of this or indeed of exerting any influence on the rest of the continent’s mitigation policy. Yes the UNFCCC offers a framework for the UK to influence global climate goals, but given the number of competing voices and the power of some of the players, it is unlikely a lone actor would wield much, if any, influence.

Step aside from mitigation and you run into yet more problems. EU funding to tackle natural disasters caused by climate change? Not if you’re outside the union. Funding for climate research? Not as muchaccording to Julia Sligo of the Met Office, who said Brexit would diminish the quality of their climate models and their climate advice.

Taking the above together, it’s difficult not to conclude that leaving reduces the likelihood of the UK making its rightful contribution to the cuts needed to avoid dangerous warming. It also lessens our ability to study and adapt to climate change – and if, as seems unlikely at the moment, the UK wants to push others to cut deeper, leaving the EU diminishes our ability to do so.

Still, forget all that if you like and look on the bright side. Leave or stay, there’s always the Climate Change Act to fall back on. That’s not going anywhere. (Touch wood.)

 

Full references for hard copy sources:

Burns, C. (2013) The Implications for UK Environmental Policy of a Vote to Exit the EU. Friends of The Earth.

Miller, V. (2016) Exiting the EU: impact in key UK policy areas. Briefing Paper Number 07213, House of Commons Library.