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<\/a>Maternity Mark in Japan<\/p><\/div>\n
Summary of the paper:<\/strong><\/p>\n One\u2019s decision to have children, or to become a parent, has negative environmental impact.\u00a0 The birthing of children results in an increase in the global population, and ultimately in additional ecological burdens.\u00a0 Admitting this, Liz asks: Do individuals, at least in the affluent class, have a moral duty to attempt to mitigate the environmental impact of having children\/ becoming a parent?\u00a0 Her answer is that they do.\u00a0 But Liz also argues that this does not mean individuals have a duty to have no (biological) child or not to become a (biological) parent.<\/p>\n Typically, the argument for the duty to have no child takes the following steps:<\/p>\n \u2018P1. As affluent individuals, we have an individual moral duty to keep our own carbon footprint as low as reasonably possible\u2019; \u2018P2. Having a child will, for most of us, cause an increase in carbon emissions greater than anything else we do in our individual lives\u2019; therefore, \u2018Conclusion: We have an individual moral duty not to have children\u2019.<\/p>\n However, P1 and P2 do not automatically lead to Conclusion. \u00a0Conclusion holds if the following implicit premise is accepted: \u2018IP1: Procreation and overconsumption are morally equivalent\u2019.<\/p>\n To demonstrate that Conclusion in this argument does not necessarily hold, Liz argues that IP1 cannot be defended against at least the following line of objection.\u00a0 There are valuable and non-substitutable elements in having biological children or becoming a biological parent (i.e. procreation) which overconsumption does not have.\u00a0 Such elements include \u2018the experienced bond of pregnancy and breastfeeding, the awareness of the genetic link and tracing of family traits and resemblances, [and] the sense of immortality\u2019.\u00a0 So, the opportunity to have biological children, or to become a biological parent, can be seen either as a fundamental human interest or as an activity integral to one\u2019s plan of life or conception of the good.\u00a0 Meanwhile, overconsumption cannot be seen as either of these.\u00a0 Therefore, procreation and overconsumption are not morally equivalent. \u00a0In short, IP1 does not hold.\u00a0 And neither does Conclusion.<\/p>\n Based on this objection, Liz argues that individuals are entitled to retain the opportunity to have biological children or to become a biological parent.\u00a0 But Liz also argues that there is a moral duty which individuals should consider when enjoying that opportunity: the negative duty not to contribute to ecological unsustainability.\u00a0 In the context of procreation, this duty means the duty to mitigate the environmental impact of having children\/ becoming a parent.\u00a0 One can both enjoy the opportunity to have children and fulfil the duty to mitigate the environmental impact of having children, by doing three things: (a) having a small family, (b) raising children to become ecologically conscious citizens, and (c) ensuring a political situation which makes it possible and less costly for children to pursue sustainable (e.g. carbon neutral) lifestyles.<\/p>\n Duty (b) may face a challenge: raising children to have a particular conception of the good (e.g. a particular moral view about ecological unsustainability) may be incompatible with children\u2019s capacity of autonomy (the power to create and live by one\u2019s own conception of the good).\u00a0 Liz\u2019s response to this challenge is that one can avoid such a problem by taking an appropriate approach to education.\u00a0 If a parent attempted to make her child unquestionably accept a particular moral view, then the child\u2019s autonomy would be undermined.\u00a0 Meanwhile, if the child were encouraged, through dialogue with the parent, to reflect upon the view in question, then the child\u2019s capacity of autonomy would be enhanced.\u00a0 Education through dialogue would cultivate children\u2019s rational capacity to think, revise one\u2019s views, and critically engage with various perspectives.<\/p>\n Finally, Liz addresses an objection to her moderate view \u2013 the view that, even if individuals are entitled to have children, they also have a moral duty to attempt to mitigate the environmental impact of having children.\u00a0 The objection is that, while the birthing of children increases ecological disbenefits, it also brings benefits that offset those disbenefits.\u00a0 There are two kinds of benefit that the birthing of children may bring.\u00a0 First, supposing that those children will enjoy a decent life, the birthing of those children increases the level of aggregate human happiness (utility).\u00a0 Second, the birthing of children brings social benefits, creating a new generation of the workforce that supports parents\u2019 well-being in the future (e.g. doctors, nurses, care workers, pension-payers, etc.).\u00a0 Liz gives three responses.\u00a0 First, what morally matters in her argument is not a pure utilitarian consideration; other considerations (e.g. a deontological one) matter as well.\u00a0 Second, even if the birthing of children brings social benefits, it can still be argued that individuals are both<\/em> entitled to give birth to children who will benefit them in the future and<\/em> required to compensate for the negative impact the birthing has upon the global environment.\u00a0 And third, based on some empirical evidence, one can question the assumption that having children brings a positive social contribution that will offset the ecological disbenefits of having children.<\/p>\n Discussion:<\/strong><\/p>\n Our discussion covered interesting questions including, but not limited to, the following.\u00a0 Could we not devise alternative institutions which would no longer require us to make large individual ecological footprints?\u00a0 If we could, is there any substitutability between the small-family duty and the institutional-change duty? \u00a0(Would the performance of the latter duty make the performance of the former duty redundant?)\u00a0 In which activity does a person have a fundamental human interest, \u2018procreation\u2019 or \u2018parenting\u2019?\u00a0 Is a person\u2019s emotional drive for having a biological child a socially constructed one, or a biological one?\u00a0 (Does a person want a biological child because people around him\/her have biological children?\u00a0 Or is it because a person has the biological capacity to procreate?)\u00a0 If we are concerned about the environmental impact of procreation and consequent population growth, should we not discuss procreation and population growth in underdeveloped societies, where the population is actually growing, and not only those in affluent societies?\u00a0 Liz\u2019s answers to these questions were clear and convincing.\u00a0 The paper will be a thought-provoking contribution to the relevant debate.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n