{"id":1113,"date":"2018-05-18T09:43:13","date_gmt":"2018-05-18T09:43:13","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk\/jwi\/?p=1113"},"modified":"2018-05-18T09:50:40","modified_gmt":"2018-05-18T09:50:40","slug":"kieran-oberman-killing-and-rescuing-the-case-for-revising-necessity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk\/jwi\/2018\/05\/18\/kieran-oberman-killing-and-rescuing-the-case-for-revising-necessity\/","title":{"rendered":"Kieran Oberman \u2013 Killing and Rescuing: The Case for Revising Necessity"},"content":{"rendered":"

PTRG: 16 May 2018\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Killing is justifiable if it is necessary.\u00a0 If killing is unnecessary, it is unjustifiable and therefore wrong.\u00a0 Then, a question is: When is killing necessary or unnecessary?\u00a0 Oberman addresses this question in relation to the act of other-defence: When is killing someone necessary or unnecessary to defend others against death?\u00a0<\/p>\n

A standard answer is this: killing a person is necessary if there is no alternative way to save others from death besides killing that person, whereas killing is unnecessary if there is such an alternative.\u00a0 However, in fact, in some cases, whether killing someone is necessary or unnecessary to save others is more difficult to answer than we normally think.\u00a0 Compare the following two cases:<\/p>\n

Case (A): There is Attacker.\u00a0 Attacker will kill Victim.\u00a0 You can save Victim now by killing Attacker.\u00a0 But you can also save Victim by waiting a few minutes until Attacker turns her back.<\/p>\n

Oberman calls this a \u2018standard case\u2019 because the conclusion is the same no matter which of the views to be discussed below is adopted: killing Attacker is unnecessary in this case.<\/p>\n

Case (B): There is Attacker.\u00a0 Attacker will kill Victim.\u00a0 You can save Victim only by killing Attacker.\u00a0 But there is also Hiker bitten by a snake.\u00a0 You can save Hiker only by driving her to hospital immediately.\u00a0 You can save only one of them.<\/p>\n

Oberman calls this a \u2018problem case\u2019 because whether killing Attacker is necessary or unnecessary in this case depends upon which of the views to be discussed below is adopted.<\/p>\n

In case (A), it seems clear that killing Attacker is unnecessary to save Victim from death.\u00a0 You could wait a few minutes.\u00a0 But in case (B), whether killing Attacker is necessary or unnecessary depends upon which of the following views we adopt.\u00a0 On the standard view, killing Attacker is necessary because there is no alternative way to save the specific individual \u2013 Victim \u2013 from the specific threat \u2013 the one posed by Attacker \u2013 other than killing Attacker.\u00a0 But Oberman defends a different view: what he calls the \u2018revisionary view\u2019 of necessity.\u00a0 On this view, the just end for other-defensive killing is \u2018saving a<\/em> life\u2019, not \u2018saving a specific person\u2019s life (e.g. Victim\u2019s life)\u2019.\u00a0 You could achieve this end by saving Hiker.\u00a0 Therefore, there is an alternative to killing Attacker (i.e. saving Hiker).\u00a0 And therefore, killing Attacker is unnecessary.<\/p>\n

In short, there are two different views regarding the necessity of killing.\u00a0 On the standard view, the just end for other-defensive killing is saving a specific person\u2019s life from a specific threat.\u00a0 Therefore, on this view, killing is unnecessary if there is an alternative that the rescuer can choose to save that specific person from that specific threat.\u00a0 Meanwhile, on the revisionary view, the just end for other-defensive killing is saving a life from a threat, not saving a specific person\u2019s life from a specific threat.\u00a0 Therefore, on this view, killing is unnecessary if there is an alternative that the rescuer can choose to save a specific person from a different threat, or to save a different person from a different threat.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

1. What is a just end for other-defensive killing?<\/strong><\/p>\n

To defend the revisionary view, Oberman first identifies the end for other-defensive killing that can be considered just.\u00a0 The choice is among (a) \u2018saving a specific person\u2019s life\u2019, (b) \u2018saving a specific person\u2019s life immediately\u2019, and (c) \u2018saving a life\u2019.<\/p>\n

According to Oberman, it is inappropriate to choose (b).\u00a0 Consider case (A) above again. \u00a0In that case, the rescuer could either kill Attacker to save Victim now or wait a few minutes to save Victim later.\u00a0 A just end for other-defensive killing must be the one that is, from the rescuer\u2019s standpoint, so important that it is worth killing for.\u00a0 Is \u2018saving Victim now\u2019 in case (A) worth killing Attacker for?\u00a0 The answer is \u2018No\u2019 because you could wait a few minutes to save Victim later.<\/p>\n

The choice is, then, between (a) and (c).\u00a0 Consider case (B) above.\u00a0 In that case, should the rescuer prioritise Victim\u2019s life over Hiker\u2019s?\u00a0 The rescuer may have a reason to prioritise Victim\u2019s life if she has a special connection with the latter (e.g. if Victim is the rescuer\u2019s daughter, etc.).\u00a0 But if Victim and Hiker are both strangers to the rescuer, there is no reason for the rescuer to prioritise one over the other.\u00a0 Both deserve equal respect in the rescuer\u2019s moral judgement.<\/p>\n

Taking these points as well as several exemplary cases into consideration, Oberman argues that it is (c) \u2018saving a life\u2019 that can be regarded as the just end for other-defensive killing.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

2. Is \u2018saving Victim from the specific threat posed by Attacker<\/em>\u2019 a just end for defensive killing?<\/strong><\/p>\n

On the standard view, the just end for other-defensive killing is (a) saving a specific person (e.g. Victim) (b) from the specific threat that the person is subject to (e.g. the one posed by Attacker).\u00a0 We have already seen why (a) is untenable: the just end for other-defensive killing is not \u2018saving a specific person\u2019s life\u2019 but \u2018saving a<\/em> life\u2019.\u00a0 What about (b)?\u00a0 Oberman argues that there is a case that indicates (b) is also untenable. \u00a0Consider the following case:<\/p>\n

Victim has had a stroke that affects the left side of her body.\u00a0 She will be paralysed on her left side unless you inject her with chemical L immediately.\u00a0 You are about to inject L when Attacker comes in to inject R \u2013 another chemical that will paralyse Victim on her right side.\u00a0 You can prevent Attacker\u2019s injection of R only by killing her.\u00a0 Now, suppose you have only two options: you can either inject L now, allowing Attacker to inject R, or prevent Attacker\u2019s injection of R now, giving up your injection of L.\u00a0 If you take the first option, Victim\u2019s left side will be saved from paralysis by your injection of L. \u00a0But her right side will be paralysed by Attacker\u2019s injection of R.\u00a0 Meanwhile, if you take the second option, Victim\u2019s right side will not be paralysed, because the stroke has no effect upon that side, and because Attacker is killed and prevented from injecting R.\u00a0 But her left side will be paralysed due to the stroke.<\/p>\n

On the standard view, killing Attacker in this case is necessary to save Victim from the specific threat posed by Attacker \u2013 the injection of R which will paralyse the right side of her body.\u00a0 There is no way to prevent that threat besides killing Attacker.\u00a0 However, saving Victim from being paralysed on her right side<\/em> is not what we really care about \u2013 in particular, if Victim does not care whichever side will be paralysed.\u00a0 The just end for defensive killing in this case is broader than that: what we really care about is saving Victim from being paralysed on one half of her body<\/em>.\u00a0 The rescuer can achieve this end without killing Attacker if she chooses the first option; so, killing Attacker in this case is unnecessary.\u00a0 This also indicates that, in certain cases, we can achieve a just end without preventing the specific threat posed by Attacker.\u00a0 Therefore, (b) fails.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

3. Is there any plausible argument for the standard view of necessity?<\/strong><\/p>\n

So far, Oberman has presented a case for the revisionary view of necessity.\u00a0 But is there any plausible case for the standard view?\u00a0 Oberman addresses several lines of argument for the standard view and concludes that none of these is persuasive.\u00a0 For example, he refutes the following argument in the following way.<\/p>\n

(1) It is more important to save a life from wrongful killing (e.g. Victim\u2019s life) than it is to save a life from natural misfortune (e.g. Hiker\u2019s).<\/p>\n

(2) If premise (1) is true, then \u2018saving a life from wrongful killing\u2019 can be considered to be a distinct end that justifies defensive killing, separate from \u2018saving a life from natural misfortune\u2019.<\/p>\n

(3) In problem cases like case (B) above, there is no way to save a life from wrongful killing other than defensive killing.<\/p>\n

Premises (2) and (3) together lead to Conclusion: In problem cases, killing is necessary.<\/p>\n

In response, Oberman argues that, even if premise (1) is true, it does not necessarily support premise (2). \u00a0There are at least two ways to defend premise (1).\u00a0 First, wrongful killing may be bad for Attacker.\u00a0 It may make Attacker\u2019s life worse.\u00a0 Second, wrongful killing may be bad for Victim.\u00a0 It not only deprives Victim of her life, but may also undermine her honour. \u00a0However, premise (1) does not necessarily support premise (2).\u00a0 \u2018Saving a life from wrongful killing\u2019 can be more important than \u2018saving a life from natural misfortune\u2019; but it can be important without being so important as to justify defensive killing.\u00a0 Oberman writes: \u2018Only things that are extremely valuable will be worth killing for\u2019.<\/p>\n

The question, then, is: Is \u2018saving a life from wrongful killing\u2019 so important as to justify defensive killing?\u00a0 Let\u2019s consider the first argument first.\u00a0 Wrongful killing may be bad for Attacker; so, preventing it (by saving Victim\u2019s life from it) may be important.\u00a0 If so, it may make Attacker better off if the rescuer punches or kicks Attacker to prevent her from killing Victim.\u00a0 However, it seems hard to say that Attacker would be better off if she were preventatively killed.\u00a0 Therefore, \u2018saving a life from wrongful killing\u2019 is not so important as to justify defensive killing by the rescuer.<\/p>\n

Let\u2019s consider the second argument.\u00a0 Wrongful killing may be bad in the light of Victim\u2019s honour.\u00a0 Can this be a reason to justify defensive killing by the rescuer?\u00a0 \u2018Perhaps\u2019, Oberman writes, \u2018honour is something that a victim can only defend for herself; others cannot defend it for her\u2019. \u00a0This is because defending one\u2019s honour is about asserting oneself as an active agent, as opposed to a passive object.\u00a0 The beneficiaries of other-defence are not asserting their agency (but, instead, displaying their dependence upon others for survival).\u00a0 If so, defensive killing by the rescuer does not serve Victim\u2019s honour.\u00a0 Also, perhaps, \u2018Victim has already resisted Attacker with considerable force. \u00a0Although Victim will die, no one will doubt she has asserted herself as an agent\u2019.\u00a0 Or, perhaps, Victim and everyone who matters to her believe that Victim should not be treated in the way Attacker treats her; that the way Attacker treats Victim undermines Victim\u2019s honour irrespective of whether she fights back or not.\u00a0 \u2018She knows that and everyone who matters knows that. \u00a0She has nothing to prove\u2019.\u00a0 If so, defensive killing by the rescuer is unnecessary in the light of Victim\u2019s honour.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

4. Is the revisionary view of necessity overly demanding?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The revisionary view requires that the rescuer should not kill if there is an alternative to killing that rescues a life.\u00a0 But what if choosing such an alternative is too demanding either because it is too costly or because it conflicts with one\u2019s professional duty?<\/p>\n

If saving lives without killing is too costly, the rescuer is permitted to see it as an irrelevant alternative.\u00a0 She is permitted to kill in order to save lives.\u00a0 But is it too costly to save lives without killing?\u00a0 Empirically, Oberman argues, it isn\u2019t.\u00a0 Oberman indicates this point by comparing the cost of anti-poverty with the cost of military intervention intended to save lives:<\/p>\n

\u2018One does not have to scour the world to save people to rescue; one can donate to anti-poverty programs at a click of a button. \u00a0The most cost effective anti-poverty programs can save lives from poverty for as little as $3000 to $4000. \u00a0Killing to save people, by contrast, is often dangerous (since it involves confronting aggressors) and can be financially costly as well (since it can require weapons and other equipment). \u00a0There is no reason, then, to think that cost can save the standard view.\u2019<\/p>\n

Also, one\u2019s professional duty is a relevant consideration too.\u00a0 Some professionals, such as soldiers and the police, may have no relevant alternative to killing because they have duties to perform the roles they have assumed.\u00a0 In this case, their other-defensive killing can be seen as necessary killing.\u00a0 (But we should also note that one could have chosen a career that does not require one to kill to save lives in the first place.)<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

5. What if one can save both Victim and Hiker? <\/strong><\/p>\n

Consider a variation of case (B) above:<\/p>\n

There is Attacker.\u00a0 Attacker will kill Victim.\u00a0 You can save Victim only by killing Attacker.\u00a0 There is also Hiker bitten by a snake.\u00a0 You can save Hiker only by driving her to hospital.\u00a0 You can easily save both.<\/p>\n

In this case, killing Attacker is necessary in so far as you will actually<\/em> save both.\u00a0 If you will save Victim by killing Attacker, but will not save Hiker, then killing Attacker is unnecessary.\u00a0 If you will save both, no matter which you will save first, then killing Attacker is necessary.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

6. When is killing necessary?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Finally, Oberman notes that the revisionary view should not be confused with pacifism.\u00a0 He identifies 5 types of case in which, even on the revisionary view, it would be necessary to kill Attacker:<\/p>\n

\u20181. Partiality. \u00a0The rescuer may have strong reason to be partial to the victim over other people the rescuer could rescue.<\/p>\n

2. Impartial necessity. Even from an impartial standpoint, there is no equivalent threat that could be prevented without killing.<\/p>\n

3. Costs. Pursuing alternatives would be so costly to the rescuer that it is permissible for the rescuer to disregard them.<\/p>\n

4. Duties. The rescuer has duties that prevent her pursuing alternatives.<\/p>\n

5. Reasons beside defence. There are reasons to kill that are not reasons of defence, for instance prevention, deterrence or retribution.\u2019<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

7. Discussion<\/strong><\/p>\n

Our discussion covered questions on: disanalogies that may complicate the application of Oberman\u2019s argument to the practical issues Oberman also discusses in the paper (e.g. the choice between anti-poverty programmes and military interventions to save lives); empirical evidence that may question whether military interventions in the real world are actually intended to \u2018save lives\u2019; justifiability v. permissibility of killing (permissible<\/em> killing and justifiable<\/em> killing may come apart); and many more.\u00a0 Oberman\u2019s paper and his responses were full of interesting points supported by analytical rigour.\u00a0 The paper will be a great contribution to the relevant literature, and to the way we think about the means to save people\u2019s lives.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Written by Yuki Iwaki<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

****<\/p>\n

Kieran Oberman<\/a> is Lecturer in Politics at Edinburgh University.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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