{"id":711,"date":"2016-06-15T23:41:15","date_gmt":"2016-06-15T23:41:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk\/jwi\/?p=711"},"modified":"2016-11-22T16:34:19","modified_gmt":"2016-11-22T16:34:19","slug":"arash-abizadeh-hobbess-theory-of-the-good-felicity-by-anticipatory-pleasure","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk\/jwi\/2016\/06\/15\/arash-abizadeh-hobbess-theory-of-the-good-felicity-by-anticipatory-pleasure\/","title":{"rendered":"Arash Abizadeh \u2013 Hobbes\u2019s Theory of the Good: Felicity by Anticipatory Pleasure"},"content":{"rendered":"

Political Theory Research Group<\/a> seminar series: 15 Jun 2016<\/p>\n

\"PTRG<\/a><\/p>\n

I<\/p>\n

Ancient Greek ethicists assumed that human beings have a single overarching supreme good, which is eudaimonia<\/em>, or \u2018happiness\u2019, and that this is the final end of every human action.\u00a0 On the Epicurean view, eudaimonia<\/em>, or in Latin felicitas<\/em>, or in English \u2018felicity\u2019, consists in the state of being free from pain and a life of pleasure.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

For Hobbes, as for Epicurean thinkers, felicity consists in a life of pleasure and the absence of pain.\u00a0 But, Arash explained, Hobbes saw felicity not as the single final good that all human actions are or should be (intentionally) aimed at, but as the by-products that human beings achieve typically when pursuing other aims.\u00a0 Meanwhile, Arash continued, this does not mean that Hobbes rejected the idea that felicity is an overarching supreme good \u2013 a summum bonum<\/em> \u2013 that gives coherence to a valuable life.\u00a0 This is one of the two respects in which Hobbes\u2019s theory of the good diverges from the Epicurean counterpart.<\/p>\n

The second respect in which Hobbes\u2019s theory can be seen as unique is that he rejected the static<\/em> view of felicity: the view that felicity is the pleasurable state of being free from pain, or the state of tranquillity or rest that marks the termination of a person\u2019s desires.\u00a0 Rather, according to Arash, Hobbes took felicity as an ongoing motion<\/em> from pleasure to pleasure.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

II<\/p>\n

Arash constructed this interpretation of Hobbes\u2019s theory of the good by carefully analysing his works and drawing out his answers to four separate, but related, questions. \u00a0(1) What is the property of goodness? \u00a0(2) What makes something good, or in virtue of what does something have or acquire the property of goodness? \u00a0(3) What causes agents to see something as good and\/or to call it \u2018good\u2019? \u00a0And (4) what does the term \u2018good\u2019 mean?\u00a0 Questions (1) and (2) concern Hobbes\u2019s metaphysical theory of the good; meanwhile, question (3) concerns what Hobbes saw as the customary use of the term \u2018good\u2019.\u00a0 To understand his answers to these questions is critical to understanding his answer to question (4), which concerns his scientifically reformulated, or the \u2018apt\u2019, meaning of \u2018good\u2019.<\/p>\n

Hobbes\u2019s answer to question (1), Arash explained, is that the property of goodness is relational<\/em>: something is good because it is good for<\/em> the well-being, or felicity, of some particular individual.\u00a0 (A common good is good for that of many; a universal good is good for that of everyone.)\u00a0 Now, in virtue of what does something acquire the property of goodness, or what makes something good?\u00a0 According to Hobbes, Arash continued, something is good in virtue of conducing to the individual\u2019s felicity<\/em>.\u00a0 Felicity, for Hobbes, is the only unconditional good for human agents.<\/p>\n

Arash then turned to Hobbes\u2019s answer to question (3), the one concerning the customary use of the term \u2018good\u2019.\u00a0 What causes individuals to call something good?\u00a0 Hobbes\u2019s psychological explanation is this.\u00a0 Desire is the conative drive that propels an agent to act to achieve an object.\u00a0 Meanwhile, pleasure is the cognitive representation of the object as good.\u00a0 All actions are prompted by desires.\u00a0 All desires are accompanied by pleasures.\u00a0 And an agent desires something only if he\/she represents it in his\/her mind as something pleasant to him\/herself.\u00a0 Desire and pleasure are the two aspects of the same internal bodily motions.\u00a0 So, a person calls the object that he\/she desires \u2018good\u2019 because, in desiring it, he\/she conceives it as pleasant to, or good for, him\/herself.<\/p>\n

In this context, Arash also pointed out the key distinction that Hobbes made between two types of pleasure: namely, between pleasures of fruition<\/em>, or satisfaction, and pleasures of anticipation<\/em>, or imagination. \u00a0The former arise from perceiving something presently satisfying<\/em> one\u2019s desire; the latter from imagining<\/em> one\u2019s desire being satisfied in the future<\/em>. \u00a0(Hobbes identified the former with pleasures of sense<\/em>; the latter with pleasures of mind<\/em>.)\u00a0 Arash then noted that Hobbes\u2019s account of anticipatory pleasure is somewhat hybrid in the sense that, in some cases, the pleasure involved in a mental pleasure of anticipation is partly grounded in sensory perception: one may take pleasure simultaneously from perceiving an object and from imagining it as yet to be realised.\u00a0 So, we now reach a complex set of distinctions concerning types of pleasure: between (1.a) sensory pleasures of fruition concerning present satisfaction and (1.b) mental pleasures of anticipation concerning future satisfaction, on the one hand, and between (2.a) hybrid mental pleasures of anticipation and (2.b) pure mental pleasures of anticipation, on the other.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, Hobbes, according to Arash, assumed that the customary sense of \u2018good\u2019 cannot provide the plausible foundation for the scientific philosophy of the good.\u00a0 Scientific philosophy, according to Hobbes, either corrects customary definitions or makes an apt definition newly.\u00a0 (The customary sense is, nevertheless, useful as a preliminary step for diagnosing where the received conception of the good has gone wrong.)\u00a0 Then, a question is which type of pleasure has a privileged status in Hobbes\u2019s scientific theory of the good.\u00a0 Arash answered: the anticipatory type does.\u00a0 To call \u2018good\u2019 what one perceives presently satisfying one\u2019s desire is to use the term merely in passion<\/em>; to call \u2018good\u2019 what one can foresee\/imagine will satisfy one\u2019s desire in the future is to use the term in reason<\/em>. \u00a0To use the term \u2018good\u2019 merely in passion is to use it in its pre-scientific, customary<\/em> sense; to use it in reason is to use it in its scientific<\/em> sense.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

III<\/p>\n

We now understand that Hobbes intended to fix the meaning of \u2018good\u2019. \u00a0For him, the term \u2018good\u2019 names not whatever people happen to desire or find pleasant at any given point in time, but what is good for them in reason, i.e. their true, long-term<\/em> good. \u00a0So, Arash went on to ask: What makes a human life good in this true, long-term sense?<\/p>\n

Due to their limited foresight, people tend to undertake actions that merely appear<\/em> to be good.\u00a0 But such apparently good actions are not always conducive to people\u2019s true good<\/em>.\u00a0 For Hobbes, truly good actions are those whose total, long-run consequences involve a greater amount of pleasure relative to pain overall<\/em>.<\/p>\n

This point clarifies in what felicity consists on Hobbes\u2019s view. \u00a0A felicitous life, for Hobbes, is a life constituted by the experience of a greater amount of pleasure relative to pain overall.\u00a0 But Hobbes rejected the view that felicity is a mere aggregation of separate experiences of pleasure; rather, he took felicity as an overarching good that integrates separate experiences of pleasure into a coherent whole. \u00a0Also, according to Hobbes, a felicitous life is a life through which a person continuously<\/em> experiences greater pleasure relative to pain; so, what matters is the relative distribution of pleasure over time<\/em>.\u00a0 To sum up, for Hobbes, Arash explained, felicity is an integrative value; and it consists in the presence of pleasures, and the absence of pains, experienced on an ongoing basis continually over time.<\/p>\n

Questions still remain. \u00a0What kinds<\/em> of pleasure primarily constitute a felicitous life?\u00a0 And by what means<\/em> do we experience them? \u00a0According to Arash, Hobbes has four related points to make concerning these questions.\u00a0 First, felicity primarily consists in mental pleasures of anticipation, rather than in sensory pleasures of fruition.\u00a0 Second, the amount of ongoing mental pleasure of anticipation relative to mental pain is maximised when desires yet to be satisfied combine with the hope<\/em> that they will be satisfied, rather than with the fear<\/em> that they will be frustrated.\u00a0 Third, desire combines with hope when one has repeatedly experienced successful desire satisfaction.\u00a0 And finally, one\u2019s repeated success in desire satisfaction increases hope because it generates the awareness that one has power<\/em> to satisfy desires.\u00a0 (The experience of the anticipatory pleasure that accompanies contemplating one\u2019s power to satisfy desires is the experience of what Hobbes called \u2018glory\u2019, Arash noted.\u00a0 And true glory<\/em>, as opposed to vainglory<\/em>, is grounded in a true, factual record of successful desire satisfaction.)<\/p>\n

What role do successful desire satisfaction and the accompanying sensory pleasures of fruition play in Hobbes\u2019s account of felicity?\u00a0 Sensory pleasures of fruition, as Arash already explained, do not take a privileged status in Hobbes\u2019s scientific theory of the good.\u00a0 But this does not mean that they do not contribute to people\u2019s felicity at all; they do play a significant instrumental role.\u00a0 In Hobbes\u2019s account, Arash continued, pleasures of fruition facilitate felicity by fostering hope of further desire satisfaction, and thereby securing anticipatory pleasures of mind.\u00a0 In short, pleasures of fruition are instrumental<\/em> to felicity, while pleasures of anticipation are constitutive<\/em> of it.<\/p>\n

Finally, Arash pointed out that it is a groundless mistake to think that Hobbes rejected the notion of a summum bonum<\/em>, or a supreme good.\u00a0 Hobbes did take felicity as an unconditional and universal good for human agents: the value of an agent\u2019s action derives from the contribution it makes to his\/her felicity.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

IV<\/p>\n

Arash\u2019s discussion proceeded to two complications concerning what Hobbes saw as instrumental goods. \u00a0One of the complications was this.\u00a0 On Hobbes\u2019s substantive view of value and valuable actions, a certain action is instrumentally good for an agent because it will actually<\/em> enhance his\/her felicity. \u00a0Meanwhile, on his prudentialist view of affective and practical reasons, the term \u2018good\u2019 is reserved for those actions that an agent can reasonably know<\/em> or foresee<\/em> will enhance his\/her felicity. \u00a0The question, then, is which view Hobbes\u2019s scientifically reformulated definition of \u2018good\u2019 is supposed to reflect.\u00a0 Arash\u2019s answer was: when instrumental goods are concerned, Hobbes\u2019s reformulated definition is supposed to reflect his prudentialist theory of affective and practical reasons, rather than his substantive theory of value.<\/p>\n

The second complication which Arash invited us to consider was this.\u00a0 In some cases, an agent might reasonably foresee that a certain action will promote his\/her felicity, but also that calling it instrumentally \u2018good\u2019 (and thereby prescribing favouring it) would diminish his\/her felicity overall. \u00a0Under such prescriptively subversive circumstances, as Arash called them, the agent has an epistemic reason to believe that the action is instrumentally good for him\/her, on the one hand, and a practical reason not to call it instrumentally \u2018good\u2019, on the other.<\/p>\n

Hobbes thought that such prescriptively subversive circumstances, in their deep form, predominate in the state of nature.\u00a0 In the state of nature, individual agents would reasonably believe, and agree, that peace, as a general concept, is good for their self-preservation.\u00a0 However, in the state of nature, there would always be disagreements about, say, specific means to realise peace.\u00a0 In such circumstances, an individual agent would have an epistemic reason to believe that some specific action, given sufficient coordination and compliance, would contribute to the realisation of peace. \u00a0But he\/she would also have a practical reason not to call it instrumentally \u2018good\u2019, since he\/she would reasonably foresee that calling it so (and thereby prescribing favouring it) would give rise to disagreements, and ultimately the state of war, which in turn would diminish his\/her felicity after all.<\/p>\n

So, according to Hobbes, individuals in the state of nature would face deeply subversive circumstances with respect to all<\/em> the social means of self-preservation except this one<\/em>: namely, covenanting to establish a sovereign and thereby enter a commonwealth.\u00a0 And what is more, on Hobbes\u2019s view, through such a covenant, not only would individuals be able to get out of prescriptively subversive circumstances.\u00a0 But they would be able also to set up prescriptively self-fulfilling<\/em> circumstances: circumstances in which agreeing to call something instrumentally \u2018good\u2019 actually makes it instrumentally good for securing peace.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

V<\/p>\n

The ensuing discussion with participants was active and lively.\u00a0 How would Hobbes treat the distinction between the anticipatory pleasures that a person gets from contemplating his\/her power to satisfy desires if he\/she wants to when he\/she does not actually have such desires<\/em>, on the one hand, and the anticipatory pleasures that a person gets from contemplating his\/her power to satisfy desires when he\/she actually wants to satisfy them<\/em>, on the other?\u00a0 Also, if sensory pleasures and the pleasures accompanying vainglory are not really valuable on Hobbes\u2019s view because they are \u2018fleeting\u2019, then anticipatory pleasures of a valuable, non-fleeting kind are those to which results are connected.\u00a0 But those results seem to consist in fruition, and so, after all, anticipation seems to be connected to fruition.\u00a0 If so, is Hobbes\u2019s view of the good inconsistent?\u00a0 Furthermore, Hobbes wrote that imagination, the motion involved in anticipation, is \u2018nothing but decaying sense\u2019.\u00a0 But exactly what aspect of imagination or anticipation decays as time passes?\u00a0 Is it its conative side (as a passionate drive) or its cognitive side (such as vividness of memory) that fades away?\u00a0 And what did Hobbes say about the source of desires?\u00a0 Is it imagination that is the source of desires while reasoning provides the means to satisfy desires?\u00a0 All these questions invited Arash to clarify his points, which in turn helped us understand Hobbes\u2019s theory at a deeper level.<\/p>\n

The paper Arash presented, he said, is a chapter from his book project.\u00a0 His very careful and insightful analysis in the paper will be a huge contribution to the literature of intellectual history when the book comes out.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Written by Yuki Iwaki<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n

****<\/p>\n

Arash Abizadeh<\/a> is Associate Professor in political philosophy at McGill University.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Political Theory Research Group seminar series: 15 Jun 2016 I Ancient Greek ethicists assumed that human beings have a single overarching supreme good, which is eudaimonia, or \u2018happiness\u2019, and that this is the final end of every human action.\u00a0 On the Epicurean view, eudaimonia, or in Latin felicitas, or in English \u2018felicity\u2019, consists in the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":189,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[28,24,22,8,1],"tags":[],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk\/jwi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/711"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk\/jwi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk\/jwi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk\/jwi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/189"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk\/jwi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=711"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk\/jwi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/711\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":846,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk\/jwi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/711\/revisions\/846"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk\/jwi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=711"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk\/jwi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=711"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk\/jwi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=711"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}