Four pillars of foreign policy

Dr Juliet Kaarbo, University of Edinburgh

Dr Juliet Kaarbo, University of Edinburgh

States’ visions of their foreign policies typically have four elements, or pillars:  protection, profits, principles, and pride.  The Scottish Government’s White Paper released last month is no exception, Juliet Kaarbo explains.

Protection’ (or ‘power’) concerns the key function of sovereign states – to provide security for their citizens, mainly at home but also abroad. On this pillar, the White Paper lays out the case for continued membership in NATO and its

defence priorities relating to budget allocations, maritime capabilities, numbers for regular and reserve personnel, and continued operation of current major military bases.

The ‘Profits’ element is how the state will engage with the international economy and position its domestic economy to provide economic wealth and security.  On this pillar, the White Paper clearly embraces a liberal, pro-trade economic foreign policy in its discussion of the advantages of continued EU membership, ‘focused engagement’ with the EU, and full participation in the Europe 2020 growth agenda.

Principles’ are the values and the projection of ‘what we stand for’ that purportedly guide a state’s foreign policy.  It is on this pillar that the White Paper seeks to put the most daylight between an independent Scottish foreign policy and its characterisation of UK foreign policy.  The White Paper, for example, emphasises the ‘different international priorities’ between Westminster and an independent Scotland and notes ‘we see that most clearly in matters of war and peace and in our relationship with the EU’ (White Paper, page 209).  The anti-nuclear argument of the White Paper is also partly based on value statements, such as “Trident is an affront to basic decency with its indiscriminate and inhumane destructive power” (p.232).  More principles are advanced when the White Paper envisions Scotland as a ‘champion for international justice and peace’ and puts forward the values of  ‘international development, human rights, climate change, and climate justice’ (page 225).  The Government boldly puts forward a ‘Do No Harm’ policy, stating: ‘As an expression of the values driving our foreign policy, this Government will ensure that other Scottish Government policies do no harm to development countries, do not undermine international development aims and ideally contribute to international development success’ (page 231).

Finally, ‘pride’ plays a place in most states’ foreign policies.  Pride often surfaces in characterisations the state’s identity, of ‘who we are,’ and of the state’s and its people’s accomplishments.  Pride may connect to values, such as human rights and climate justice.  But pride can also be projections of the nation’s self-image, such as a ‘beacon of democracy’ or a ‘cradle of a civilisation.’   In this way, the White Paper paints a picture of Scotland as “an outward facing nation, exporting goods, people, and ideas around the world…”(207) and refers to ‘’Scotland’s proud military tradition” (234).  At its most dangerous end, pride can turn negative and derogatory in tone, painting an excessively positive image of itself only in reference to excessively negative images of other.  There is none of this extreme negativity in the Scottish White Paper’s vision of its foreign policy, which is perhaps surprising for a document written by a political party with ‘national’ in its name.

The four pillars of foreign policy can stand alone in a vision statement, such as the White Paper.  In practice, however, they are not mutually exclusive.  They can work together, reinforcing each other (profits can my protection, for example), but they often come in conflict.  What happens when, for example, profits come from trade with states with human rights violations or security imperatives lead the state to act in ways counter to its self-image?   The White Paper does reflect on these potential conflicts.  It states:  “we will not allow commercial or other considerations, including military considerations, to influence our approach [to international development] improperly’ (231).  A praise-worthy goal indeed, but few states have succeeded in avoiding these trade-offs and in isolating principles from profits and protection, and Scotland would be no exception.

The White Paper rightly states that with independence, Scotland would have sovereign ability to choose the direction of its foreign affairs – to follow the pillars the Government seeks to build.  But it would quickly discover that with sovereignty comes the difficult task of deciding what to do when the pillars point a state in conflicting directions.

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The Birth of a State has Many Midwives

The international community weighs in...

The international community weighs in…

Ryan Beasley and Juliet Kaarbo analyse the role that the international community can and should play in Scotland’s referendum debate.

In early 2013, the BBC surveyed EU governments, asking for their opinion on Scottish independence and on the question of Scottish EU membership. More than half of the member states responded either that it was entirely an internal matter or refused to reply.  Why the silence?  Are other countries just not interested in the outcome?  Almost certainly not.  More likely, other governments feel constrained by international norms of non-interference.  Simply put, outside actors are not supposed to intervene in free and fair democratic processes.

A democratic referendum means an honest opportunity for the ‘rule of the people’ and a chance for the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’ sides to campaign and shape public opinion.  It also means giving a platform for outside actors to shape the public discourse and to define what Scotland might, and might not, be should it gain independence. 

This can be considered an international norm, which is the  unwritten rule about appropriate behaviour that can shape and constrain states’ actions.  Indeed, international norms about democracy are strong.   Given the widespread sense that people should be free to govern themselves, and the idea that democratic governments tend to conduct both their internal and external affairs with less brutality, it is rather difficult to justify interfering in what is arguably the most significant of democratic exercises, a vote on independence.

But that is exactly what is going to happen, and actually has been for some time, albeit indirectly.  This is not unique to the question of Scottish independence, but has to do with the nature of statehood itself.  When new states are born, or seek independence, the international community has a vested interest in the outcome.  External actors attempt to shape both whether a new state will emerge and what role the state would play in the world, even before statehood.

Members of the international community have a variety of reasons for being keenly interested in the outcome.  While the United States, for example, will undoubtedly continue to profess neutrality born of respect for the right of peoples to rule themselves, it will also put its thumb on the scale in an effort to create an outcome suitable to its preferences.  And make no mistake, it has preferences.  Not only is the United States concerned about the future of the Trident submarine, but an independent Scotland potentially weakens one of its strongest allies (the UK) and independence may set a precedent for further, possibly dangerous, separatism in other parts of the world.  These concerns have been voiced in U.S.-based elite opinion pages and by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, with SNP reactions.  Norms against outside interference in democratic processes prevent blatant interference, so influence takes other forms.   States can emphasize, for example, Scotland’s small size and the challenges of security and economic viability that small states face.   States can choose or refuse to meet with Salmond in the run-up to the referendum.

It’s not just state that are seeking to limit (or grow) the  sovereignty club. Organisations with rules for both admission and conduct have a stake – and hence a say – in the possibility of new statehood.  The EU, NATO, the UN and the WTO are the most obvious. Already international organisations have weighed in on the debate, if through no other means than suggesting the ease or difficulty that Scotland might face in trying to gain (or regain) membership. The EU Commission President declared that any new state would have to apply for EU membership, despite the SNP having said an independent Scotland would be able to renegotiate its terms of membership from inside the EU.  NATO also indicated that an independent Scotland would have to apply as a new state and that membership would require unanimous agreement of all twenty-eight states in the alliance. Deciding to apply the organizational rules in this fashion can be seen as an effort to shape the debate itself, and the role Scotland might (or might not) play in the event of its independence.

Of interest is that the very thing that makes this event unique is also what gives rise to these types of efforts to influence the outcome. Scores of states have been created over the last 60 years, and many of them were also seeking to join the EU and be a part of the NATO alliance.  But this is an independence movement in the European heartland of democracy and political stability, while most recent new states have come from the process of decolonization or the break-up of empires or larger states – the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are prime examples.  And unlike most other new states, Scotland is deciding on independence through a very open political and democratic process.  This openness, however, cuts two ways.  A democratic referendum means an honest opportunity for the ‘rule of the people’ and a chance for the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’ sides to campaign and shape public opinion.  It also means giving a platform for outside actors to shape the public discourse and to define what Scotland might, and might not, be should it gain independence.  And so in September 2014, the people in Scotland will vote their fate.  But in the larger landscape, because the creation of a new state hangs in the balance, others states and organisations of the world are already part of this debate.  Far from being silent, important actors on the world stage are voicing their concerns by attempting to shape the role that an independent Scotland could play.  In this sense, democratic norms empower citizens to determine their sovereignty, but not necessarily their destiny.

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A different Scotland is happening

after independenceAt the launch of their new book, After Independence, Gerry Hassan and James Mitchell discuss the constitutional options for Scotland, the implications of the white paper and the potential to expand the debate.

Many words will be written this week and in the years to come about the independence debate and the publication of the Scottish Government White Paper on independence launched yesterday in Glasgow by Alex Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon.

All of this has come about after negotiations between the UK and Scottish Governments. They agreed the question to be put to the Scottish people, about who could vote and the rules of the referendum. The two Governments and campaign organisations associated with each side seek to define the terms of the debate: independence vs. separatism; hope vs. fear; change vs. continuity.

There is nothing unusual in this. Elections and referendums in liberal democracies are about giving the public an authoritative voice on pre-determined choices.

As a device for consulting the people, the referendum is now more commonly used in the UK than the past. It has value in ensuring that a decision carries the legitimising power of public support, as happened in the 1997 devolution vote. But referendums have their limitations. They encourage highly adversarial politics and limit choices to what is on offer at the ballot box, even if the public might prefer something else. These features can limit public involvement to being spectators.

While little can be done about the choices available at the ballot box, there is no reason for limiting the scope of this debate. The referendum may have been a Government initiative but there is no reason why anyone need stick to a limited agenda.

The referendum may have come about through inter-governmental bargaining but the debate cannot be limited by government or the formal campaign organisations. There is no disputing the relative powers of these and the conventional media in setting the terms of the debate, but there has been growing evidence from across Scotland that this referendum is encouraging a multiplicity of people and bodies to articulate their own fears, hopes and expectations.

Much of this might at first sight appear to have little to do with the referendum question. However relevant or otherwise, the referendum is proving a useful means of discussing what kind of Scotland we want to live in, which cannot be boiled down to whether Scotland should or should not be an independent country.

The referendum and independence debate does not belong to any party, government or campaign group. Neither does it belong to the conventional media or ‘experts’ explaining the meaning of white papers or opinion polls.

There is no doubt that insider opinion has had and will continue to have the dominant part in setting the agenda of debate. But, paradoxically for a device that puts the voting public at the heart of the decision, the wider public needs to assert itself and find means of insinuating itself into this debate.

Referendums can be dangerous devices for sponsoring governments. The people do not always answer as expected or hoped for. It is conceivable that the result will end up pleasing neither government or camp. The result may prove contestable – and a close result is bound to be contested whatever may be said by both sides just now.

But this referendum offers an even bigger prize than that imagined by insider Scotland. It is about the kind of society we want and what kind of collective future we would like to bring into being. It offers an opportunity to raise awkward questions and challenge each side to outline where we are going, not just in the narrowest sense of constitutional politics but how we constitute ourselves in the widest sense.

Over the last two decades and more, constitutional debate across the globe has been far more expansive than the narrow debate that insider Scotland would have us focus upon. Modern constitutions commonly include references to gender rights, social and welfare rights and much more besides. Scotland’s constitutional debate needs to enter the modern world too.

The greatest challenge lies in addressing ‘missing Scotland’ and what has been become called ‘the missing million’: the part of Scotland’s electorate which has slowly and inexorably slipped out of our democracy and stopped voting in the last generation. This dynamic reflects the increasing concentration of politics on a narrow range of issues, the focus on ‘swing’ voters in marginal seats, and the decline of such factors as class and party identification.

It is true that turnout at elections has declined in many – though by no means all liberal democracies – a point underlined in Philip Coggan’s ‘The Last Vote’. But no one should be allowed to hide behind a general Western trend. Both sides in this referendum claim to be reaching out to a wider public, engaging in new ways and bringing people into their campaigns who had never previously been involved.

There is no reason to disbelieve this but the challenge comes with the results not just in the proportion who voted but the difference that participation makes. Who are these new political activists? What do they bring to our politics and what will be the longer-term consequences of their engagement?

The referendum and independence debate cannot be left solely in the hands of this ‘insider Scotland’ with their exclusive claims to representing and understanding the popular will. If it is to maximise change and political participation, there must be an acknowledgement of the diverse voices of ‘outsider Scotland’ who have been too often forgotten about, or paid lip service to in the language of the supposed ‘new politics’.

It would be disappointing if they merely represent an exten

sion of insider Scotland – more middle aged, middle class white men. Our experience of devolution suggests that having a better gender balance is an improvement but hardly revolutionary. The lesson of the last decade is that representation of a slightly more diverse range of people is not enough.

This entails thinking about politics, political change and the roles and expectations on public bodies and institutions in a more multi-layered way reflecting the numerous pressures, demands and expectations in public life. Scottish politics for too long has been traditionally defined in a very narrow, constricting manner, which has left politics in the hands of insider groups, and the sum total of change at best swapping elites while the people watch.

The referendum and independence debate cannot be left solely in the hands of this ‘insider Scotland’ with their exclusive claims to representing and understanding the popular will. If it is to maximise change and political participation, there must be an acknowledgement of the diverse voices of ‘outsider Scotland’ who have been too often forgotten about, or paid lip service to in the language of the supposed ‘new politics’.

Two very different timescales are evident in this debate. The first is that Scotland has ended up having this independence debate sooner than most people assumed. The consequences are clear to see all around: the anger and dismay of certain pro-union voices, a general bewilderment and incomprehension in many undecided voters, and an over-zealousness and simplicity in some pro-independence opinion. But what is also happening is that in a very short space of time the idea of independence, once on the fringes of political life, has become mainstream.

If the first is the shortened road to the referendum, the second is the long road to the referendum (in the short term frame of 2011-14). This has allowed a host of self-organising, self-motivated groups to emerge outwith the reach of institutional Scotland. There is a generational shift in this, a gender dimension and the rise of social media; perhaps most importantly this signals a move from an over focus on ‘hard’ power to ‘soft’ power.

This week is a watershed moment, and it would be good if more of our debate could pause and reflect this and be more humble, generous of opposing views, idealistic and outward focused on the challenges ahead. It is in this spirit that we planned and commissioned ‘After Independence’, officially published this week, which collects two dozen essays on different aspects of independence, ranging far and beyond the narrow definition of constitutional politics – to economic, social and cultural policies, the nature of the UK and England, defence and international dimensions.

Whatever the final outcome on September 14th 2014 Scotland is being dramatically changed by this debate and irrespective of whether we vote Yes or No, Scotland, the union and the UK will never be the same again. This shows the shortsightedness of those who are already rushing to call the result, the latest of which is ‘The Economist’ ‘The World in 2014’ which has boldly declared, ‘The Scots will vote no to independence’. Instead, we should see this debate and result as part of a journey on the road to a politics and culture of self-government.

The phrase, ‘Another Scotland is possible’ is used by some of the new forces of the left gathering around this debate. Many mainstream voices scoff and pour cynicism on the naivety and idealism of such groups ignoring the scale of change Scotland has underwent in the last thirty years.

We have not and will not reach a final destination in this debate or in our society and politics. Rather than say, ‘Another Scotland is possible’, it would be more accurate to say, ‘A different Scotland is happening’. We just do not yet fully know the shape of that Scotland, who will emerge as the winners and losers, and the scale and form of the greater self-government.

Gerry Hassan is Research Fellow in cultural policy at the University of the West of Scotland. James Mitchell is Professor of public policy at Edinburgh University. Their collection, ‘After Independence’ is officially published by Luath Press priced £12.99. This blog was originally published on Open Democracy.

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After a Yes Vote

Professor James Mitchell, University of Edinburgh

Professor James Mitchell, University of Edinburgh

James Mitchell reflects on what might happen following a yes vote, arguing that governments are likely to find ‘pragmatic solutions to difficult problems’.

Whatever happens next September, Scotland will continue to share this island with the rest of the rest of the UK (rUK).  Geographic separatism cannot be brought about by constitutional change.

Ironically, unionists insist that Scotland’s relationship with rUK will be troublesome and fractious while nationalists paint a picture of harmony.  We might ask why we would want to remain in a union with such bad neighbours or why we need independence if we have common interests.

Campaign rhetoric apart, what can we realistically expect after a Yes vote.  The experience of relations between devolved and UK Governments suggests that relations will be complex and changeable.  There will be occasions when harmonious and deeply discordant relations will operate simultaneously.  Never underestimate the capacity of governments to operate in silos.  But never underestimate the capacity of governments to find pragmatic solutions to difficult problems.  The institutions of inter-governmental relations already exist and would not have to be invented but some new arrangements will be required.  Emphasis is placed in the white paper on a ‘substantial diplomatic presence in both London and Dublin’ suggesting continuity in the deep relations with rUK but developing into a new set of relations incorporating the Irish Republic.  The white paper outlines these pragmatically but its opponents suggest that UK Governments will behave dogmatically.  Much of this is campaign rhetoric.

Under what circumstances would a UK Government (or Scottish for that matter) incline towards cooperation or conflict in its relations with its neighbour?

The key is motivations.  Nobody should expect either Government to be motivated by good will.  London will owe Scotland nothing and Edinburgh will owe London nothing.  Self-interest will dictate behaviour.  Neither Government will act against its own self-interest but neither will act spitefully unless it wants to inflict harm on itself long-term.  It is in the UK’s self-interest to portray relations with an independent Scotland on this side of the referendum as highly contentious and difficult but its interests will immediately change on the other side of a referendum if Scotland votes Yes.

Scotland may be small in comparison to rUK but losing Scotland will be a blow to the UK’s prestige.  Drawing attention to what is now described as a major rupture in UK politics will no more be in the UK’s than Scotland’s interests.  Both Governments will need to convey continuity and stability.

While politicians regard themselves as powerful, none is as powerful as the financial markets.  The lesson of the last few years should be obvious to one and all.  No state, no matter how mighty, is capable of taking on such powerful economic forces that brought the world economy to its knees.  Both Governments will seek to convince the money markets that all will be well, stability is maintained and relations will be good.  That pressure may be ignored during the campaign but it will concentrate minds in Edinburgh and London powerfully after a Yes vote.

James Mitchell is a Professor of Public Policy and the co-editor of After Independence, published in October 2013 by Luath Press. This article was originally published in the Scotsman. 

Posted in Policy - General | 1 Comment

‘A Lasting Settlement’

Rt Hon Carwyn Jones, First Minister for Wales

Rt Hon Carwyn Jones, First Minister for Wales

Cera Murtagh reports from a major speech by First Minister of Wales the Rt Hon Carwyn Jones AM, hosted by the Academy of Government, on the implications of the Scottish independence referendum for Scotland, Wales and the UK as a whole

In the wake of his landmark speech at the University of Edinburgh last week, the Welsh First Minister’s warning that Wales would want a say on an independent Scotland joining a currency union with the rest of the UK has dominated the headlines. Provoking nationalist-unionist claim and counter-claim however, this focus distracted from what was perhaps the First Minister’s more substantive point: that the UK is in need of fundamental constitutional reform.

Delivering a speech entitled ‘Wales, Scotland and the United Kingdom’, in advance of the Scottish Government’s publication of the White Paper on Scotland’s Future, the Right Honourable Carwyn Jones approached his topic with a mixture of caution and determination. Aware that wading into the Scottish independence debate is a risky business, the First Minister stressed his respect for Scotland alone to determine the outcome of the referendum, and insisted he was not here to preach. Nevertheless, given the stakes – not only for Scotland but for the UK as a whole – he felt it necessary to present the “wider perspective”.

The Welsh premier owned that an independent Scotland could, of course, survive. The question, he argued, was whether it would be better off as an independent country or, as he believed, within a renewed Union of devolved nations.

In setting out his stall for reform, the Welsh premier demonstrated that developments north of the border can generate debates over much wider constitutional reform

Constitutional reform to embed devolution is the route to this new and improved United Kingdom, according to the First Minister. It is now the time to establish a “stable territorial constitution”, he urged; “a proper and durable long-term settlement for the whole of the UK”, in which the place of the devolved nations would be cemented.

“Can we see a future for the UK which is built on a fundamental acceptance that we are a territorial Union with a devolved constitution? Can we have confidence that our constitutional arrangements will be respected and transcend party politics?,” he asked.

“I believe the answer is yes. I believe it is possible to work out a full future for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, through devolution, within the wider framework of a strong UK bound together by common threads of shared history, culture and values.”

A new UK constitution must enshrine three key principles, the First Minister advanced: it should guarantee the devolved legislatures of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as permanent features of the Union; it should ensure a presumption towards devolution, wherever practical; and it should provide a consistent method for devolving powers across all parts of the UK.

Outlining a positive vision of the Union, Jones drew upon Wales’s experience of devolution and recent negotiations with the UK Government over the transfer of further powers to the Welsh Assembly in response to the Silk Commission, to demonstrate what can be achieved when the Westminster Government and devolved administrations work together constructively and respectfully.

While making the case for constitutional change, the First Minister was nevertheless forthright on the merits of maintaining the Union. He staked this argument first and foremost on trade and currency. On the Scottish National Party’s plan to remain in a currency union with the remainder of the UK post-independence, Jones raised significant doubts, and warned that, as First Minister of a devolved administration, he would “want the right to have a say” on Scotland joining such a pact.

In setting out his stall for reform, the Welsh premier demonstrated that developments north of the border can generate debates over much wider constitutional reform.

Hosted by the Academy of Government in the University’s Old College on 20 November 2013, the lecture by First Minister of Wales the Rt Hon Carwyn Jones AM was chaired by Academy Director Professor Charlie Jeffery and attended by staff, students, members of the public, as well as a host of media outlets.

Cera Murtagh is a PhD candidate in Politics & International Relations at the University of Edinburgh

 

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Scottish Government Plans on Immigration: Are they Feasible?

Christina Boswell

Christina Boswell, Edinburgh Professor of Politics and leading authority on the politics of migration, assesses the Independence White Paper’s prospectus for asylum and immigration. She argues that public opinion, and cross-border pressures from rUK and the EU may constrain the noble aspirations of the Scottish Government toward a more liberal policy.

There are no major surprises in the Scottish Government’s plans on immigration, as set out in the White Paper on Scotland’s Future published yesterday. As expected, the paper outlines a programme for a more liberal stance on many aspects of immigration asylum policy. This is refreshing given the largely negative and defensive debate on immigration policy south of the border. But how feasible are the plans for liberalising immigration in the event of Scottish independence?

Border control. The paper proposes that an independent Scotland be part of the Common Travel Area (CTA) currently in operation between the UK and Ireland. This would imply no (or at least very limited) border controls between Scotland and the rest of the UK (rUK). This proposal seems reasonable and feasible. Whatever the current rhetoric, rUK would have a strong interest in free circulation between an independent Scotland and England.

A future Scottish government keen to pursue a more liberal policy would need to think carefully about how it phased in reform, justified it, and – most importantly – how it got the media and opposition parties on board. It’s a noble aspiration. But given what we know about the politics of immigration across Europe, I can’t help feeling sceptical about its political traction.

What is less clear is the degree to which membership of the CTA would be compatible with a ‘more flexible immigration system’. To be sure, membership of the CTA does not impose formal constraints on national immigration and asylum policies. However, experience of the border-free zone between Schengen countries suggests that a number of concerns about irregular flows might kick in. Notably, the potential for third country nationals not authorised to stay or work in rUK to move across the border from Scotland. I’ll return to this point later.

Labour migration. The paper suggests introducing two main routes for labour migrants. First, a points-based system to recruit migrants who meet particular criteria. Such a system could be adapted to suit the demographic or labour market requirements of Scotland, or even particular regions within Scotland – for example, by awarding points for skills and qualifications, sector, or age. Second, it would re-introduce labour market access for foreign graduates of Scottish universities – as used to be the case under the Fresh Talent initiative, which entitled graduates to stay and look for work for up to 24 months.

Both proposals seem sensible and feasible as a means of attracting skilled migrants to address labour shortages and offset ageing populations. A points based system may not be the sharpest tool for matching workers to jobs in particular sectors/occupations. So the government might be wise to consider complementing this route with an employer-driven scheme for recruiting workers in sectors facing serious shortages. Another caveat relates to the notion that a points-based system could provide ‘incentives’ for people to live and work in ‘more remote geographical areas’. It would be difficult to enforce residency requirements for immigrants. That said, the basic ideas are sound.

A points based system may not be the sharpest tool for matching workers to jobs in particular sectors/occupations. So the government might be wise to consider complementing this route with an employer-driven scheme for recruiting workers in sectors facing serious shortages. 

Asylum. The government would continue its policy of ‘promoting the integration of refugees and asylum seekers from the day they arrive. And it would end dawn raids and limit the use of detention and forcible removals. In addition, there is a vaguely articulated aspiration to ‘address asylum seekers’ access to employment, education and accommodation’. This formulation is less developed than previous Scottish Government statements about actively promoting employment of asylum seekers to address labour shortages. But caution in this area shows political maturity. The idea of drawing on asylum seekers as a means of addressing labour shortages would set off loud alarm bells in London and Brussels. It would be seen as creating a ‘pull’ factor for would-be migrants, who might abuse the asylum system as a route to the labour market. Whether or not such concerns are well grounded, UK and EU policy circles very much buy into this narrative of asylum abuse, especially where there’s a risk that asylum seekers might travel on to other European countries. Such fears could affect plans to eliminate border controls between Scotland and rUK. If a more liberal asylum policy in Scotland were to attract greater numbers of asylum seekers, then the worry would be that they might travel across the border to seek irregular employment south of the border. Given such a scenario, Whitehall would be likely to place strong pressure on a Scottish government to stick with more restrictive treatment of asylum seekers; or else risk the re-introduction of border controls.

Finally, we should consider how the Scottish public would feel about a more liberal approach to immigration and asylum. Recent research has found that there is a lower level of hostility to immigrants and ethnic minority residents in Scotland, compared to the rest of the UK. But there are reasons for caution about relying on such findings. Firstly, the differences are marginal – a 3-6% variation between Scottish and average UK attitudes according to data from the British Social Attitudes Survey. But secondly, we might expect these dynamics to change in the scenario of an independent Scotland. If a Scottish government were to introduce a more liberal policy, it would create strong incentives for opposition parties and the populist media to score points through highlighting the adverse effects of increasing immigration and asylum. Indeed, this has been the experience of almost all immigration receiving countries in Europe since the 1990s. No single European country – with the possible exception of Spain – has been able to sustain a more liberal policy. Witness the demise of Labour’s more expansive approach to labour migration in the first half of the 1990s. European publics – including those in the UK – have proved highly susceptible to political mobilisation around immigration. Immigration offers a channel for articulating broader concerns about unemployment, inequality and declining social cohesion.

A future Scottish government keen to pursue a more liberal policy would need to think carefully about how it phased in reform, justified it, and – most importantly – how it got the media and opposition parties on board. It’s a noble aspiration. But given what we know about the politics of immigration across Europe, I can’t help feeling sceptical about its political traction.

Professor Christina Boswell is Professor of Politics at the University of Edinburgh. You can read her blog posts on Politics, Knowledge and Migration at: http://christinaboswell.wordpress.com/

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Not the DVLA question. Cross-Border Governance after Independence

Dr. Nicola McEwen, Academy of Government

Dr. Nicola McEwen, ESRC Fellow

Dr Nicola McEwen, ESRC Senior Scotland Fellow and Director of Public Policy, Edinburgh Academy of Government, assesses the White Paper’s prospectus for shared cross-border arrangements after independence.

It used to be called the DVLA question. A vision of Scottish independence which is embedded within the British Isles, with lots of cross-border arrangements and services jointly delivered. In the White Paper published this week, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency is in fact one of the institutions that would be replaced by a Scottish body after independence, but there are many more where the Scottish government wants continuity and shared service delivery.

Many of these are functional, low profile institutions, like the Office of Rail Regulation, the Civil Aviation Authority and the Green Investment Bank. The National Lottery and the Big Lottery Fund would also continue as now, and the UK research councils – an issue dear to the heart of many academics – would be shared and co-funded.

And while no-one should expect the UK government to pre-negotiate this side of a referendum, one is left with the feeling that the electorate deserves more clarity from both sides in this debate.

Other shared arrangements are envisaged on big ticket issues like the BBC and the currency. In the former, a Scottish Broadcasting Corporation would participate in a joint venture with the British Broadcasting Corporation, ensuring access to existing BBC services and programmes. In the latter, the White Paper reaffirms the Scottish government’s commitment to press for a formal currency union with the rest of the UK, with Scotland’s government effectively becoming a shareholder in the ownership and governance of the Bank of England.

Managing institutions and services on a cross-border basis would require some mechanism for joint decision-making, oversight and governance. Yet, the White Paper says very little about how such governance arrangements would be designed. Experience from elsewhere suggests that a variety of treaties and bilateral agreements would be necessary, supported by less formal day-to-day co-ordination and communication. But some formal mechanism for intergovernmental relations would be needed to underpin and facilitate informal coordination, not least to resolve any disputes that may emerge.

All such shared arrangements would of course be subject to negotiation with the UK government if Scots vote YES next September. The White paper presents Scottish-rUK co-operation and co-ordination as the common sense approach, which would be in the interests of both an independent Scotland and the rest of the UK. This is somewhat presumptuous. The Scottish government may legitimately claim to be in a position to determine what is in Scotland’s best interests, but it can’t define the interests of the rest of the UK. The UK government, for its part, has given heavy hints that formally sharing a currency and other such arrangements may not be in their interests, with the Secretary of State and others demanding a ‘plan B’ from the Scottish government in case such offers of partnership and co-operation are refused. This is clearly a politically pragmatic response, raising doubts without offering a definitive position. And while no-one should expect the UK government to pre-negotiate this side of a referendum, one is left with the feeling that the electorate deserves more clarity from both sides in this debate.

Dr Nicola McEwen is ESRC Senior Scotland Fellow and Associate Director of the ESRC Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change.

Posted in Referendum process, campaign and vote | 3 Comments

Business competitiveness and constitutional uncertainty: Towards a mature debate

busstrategyProfessor Brad MacKay and Veselina Stoyanova address the means by which businesses are attempting to navigate the debate on Scottish independence.

Approximately 300 days remain until the morning of the 18th of September, 2014, when Scots will decide on their constitutional future. While the political debate is picking up momentum, thus far the focus has been on such issues as constitutional scenarios, debt shares, monetary policy, EU membership, fiscal performance, oil revenues, tax contributions and structure, defence arrangements and so on, but little attention has focused on business itself.  Yet, the health of the business community is fundamental to the health and prosperity of the economy, and society, as a whole. The current constitutional debate presents an opportunity to discuss, regardless of the referendum outcome, how an environment that is competitive for business and creates wealth can be created.

This is at the heart of this current study into how constitutional uncertainty is influencing business decision-making in Scotland and the United Kingdom. With notable exceptions, business leaders have been reluctant to ‘stick their heads above the parapet’ and take part in such a debate. This is understandable given that businesses have stakeholders, be they customers, board members, employees, shareholders, suppliers or governments, on both sides of the discussion. Moreover, all too frequently within the debate reason has given way to emotion and political ideology has become confused with business decision-making. And while business leaders, quite rightly, are keen to stay politically neutral – publicly at least – focusing their attention and decisions on their business interests, there is also an opportunity to outline what sort of business environment is needed in Scotland and the United Kingdom to stay competitive in a globalised world.

The uncertainties created by the constitutional debate vary across sectors. Such uncertainties might include access to markets, currency fluctuations, skilled labour, tax structures, research and development (R&D) incentives and regulatory regimes. What uncertainties influence individual businesses might depend on whether customer bases are located inside Scotland, the United Kingdom, Europe, or more broadly, the world. It might also differ depending on whether ownership structures of businesses are domestic or international, whether they have their head office in Scotland/the UK, or they are a subsidiary, whether they are a small, medium or large business, whether they operate in highly regulated or loosely regulated industries, whether their labour force is highly skilled and mobile, or whether they are in global or regional industries. While uncertainties present risks to businesses, which business must mitigate by the decisions that they take, they also present opportunities for rethinking business-level strategy.

The risks and opportunities that are a result of the uncertainties created by the constitutional debate will impact in greater and lesser degrees on individual businesses and sectors, manifesting in diverse ways. What all businesses have in common is that, whatever the result on September 18th, businesses will take decisions based on whether the changes that will inevitably take place no-matter what the referendum outcome maintain or improve a business environment that is conducive to business growth. It is, therefore, incumbent on business leaders, policy-makers and the public to take this opportunity to have a mature debate about how to continue to foster a business environment that is competitive, wealth creating and contributes to the prosperity of all.

Brad MacKay is Professor of Strategic Management in the Business School, University of Edinburgh. Veselina Stoyanova is a PhD student at the University of Edinburgh.

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Event: First Minister of Wales at Edinburgh University

Rt Hon Carwyn Jones, First Minister for Wales

Rt Hon Carwyn Jones, First Minister for Wales

The First Minister of Wales, Rt Hon Carwyn Jones, will give a lecture on ‘Wales, Scotland and the United Kingdom’ at 6.30-7.30pm on Wednesday 20 November in the Raeburn Room.

You can register to attend at http://firstministerofwales.eventbrite.co.uk

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Upcoming Events: Fiscal Implications of Independence and Exploring Independence

ImportantDateUpcoming events which may be of interest for blog readers

The Fiscal Implications of an Independent Scotland
Institute for Fiscal Studies
Edinburgh, UK
18 November 2013

If you would like to book a place for this event, please contact the IFS events team – events@ifs.org.uk

Exploring Independence after the White Paper
30 November 2013
Edinburgh, UK

Registration for Exploring Independence after the White Paper is now open. Registration is free, but space is limited to 200 people. Please register your place on Eventbrite.

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