Rt Hon Carwyn Jones, First Minister for Wales

Cera Murtagh reports from a major speech by First Minister of Wales the Rt Hon Carwyn Jones AM, hosted by the Academy of Government, on the implications of the Scottish independence referendum for Scotland, Wales and the UK as a whole

In the wake of his landmark speech at the University of Edinburgh last week, the Welsh First Minister’s warning that Wales would want a say on an independent Scotland joining a currency union with the rest of the UK has dominated the headlines. Provoking nationalist-unionist claim and counter-claim however, this focus distracted from what was perhaps the First Minister’s more substantive point: that the UK is in need of fundamental constitutional reform.

Delivering a speech entitled ‘Wales, Scotland and the United Kingdom’, in advance of the Scottish Government’s publication of the White Paper on Scotland’s Future, the Right Honourable Carwyn Jones approached his topic with a mixture of caution and determination. Aware that wading into the Scottish independence debate is a risky business, the First Minister stressed his respect for Scotland alone to determine the outcome of the referendum, and insisted he was not here to preach. Nevertheless, given the stakes – not only for Scotland but for the UK as a whole – he felt it necessary to present the “wider perspective”.

The Welsh premier owned that an independent Scotland could, of course, survive. The question, he argued, was whether it would be better off as an independent country or, as he believed, within a renewed Union of devolved nations.

Constitutional reform to embed devolution is the route to this new and improved United Kingdom, according to the First Minister. It is now the time to establish a “stable territorial constitution”, he urged; “a proper and durable long-term settlement for the whole of the UK”, in which the place of the devolved nations would be cemented.

“Can we see a future for the UK which is built on a fundamental acceptance that we are a territorial Union with a devolved constitution? Can we have confidence that our constitutional arrangements will be respected and transcend party politics?,” he asked.

“I believe the answer is yes. I believe it is possible to work out a full future for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, through devolution, within the wider framework of a strong UK bound together by common threads of shared history, culture and values.”

A new UK constitution must enshrine three key principles, the First Minister advanced: it should guarantee the devolved legislatures of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as permanent features of the Union; it should ensure a presumption towards devolution, wherever practical; and it should provide a consistent method for devolving powers across all parts of the UK.

Outlining a positive vision of the Union, Jones drew upon Wales’s experience of devolution and recent negotiations with the UK Government over the transfer of further powers to the Welsh Assembly in response to the Silk Commission, to demonstrate what can be achieved when the Westminster Government and devolved administrations work together constructively and respectfully.

While making the case for constitutional change, the First Minister was nevertheless forthright on the merits of maintaining the Union. He staked this argument first and foremost on trade and currency. On the Scottish National Party’s plan to remain in a currency union with the remainder of the UK post-independence, Jones raised significant doubts, and warned that, as First Minister of a devolved administration, he would “want the right to have a say” on Scotland joining such a pact.

In setting out his stall for reform, the Welsh premier demonstrated that developments north of the border can generate debates over much wider constitutional reform.

Hosted by the Academy of Government in the University’s Old College on 20 November 2013, the lecture by First Minister of Wales the Rt Hon Carwyn Jones AM was chaired by Academy Director Professor Charlie Jeffery and attended by staff, students, members of the public, as well as a host of media outlets.

Cera Murtagh is a PhD candidate in Politics & International Relations at the University of Edinburgh

Christina Boswell

Christina Boswell, Edinburgh Professor of Politics and leading authority on the politics of migration, assesses the Independence White Paper’s prospectus for asylum and immigration. She argues that public opinion, and cross-border pressures from rUK and the EU may constrain the noble aspirations of the Scottish Government toward a more liberal policy.

There are no major surprises in the Scottish Government’s plans on immigration, as set out in the White Paper on Scotland’s Future published yesterday. As expected, the paper outlines a programme for a more liberal stance on many aspects of immigration asylum policy. This is refreshing given the largely negative and defensive debate on immigration policy south of the border. But how feasible are the plans for liberalising immigration in the event of Scottish independence?

Border control. The paper proposes that an independent Scotland be part of the Common Travel Area (CTA) currently in operation between the UK and Ireland. This would imply no (or at least very limited) border controls between Scotland and the rest of the UK (rUK). This proposal seems reasonable and feasible. Whatever the current rhetoric, rUK would have a strong interest in free circulation between an independent Scotland and England.

What is less clear is the degree to which membership of the CTA would be compatible with a ‘more flexible immigration system’. To be sure, membership of the CTA does not impose formal constraints on national immigration and asylum policies. However, experience of the border-free zone between Schengen countries suggests that a number of concerns about irregular flows might kick in. Notably, the potential for third country nationals not authorised to stay or work in rUK to move across the border from Scotland. I’ll return to this point later.

Labour migration. The paper suggests introducing two main routes for labour migrants. First, a points-based system to recruit migrants who meet particular criteria. Such a system could be adapted to suit the demographic or labour market requirements of Scotland, or even particular regions within Scotland – for example, by awarding points for skills and qualifications, sector, or age. Second, it would re-introduce labour market access for foreign graduates of Scottish universities – as used to be the case under the Fresh Talent initiative, which entitled graduates to stay and look for work for up to 24 months.

Both proposals seem sensible and feasible as a means of attracting skilled migrants to address labour shortages and offset ageing populations. A points based system may not be the sharpest tool for matching workers to jobs in particular sectors/occupations. So the government might be wise to consider complementing this route with an employer-driven scheme for recruiting workers in sectors facing serious shortages. Another caveat relates to the notion that a points-based system could provide ‘incentives’ for people to live and work in ‘more remote geographical areas’. It would be difficult to enforce residency requirements for immigrants. That said, the basic ideas are sound.

Asylum. The government would continue its policy of ‘promoting the integration of refugees and asylum seekers from the day they arrive. And it would end dawn raids and limit the use of detention and forcible removals. In addition, there is a vaguely articulated aspiration to ‘address asylum seekers’ access to employment, education and accommodation’. This formulation is less developed than previous Scottish Government statements about actively promoting employment of asylum seekers to address labour shortages. But caution in this area shows political maturity. The idea of drawing on asylum seekers as a means of addressing labour shortages would set off loud alarm bells in London and Brussels. It would be seen as creating a ‘pull’ factor for would-be migrants, who might abuse the asylum system as a route to the labour market. Whether or not such concerns are well grounded, UK and EU policy circles very much buy into this narrative of asylum abuse, especially where there’s a risk that asylum seekers might travel on to other European countries. Such fears could affect plans to eliminate border controls between Scotland and rUK. If a more liberal asylum policy in Scotland were to attract greater numbers of asylum seekers, then the worry would be that they might travel across the border to seek irregular employment south of the border. Given such a scenario, Whitehall would be likely to place strong pressure on a Scottish government to stick with more restrictive treatment of asylum seekers; or else risk the re-introduction of border controls.

Finally, we should consider how the Scottish public would feel about a more liberal approach to immigration and asylum. Recent research has found that there is a lower level of hostility to immigrants and ethnic minority residents in Scotland, compared to the rest of the UK. But there are reasons for caution about relying on such findings. Firstly, the differences are marginal – a 3-6% variation between Scottish and average UK attitudes according to data from the British Social Attitudes Survey. But secondly, we might expect these dynamics to change in the scenario of an independent Scotland. If a Scottish government were to introduce a more liberal policy, it would create strong incentives for opposition parties and the populist media to score points through highlighting the adverse effects of increasing immigration and asylum. Indeed, this has been the experience of almost all immigration receiving countries in Europe since the 1990s. No single European country – with the possible exception of Spain – has been able to sustain a more liberal policy. Witness the demise of Labour’s more expansive approach to labour migration in the first half of the 1990s. European publics – including those in the UK – have proved highly susceptible to political mobilisation around immigration. Immigration offers a channel for articulating broader concerns about unemployment, inequality and declining social cohesion.

A future Scottish government keen to pursue a more liberal policy would need to think carefully about how it phased in reform, justified it, and – most importantly – how it got the media and opposition parties on board. It’s a noble aspiration. But given what we know about the politics of immigration across Europe, I can’t help feeling sceptical about its political traction.

Professor Christina Boswell is Professor of Politics at the University of Edinburgh. You can read her blog posts on Politics, Knowledge and Migration at: http://christinaboswell.wordpress.com/

Royal College of Surgeons, Nicolson Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9DW

This event, organised by the Institute of Fiscal Studies, will see the launch of the first long term fiscal projections for an independent Scotland. This new research, which is part of a project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council on the Future of the UK and Scotland, will use information on demographic trends, tax revenues and spending patterns to look at fiscal scenarios for Scotland and the UK over the next fifty years and their sensitivity of the projections to key assumptions over long-term growth, the cost of government borrowing and the level of net migration. The event will provide a clear illustration of the fiscal pressures facing an independent Scotland, how these are similar to, and different from, those facing the rest of the UK, and the options available to an independent Scotland to achieve fiscal sustainability.

Other presentations will focus on tax and spending as we aim to clarify some of the fiscal opportunities and constraints that would face Scotland were it to become independent.

This event will take place in Symposium Hall (King Khalid Building), the Royal College of Surgeons, Edinburgh. Registration will take place between 09:30 and 10:00 and the event is expected to conclude by 12:30. A sandwich lunch will follow and delegates will have the opportunity to meet the research team.

Further information and booking details can be found on the IFS website

Colin Fleming, University of Edinburgh

In this article, first published in The Sunday Herald , Colin Fleming challenges the argument presented in a recent UK Government report that an independent Scotland would be unable to deliver the same defence and security provisions as currently enjoyed by the UK

On Tuesday morning [8 October] the Secretary of State for Defence, Philip Hammond, launched the UK Government’s Defence report on Scottish Independence.

This is the latest of its Scotland analysis papers, which the UK Government has produced to put forward its case for maintaining the political status quo, but it is an increasingly salient issue in the referendum debate.

The matter of defence is especially important, being traditionally understood as the cornerstone of state responsibility.

Drawing on the UK’s global role, the main theme of the report is that an independent Scotland would not be able to deliver the same spectrum of defence provision as enjoyed by the UK and thus be unable to fully participate in global affairs.

In fact, it goes as far as to argue that following independence Scotland would not have the same influence on international affairs as it does as part of the UK. It also explicitly states that Scotland’s security would be diminished by independence, and makes the case that Scotland enjoys the safeguards provided by the “integrated” spectrum of forces currently provided as part of the Union.

Boiled down, the report offers an absolutist perspective on military power as a way of delimiting that outlined so far by the SNP and Scottish Government.

Of course, the Scottish Government will have to articulate how it will ensure Scotland’s security in the event of independence, but voters might ask why Scotland would be unable to provide defence and security at least as well as the UK.

The report’s identification of the UK global role and integrated defence is at least questionable. On the question of whether Scotland has international influence as part of the UK, it is correct that devolution has allowed Scotland to take on an international role (not least in Malawi). However, Scotland’s ability to act independently is limited and the idea that an independent Scottish state would somehow have less influence than presently seems particularly specious.

Regardless of whether one supports independence or not, most Scots are likely to feel uncomfortable with the idea that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are good examples of Scotland’s international influence, with the obvious riposte being that only with independence would Scotland have the powers to decide whether it takes part in these types of military operations.

Building on this argument, the report goes on to explain the integrated nature of defence across the UK, to the extent that Scotland could not expect to inherit Scots regiments and military assets. Like other aspects of the paper the rationale is clear, yet again, as the idea that Scotland would somehow not be entitled to its fair share of defence assets is unrealistic at best.

As the report makes clear, there are substantial assets existing in Scotland and it would not be unreasonable that an independent Scottish Government would expect to inherit its fair share. Indeed, the suggestion that the UK forces are so integrated that Scottish assets could not be disentangled begs the question as to how it has been possible for the MoD to restructure the armed forces, resulting in major redundancies in the process.

The report provides no information on possible defence co-operation between the UK and Scotland should there be a Yes vote, despite being asked to consider this issue in a recent Defence Committee report.

The issues regarding recruitment and defence jobs are as equally problematic for the UK as they would necessarily be for a new Scottish state. Yes, Scotland would need to ensure that it is able to recruit and retain personnel, but the argument that it would not be able to provide opportunities to new recruits is overplayed. Involved in constant, major, military operations for more than 10 years, the MoD’s own performance reports demonstrate the difficulty it has retaining service personnel.

The consequence of such poor retention rates has resulted in further pressure on personnel, with more time spent on operation than military guidelines stipulate.

Exacerbated recently by changes to military pensions, there has been an erosion in the Military Covenant that the paper is so keen to highlight. The paper’s use of a 2007 Rand publication may not paint the most accurate picture of whether a career in the forces is as appealing. Indeed, if the Scottish Government can provide assurances on pay and conditions, the UK’s argument that Scotland will have a fatal recruitment shortfall could be proven wrong. In terms of defence jobs, Scotland might not enjoy the economies of scale as that of the UK, but the internationalisation of defence industries has become normal and it is probable that Scotland would be able to maintain jobs in that sector. Omitting to explain its recent defence cuts in Scotland, and how these have impacted on communities, like other areas of the report the UK Government glosses over a great many issues. Whether the long-awaited Scottish Government White Paper is able to better answer the defence question is yet to be seen.

This article was originally published in The Sunday Herald on 13 October 2013

Dr Colin Fleming is Research Fellow at the Scottish Centre for Constitutional Change at the University of Edinburgh

Professor Bronwen Cohen, Honorary Professor in Social Policy at the University of Edinburgh, suggests that transferring powers to the Scottish Parliament over tax and benefits could help bring Scotland’s Early Childhood Education and Care into the 21st century.

Would independence help Scotland deliver better Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) services? The Scottish Government certainly thinks so. In its consultation paper on the Children and Young People Bill, now wending its way through the Scottish Parliament, it announced its commitment to develop high quality flexible and integrated early learning and childcare “matching the best in Europe”, but added that Scotland does not at present have “all the levers” to achieve this goal. The consultation document pointed out that “the tax and benefits system plays a crucial role in shaping how services are funded, organised and delivered and the powers for this remain with the UK”.

Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) (as it is now known in many countries) forms only a small part of the current bill. There is little dispute that this is an area in need of radical improvement, despite some real achievements of successive administrations. But few would dispute the Scottish Government’s own critique of the absence of “a universal coherent system of early learning and childcare“ and a division between early learning and childcare which “does not give our children the best start in lives”.

It means parents having to juggle their arrangements between the pre-school entitlement and additional childcare they require, with some 60 per cent of families using two or more forms of childcare a week. Until the new legislation is enacted, Scotland’s children have access to fewer hours of pre-school education than their English counterparts. Their parents are paying amongst the highest costs for some services and there has been no legislative requirement on Scottish local authorities to secure adequate childcare for working parents.

However, little attention has been paid to the argument that ECEC is one of the areas where the current split in responsibilities between the Scottish and Westminster parliaments causes problems. So is the Scottish Government right to suggest this is an area of people’s lives where independence would make a real difference? And what light does the post-devolution period throw on this issue?

When the Scottish Parliament was established in 1999 there were high expectations for early years’ services. Scotland was well on the way to becoming the first UK nation to implement a new Labour Government commitment to free part-time early education for 3 and 4 year olds. But a decade and a half – and many policy reviews – later, it all looks rather different. In contrast to high profile policy changes in personal care for the elderly or funding for higher education students, bold initiatives that could bring Scottish ECEC into the 21st century have been largely absent.

So what went wrong? Looking back we can see that Scotland could have benefited from either different UK-wide policies – which took more account of divergent approaches to welfare policy in the devolved nations – and/or ensuring that Scotland had more of the financial and policy levers.

Whilst education remained a matter for separate legislation, childcare, supported through tax credits, became largely a Westminster responsibility. In Scotland, which had experience of pioneering holistic approaches to education and care, and where unlike England, schools are still the biggest providers of the pre-school entitlement, a greater focus on integrating education and care within schools as well as other settings, might have yielded swifter and better results.

Some largely lost opportunities to do this, including the location of ECEC within the New Community Schools initiative and school building programmes, were down to successive Scottish administrations. However, it was unhelpful that a number of key decisions were taken prior to the setting up of the Parliament and it was also the case, particularly in the early days, that devolution was not well understood by civil servants in Westminster.

And whilst the greater involvement of the Treasury in early years policy meant increased resources, it reinforced confusion over policy responsibility, tied Scotland into programmes such as Sure Start which were not necessarily of choice, and meant that the increased resources subsequently won for this and other UK programmes would in some measure continue to have an impact on Scottish policy.

So the evidence suggests that the Scottish Government is right to point to the problems caused in part by the split in responsibilities between the two parliaments. Greater attention does need to be given to levels of decision making which can address the peculiarly asymmetric form of current UK devolution arrangements.

Bronwen Cohen is Honorary Professor in Social Policy at the University of Edinburgh.

Her article “Developing ECEC Services in Regionalised Administrations: Scotland’s Post-devolution Experience is in the August 2013 issue of International Journal of Early Childhood: http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1007/s13158-013-0089-y

Charlie Jeffery

A major survey reveals an added dimension to the debate over the future of the UK and it’s being driven by discontent among English voters, writes Charlie Jeffery

It is easy to think that the future of the UK is simply a matter of what Scotland decides in the referendum next year. But, largely unnoticed, England has begun to change in ways which may question the current form of the union just as much as Scotland’s referendum.

This is the central message from the latest Future of England Survey (FoES), a major poll conducted annually by the University of Edinburgh, Cardiff University and the Institute for Public Policy Research. The latest FoES shows how the English are beginning to see themselves – as the Scots have long done – as a national community that demands political recognition.

The drive for recognition is in part about identity. People in England have (at last, many in Scotland might say) begun to distinguish Englishness and Britishness. English identity has strengthened significantly in England since the late 1990s, and British identity weakened. While the strength of Englishness dipped last year – perhaps as a consequence of the Jubilee and the Olympics – twice as many in England prioritise their English identity (35 per cent) as those who prioritise their British identity (17 per cent).

Perhaps more significant is the way in which English identity shapes attitudes to constitutional questions. The English, put bluntly, are discontented with their lot. That feeling of discontent has much to do with devolution. People in England think devolution has given Scotland unfair advantages.

Around 80 per cent of people in England think that Scottish MPs at Westminster should not vote on English laws and that the Scottish Parliament should cover its spending through its own tax decisions. Over 50 per cent think Scotland gets more than its fair share of public spending while 40 per cent think that England gets less than its fair share. And around half think Scotland’s economy benefits more from the union and just 8 per cent that the English economy benefits.

These are not figures skewed by discontented northerners in England, caught between the political strength of devolved Scotland and the economic strength of London and the south east; they are remarkably uniform across England, also in the south east.

Importantly that is not just a complaint about Scotland. It is a complaint about the Westminster system itself. Over 60 per cent of people in England do not trust the UK government to act in England’s best interests. And in none of the questions we asked about England’s constitutional options did more than a quarter plump for the status quo. Over half favoured some form of England-specific, England-wide political arrangements: the top choice (of a third or so) was special arrangements for English laws in the UK parliament; second was a free standing English Parliament at around 20 per cent.

We also asked about the capacity of political parties in England – in government and opposition, inside and outside the UK parliament – to stand up for English interests. Table One (left) shows responses to this question in 2011, 2012 and 2013.

Two things are striking. The first is that no party is seen by more than a fifth or so of the English as standing up for their interests. The second is that Labour, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats are under pressure from forces outside the system. The top choice in 2011 and 2012 was “none of the above”. In 2013 it was Ukip. The party of the UK’s “independence” appears to have a specific and growing resonance in England.

Talk of Ukip inevitably raises the question of Europe. Here lies England’s other discontent. The EU is very unpopular in England. Asked whether Europe is a “good thing” or a “bad thing”, 43 per cent opted for the former and just 28 per cent the latter. And asked about an in-out referendum on Europe the answer is clear: English voters would leave: 50 per cent said “out” and just 33 per cent “in” with the rest undecided.

In these different ways the outline of a distinctive English politics is emerging, based on a strengthening English (and weakening British) identity, resentments about devolution and Europe, and a sense that neither the current political parties nor institutions of government are delivering for England. Significantly these different features of England’s new politics reinforce each other. Stronger English identity is associated with stronger levels of discontent about Scotland, stronger demands for some kind of English self-government, and passionate dislike of the EU.

It is interesting how these political attitudes map onto party allegiance. Liberal Democrat supporters are the furthest away from this new politics; they are more British, less resentful about Scotland, robustly pro-European and ambivalent about English self-government. Labour supporters are split. Conservative supporters are in the heartland of the new politics, but Ukip supporters are in the vanguard: they are the most English, the most discontented about Scotland, the most hostile to the EU and the most in favour of English self-government. Despite its “UK” title Ukip has become England’s national party.

What does all this mean for Scotland? We asked the FoES respondents the Scottish referendum question. They gave an answer pretty much the same as in most recent polls: Yes at 30 per cent and No at 49 per cent. So the union would be safe in England’s hands.

But it would be a different kind of union, with a limited role for Scottish MPs at Westminster and a Scottish Parliament that raised its own taxes. The English appear to be supporters of devo-max. Combined with their preference for English self-government this points to a union with a weaker centre and more autonomy in the component parts.

There is a joker in the pack though, and that is Europe. As Table Two shows – using recent Scottish data from MORI alongside FoES data for England – attitudes to Europe appear sharply divergent. In a referendum the English would vote to leave and the Scots would vote to stay. Europe plays a role in England’s emergent national politics that is not matched in Scotland. It marks out a dividing line between the two nations.

This dividing line may become important after next May’s European Parliament elections. Many expect Ukip to win. If it does do well, it seems unlikely – not least because it appears a response to England’s discontents – it will be anywhere near as strong in Scotland as England. The recent Aberdeen Donside by-election suggested as much. A newly prominent English nationalism that emphasises priorities quite different to those in Scotland may impact unpredictably on Scotland’s referendum.

What would the response be in England if Scotland did vote Yes? We asked the FoES respondents whether or not they agreed that England should become an independent country. A surprisingly high 34 per cent said yes, while 38 per cent said no, with the rest undecided.

We also asked what their views would be if Scotland voted yes next year. In that event 39 per cent were for English independence, 31 per cent against and 29 per cent undecided. We are accustomed to talking about the “rest of the UK” when imagining Scottish independence. Perhaps that – as those in Wales and Northern Ireland might note – is an optimistic assumption.

Professor Charlie Jeffery is Director of the Academy of Government at the University of Edinburgh. The FoES survey was carried out with 3,600 respondents in England from 23-28 November 2012.

This article was originally published in The Scotsman on 09 July 2013

Jan Eichhorn

Following the first major survey of the views of young people on independence by researchers at the University of Edinburgh, Jan Eichhorn, a member of the research team, argues that whatever their current opinions, young Scots are keen to engage in the debate

The minimum voting age for the Scottish independence referendum will be 16 rather than the usual one of 18. Many commentators have expressed strong views on whether this is a good idea or not. On the one hand it has been argued that younger people can judge the merits of or problems with independence just as well as anybody else, and that they ought to be involved in a decision about what will very much be their future. On the other hand multiple public figures have claimed that under-18 year olds would be ill-informed, largely uninterested, and inclined to follow the views of others rather than make a choice for themselves.

While sometimes presented eloquently, these viewpoints, were not usually based on any empirical research. Until now there has not been any investigation of the attitudes of a representative sample of 14-17 year olds towards Scottish independence – even though all those currently aged 14 ½ or more will be able to cast a vote. Funded by the ESRC a team of researchers from Edinburgh University (Prof Lindsay Paterson, Prof John MacInnes, Dr Michael Rosie and myself) has now filled that gap.

The core finding of the survey is intriguing: Only just over one in five said they supported independence, while 60% disapproved and just under 1/5th said that they were undecided. This represents a markedly lower level of support for independence than in any recent poll of the adult population.

This difference suggests that young people are inclined to make up their own minds rather than all simply following the lead of others, in particular their parents. That indeed is the case. As well as interviewing 14-17 year olds themselves, we also asked one of their parents whether they supported or opposed independence. This revealed that while 59% of young people had the same view as the parent to whom we spoke, over 40% held a different view.

Not that young people are forming their views in isolation. Nearly all (88%) had talked with someone else about the referendum – though to whom they have talked varies a lot. While some have talked to parents, others have discussed the issue with friends or classmates. Some have talked to all three! How their views are formed differs and means that we have to consider the perspectives of young people as complex.

Indeed young people seem hungry to learn more. No less than two-thirds said they wanted more information before making their final decision.

Moreover, there is little sign of apathy. Over two-thirds say they are ‘very’ or ‘rather likely’ to vote in the referendum; only 13% say that do not intend to vote in the referendum. Indeed far from being a disengaged generation nearly 60% say they are interested in politics ‘to some extent’ at least – as was evident in the interest that young people exhibited in our project when we asked a group of them to tell us how we might improve a draft version of our survey.

Uninterested? Certainly not. Following the lead of others? Not obviously so. Ill-informed; well at least young people seem to be aware of the importance of making an informed choice. And to help them do so, we will be developing politically neutral materials that can be used in classroom activities and will be meaningful to young people. But it looks as though there is plenty of work for the politicians and campaigns to do too.

More information and updates about the project can be found at http://www.aqmen.ac.uk/youngscotsurveyresults

Dr Jan Eichhorn is Research Fellow (Applied Quantitative Methods Network) and Teaching Fellow at the School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh

This blog was first published on 19 June 2013 on whatscotlandthinks.org

The political debate around the Scottish independence referendum could so far be characterised by two opposing constitutional options being trotted out against a backdrop of bickering over procedural issues. Yet what this change – or status quo – should deliver, has not been so clearly articulated.  A seminar in Edinburgh last week addressed that vacuum, posing the fundamental question: what could a new Scotland look like?

The event, entitled Women and Constitutional Futures: Gender Equality Matters in a New Scotland, held on 14 and 15 February at the Royal Society of Edinburgh, brought together a range of academics, practitioners and activists to discuss what the 2014 referendum could mean for gender equality – and, critically, the opportunities it presents to advance the agenda.  Organised by the University of Edinburgh’s Professor of Politics, Fiona Mackay and Professor of Constitutional Law, Christine Bell, this timely forum explored how women’s voices could be injected into the debate – not only in the run up to the referendum, but in the constitutional negotiations that might follow and, ultimately, the country that will emerge post-2014.  Discussions of macro-economic policy, EU membership, or indeed the timing of the poll or wording of the question, were notably absent.  Instead participants were invited to take a step back and imagine a new Scotland – one where gender equality matters.

The sense that Scotland was approaching a ‘critical juncture’ infused the event.  Constitutional change presents an unprecedented opportunity to advance women’s inclusion in society by getting in at the foundations and enshrining its principles in new constitutions, structures and institutions.  But that is a time-limited window.  Focusing minds, seminar chair Lesley Riddoch reminded the audience that Scotland’s First Minister had committed to a written constitution in an independent Scotland; if gender equality is to be embedded within that, now is the time to act.

International examples of how human rights and equality have been written into constitutions in countries like South Africa and Columbia, were set out by Georgina Waylen, Professor of Politics at the University of Manchester and Dr Catherine O’Rourke of the Institute for Transitional Justice, University of Ulster.  Sketching the opportunities and the pitfalls, they offered some lessons for women aiming to influence constitutional change: organise in advance, intervene early and form alliances.

The seminar also heard about constitutional developments closer to home.  Speakers from Iceland and Ireland explained how the recent economic and political crises in their countries had sparked constitutional reform as the public demanded greater citizen participation in their governance.  In the wake of its financial crash a deliberative process was kick started to draw up a new constitution shaped by the people.  Thorvaldur Gylfason, Chair of the Icelandic Alliance for a New Constitution, described the process that involved a Constitutional Council, made up of 25 citizens, which obtained the views of the public through its website as well as Facebook and Twitter.  This innovative approach has not been without its challenges however.  Despite the draft constitution – which includes greater public control of natural resources – being endorsed in a referendum in October, its ratification now faces opposition both from within Parliament and from special interests, Gylfason said.  But, as he reflected: “A good constitution is one that will face serious opposition”.

Meanwhile, Professor Yvonne Galligan of Queens University Belfast outlined the Constitutional Convention established in Ireland last year to discuss constitutional amendments – including proposals to enhance women’s participation in public life – and made up of one third politicians and two thirds citizens.  The professor sounded a note of caution on the use of deliberative democracy, however, warning that deliberation does not always deliver gender equality outcomes.

Unsurprisingly, women’s political representation was high on the agenda.  Dr Meryl Kenny, Research Fellow at the University of New South Wales, painted a picture of regression in the Scottish Parliament, where the proportion of women has fallen from a high of 39.5% in the 2003 elections to 34.8% in 2011, while speakers from Spain and Ireland showed how things might be done differently.  Tania Verge, of Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, shared experiences from Catalonia and Spain where gender quotas have seen women’s representation rise from 5% in the late 1970s to near parity levels in 2011.

Meanwhile, across the water, statutory parliamentary quotas of 30% women candidates on the ballot paper at the next General Election (rising to 40% after seven years) were adopted in Ireland last year.  The “system shock” of recession, according to Fiona Buckley, co-founder of the 50/50 campaign, provided the “critical juncture” to address dismal levels of women’s representation – currently 15%.  The lesson to be drawn from the Irish experience, Buckley told delegates, was to, “never waste a good crisis”.  “Women are not the problem”, she added; institutional barriers are and quotas can begin to address them.

But discussions of equality went far beyond electoral quotas to social justice in its broadest sense.  Kate Higgins, political blogger and member of Women for Independence, challenged her fellow-delegates to recognise that, “we are privileged women” and beyond those walls economic and social inequalities mark Scottish society. Tackling that injustice is core to why Scotland needs independence, she argued.

Former Scottish Socialist MSP Carolyn Leckie likewise drew attention back to class inequality, saying that for many women in Scotland a more pressing issue is how they will afford to buy adequate food for their families, and not just “horse burgers”.  “I always find myself in class environments talking feminism and in feminist environments talking class,” she added.

To round off the day delegates were taken back to the dawn of devolution.  Speakers from Northern Ireland shared their experiences of having formed an all-women’s party – the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition – in a bid to influence negotiations in advance of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.  Founder member Carmel Roulston recalled how members from nationalist and unionist communities came together to ensure women’s voices were represented in the negotiations.

Professor Alice Brown, a member of the Consultative Steering Group for the Scottish Parliament and founder member of the Scottish Women’s Coordination Group, reflected on that process and its lessons for the forthcoming campaign.

“But what worries me is that this time round there is not that same focus on equal representation,” she said.

“There is political division between the political parties; the debate is quite toxic in some regards. And that means that the broad alliance we were able to achieve in the 90s perhaps is not so possible now.”

Ending on a more positive note, Brown called on those present to consider establishing a ‘Women’s Constitutional Commission’ or ‘Women’s Futures Commission’.  Professor James Mitchell of the University of Strathclyde wholeheartedly backed the proposal, saying women should be “deeply dissatisfied” with the offerings to date of both the Yes Scotland and Better Together campaigns. Around the room, lively debate was sparked about what a body like this might look like – but the enthusiasm for some such initiative was palpable.

The day drew to a close with a sense of possibility – and a recognition that the time to realise those possibilities is now.

Cera Murtagh is a PhD Candidate in Politics at the University of Edinburgh researching cross-community political parties in divided societies