Dr. Andrew Neal, University of Edinburgh

The Home Secretary is disingenuous to claim that an independent Scotland would be left out of the loop on our island’s security, writes Dr Andrew Neal in the 12 November 2013 edition of The Scotsman.

Theresa May’s Scotland Analysis: Security paper, published recently, is two things: factual and political. Factually, it is a comprehensive inventory of the UK national security architecture. Politically, it is an opening gambit. It sets out the negotiating position of the British government in the event of a Yes vote, stating that an independent Scotland would be excluded from the existing architecture and could not possibly share it. The paper says that apart from its strong capabilities in policing, an independent Scotland would have to start from scratch.

As a reference document, the analysis paper is a fantastic resource for anyone wanting to understand the nuts and bolts of UK security governance. The problem is that the UK and Scottish governments are playing a disingenuous game of security politics with each other and with us.

The UK government says that an independent Scotland would be out in the cold. This does not fit with the realities of our shared island and its integrated infrastructure. Take the claim that an independent Scotland would be excluded from UK cybersecurity. We have an integrated telecommunications network with UK-wide service providers. Unless someone constructs a great firewall of Scotland – Hadrian’s firewall perhaps – that is not going to change. Independence or not, Scottish cybersecurity is UK cybersecurity. GCHQ has deals with communications companies for network access, which are among their most prized assets and closely guarded secrets. They are not going to tear these up.

To exclude Scotland from the national security architecture would go against the interests and tendencies of the security services. From what we have learnt in recent press about their political influence and boundless urge for expansion, they will lobby hard not to relinquish their reach over the northern third of the Great Britain.

For example, we know from the Edward Snowden revelations that the natural tendency of GCHQ is to extend its capabilities. From its station at Bude in Cornwall it monitors communications data from across Europe and Asia as it leaves the continent for America. The Snowden papers also suggest that GCHQ works closely with the intelligence services of European partners to share technology and data, and helps them stretch the interpretation of legal restrictions to make this possible.

With this in mind, it is hard to imagine GCHQ closing its ears to what happens in Scotland. If civil libertarians see independence as an opportunity for Scotland to distance itself from the perceived surveillance state that is emerging in the UK, they can forget it. Popping over the Border from Carlisle to Gretna for a bit of data privacy is not going to happen.

When the capabilities of the security services have been challenged, the intelligence community has lobbied hard to keep them. Scottish independence would be no different. For example, the three main Westminster parties were until recently committed to changing the law to allow intercept material as evidence in court. Allegedly, to prevent this, GCHQ deployed sympathetic figures such as the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation Lord Carlile to successfully turn the argument in their favour.

History shows that what the security services want, they get. Somewhat wise after the fact, David Blunkett said last week that when the security services tell the government that something needs to be done, it takes a brave minister to say no. Harold Macmillan wrote in his autobiography that ministers and even prime ministers are disadvantaged amateurs against the specialised security claims of the professional intelligence community. This will be as true for Alex Salmond is it was for him. The intelligence community will have persuasive words behind closed doors north and south of any new Border.

Arguments against security are difficult to win, and that is probably why the SNP has not tried to make them. Arguing for reduced security measures depends on the unprovable claim that the threat has decreased. The cost of getting it wrong would be terminal to any political career.

Arguing for increased security only needs to be justified against hypothetical worst-case scenarios; no proof required. There is little political cost in getting it wrong other than being labelled authoritarian. Being tougher on terrorism than the other side is a well-worn political strategy anyway. The security analysis paper hangs on a version of this thin but irrefutable reasoning: if the worst has happened in other small European countries, and then it could happen in Scotland.

The only SNP security policy we have at the moment is a bland statement that Scotland will have arrangements that are “proportionate and fit for purpose”. Like every other question ever asked about independence, from dividing up the state-owned banks to Alex Salmond’s shoe size, we expect this to be addressed in the fabled white paper on 26 November.

In the meantime, the SNP has implicitly accepted that its proposed 18-month transition from referendum to independence is not enough time to set up a new Scottish national security architecture. Nicola Sturgeon, in her evidence to the foreign affairs committee in January, suggested that an independent Scotland would expect some help from the UK security services to get its own arrangements up and running, and even for Scotland to stay in the intelligence loop. The response from the intelligence community has been “don’t bet on it”, but again this is disingenuous.

The politics of security and the facts on the ground mean that Scotland and the UK will remain security bedfellows. The UK will be compelled to keep an independent Scotland in the security fold. An independent Scotland will be compelled to stay there. It is in none of their interests to allow the merest perception of a Scottish “weak link” to take hold. All sides have said that security is the first responsibility of government. They will be held to this. It won’t be easy for Alex Salmond to tell a post-independence Scotland that “help” from the UK means that GCHQ is still listening.

Andrew Neal is working on a book on parliamentary security politics. He is principal convenor of the ESRC seminar series ‘Security in Scotland, with or without constitutional change’. His most recent book is “Exceptionalism and the politics of counter-terrorism: liberty, security and the war on terror” (Routledge 2010). His research sits between international relations theory, political theory, sociology and security studies. He is particularly poststructural, critical, and sociological approaches to security; and the work and reception of Carl Schmitt and Michel Foucault in IR and security studies.

Colin Fleming, University of Edinburgh

In this article, first published in The Sunday Herald , Colin Fleming challenges the argument presented in a recent UK Government report that an independent Scotland would be unable to deliver the same defence and security provisions as currently enjoyed by the UK

On Tuesday morning [8 October] the Secretary of State for Defence, Philip Hammond, launched the UK Government’s Defence report on Scottish Independence.

This is the latest of its Scotland analysis papers, which the UK Government has produced to put forward its case for maintaining the political status quo, but it is an increasingly salient issue in the referendum debate.

The matter of defence is especially important, being traditionally understood as the cornerstone of state responsibility.

Drawing on the UK’s global role, the main theme of the report is that an independent Scotland would not be able to deliver the same spectrum of defence provision as enjoyed by the UK and thus be unable to fully participate in global affairs.

In fact, it goes as far as to argue that following independence Scotland would not have the same influence on international affairs as it does as part of the UK. It also explicitly states that Scotland’s security would be diminished by independence, and makes the case that Scotland enjoys the safeguards provided by the “integrated” spectrum of forces currently provided as part of the Union.

Boiled down, the report offers an absolutist perspective on military power as a way of delimiting that outlined so far by the SNP and Scottish Government.

Of course, the Scottish Government will have to articulate how it will ensure Scotland’s security in the event of independence, but voters might ask why Scotland would be unable to provide defence and security at least as well as the UK.

The report’s identification of the UK global role and integrated defence is at least questionable. On the question of whether Scotland has international influence as part of the UK, it is correct that devolution has allowed Scotland to take on an international role (not least in Malawi). However, Scotland’s ability to act independently is limited and the idea that an independent Scottish state would somehow have less influence than presently seems particularly specious.

Regardless of whether one supports independence or not, most Scots are likely to feel uncomfortable with the idea that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are good examples of Scotland’s international influence, with the obvious riposte being that only with independence would Scotland have the powers to decide whether it takes part in these types of military operations.

Building on this argument, the report goes on to explain the integrated nature of defence across the UK, to the extent that Scotland could not expect to inherit Scots regiments and military assets. Like other aspects of the paper the rationale is clear, yet again, as the idea that Scotland would somehow not be entitled to its fair share of defence assets is unrealistic at best.

As the report makes clear, there are substantial assets existing in Scotland and it would not be unreasonable that an independent Scottish Government would expect to inherit its fair share. Indeed, the suggestion that the UK forces are so integrated that Scottish assets could not be disentangled begs the question as to how it has been possible for the MoD to restructure the armed forces, resulting in major redundancies in the process.

The report provides no information on possible defence co-operation between the UK and Scotland should there be a Yes vote, despite being asked to consider this issue in a recent Defence Committee report.

The issues regarding recruitment and defence jobs are as equally problematic for the UK as they would necessarily be for a new Scottish state. Yes, Scotland would need to ensure that it is able to recruit and retain personnel, but the argument that it would not be able to provide opportunities to new recruits is overplayed. Involved in constant, major, military operations for more than 10 years, the MoD’s own performance reports demonstrate the difficulty it has retaining service personnel.

The consequence of such poor retention rates has resulted in further pressure on personnel, with more time spent on operation than military guidelines stipulate.

Exacerbated recently by changes to military pensions, there has been an erosion in the Military Covenant that the paper is so keen to highlight. The paper’s use of a 2007 Rand publication may not paint the most accurate picture of whether a career in the forces is as appealing. Indeed, if the Scottish Government can provide assurances on pay and conditions, the UK’s argument that Scotland will have a fatal recruitment shortfall could be proven wrong. In terms of defence jobs, Scotland might not enjoy the economies of scale as that of the UK, but the internationalisation of defence industries has become normal and it is probable that Scotland would be able to maintain jobs in that sector. Omitting to explain its recent defence cuts in Scotland, and how these have impacted on communities, like other areas of the report the UK Government glosses over a great many issues. Whether the long-awaited Scottish Government White Paper is able to better answer the defence question is yet to be seen.

This article was originally published in The Sunday Herald on 13 October 2013

Dr Colin Fleming is Research Fellow at the Scottish Centre for Constitutional Change at the University of Edinburgh

ESRC

The ESRC is offering funding for three UK postgraduate students to attend all six security seminars, which run from September 2013 to September 2015.

This seminar series will explore the implications of Scottish independence and constitutional change for security governance in Scotland and the UK. The seminars will span the referendum date, producing independent research evidence to inform policymaking and public debate in advance of the vote and in response to the outcome.

The seminars will bring together speakers for research and knowledge exchange from the intelligence and security community, UK Government departments with security competences, parliamentary committees providing security oversight, EU institutions, Scottish Civil and Parliamentary Services, Scottish Government, political parties, local government and the Police Service of Scotland. A team of academic security and constitutional experts will facilitate the seminars and provide independent intellectual input and synthesis, supplemented by invited speakers from the UK and comparative European countries. For more information visit: http://wp.me/p2nD2X-1N

Seminar titles:

1) October 2013: Assessing security governance in the UK and Scotland under current arrangements.

2) January 2014: The threat environment of the UK and Scotland in the context of the UK National Security Strategy.

3) May 2014: The foreign policy and comparative aspects of security governance for the UK, Scotland and its neighbours.

4) September 2014: Current and prospective accountability and oversight arrangements in the UK and Scotland.

5) January 2015: The security governance implications of the referendum outcome: independence or interdependence?

6) May 2015: Lessons from the series for understanding security governance. Future research programmes, maintenance of links and dialogue, and project outputs.

Postgraduate funding:

– Three postgraduate researchers will be selected to participate in the series on the basis of the quality of their research and its relevance to the seminar themes.

– Candidates should currently be undertaking a PhD or postdoctoral research in the UK.

– We will offer the selected candidates travel and accommodation costs (as appropriate) to the six seminars in Edinburgh from anywhere in the UK.

– We will ask the three selected candidates to make presentations on a relevant topic in the final seminar. We may also ask for some basic help with research assistance and organisation for the seminars.

– Our intention is that the postgraduate presentations will form the basis of journal articles, which we will offer to supervise, edit, and include in any collective outputs of the series if appropriate.

Interested candidates should send a one-page summary of their research and a CV to andrew.neal@ed.ac.uk by Friday 6th September. Selected candidates will be informed by Monday 16th September.

Other postgraduates and academic researchers may be able to attend the seminars as appropriate, unfunded and space permitting.

]]> https://blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk/referendum/esrc_seminar/feed/ 0 https://blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk/referendum/spying_on_scotland/ https://blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk/referendum/spying_on_scotland/#respond Fri, 14 Jun 2013 07:00:33 +0000 http://blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk/referendum/?p=465 Continue reading →]]>

Dr. Andrew Neal, University of Edinburgh

In this piece, Andrew Neal reflects on the recent US spying scandal, particularly in light of revelations that the British GCHQ was making use of this intelligence. This piece was originally published on securitypolitics on 11 June 2013.

The recent revelations about domestic surveillance in the US were controversial because the National Security Agency was secretly spying on the communications of American citizens. In the US, debates about intelligence have always hinged on a distinction between citizens and foreigners. The Foreign Intelligence Service Act has long made it perfectly acceptable for US agencies to spy on foreigners at home or abroad. These powers have been consistently approved and upheld by US courts.

In the UK, successive governments have tried to create a law to allow blanket communications surveillance. This would be the mass collection, retention and analysis of communications ‘metadata’; not the content of telephone calls and emails but connections, numbers, times, locations, call length, frequency and so on. This data could be used for sophisticated forms of social network analysis. Ad hoc groupings of libertarians in parliament, led by the Liberal Democrats, have successfully blocked the Communications and Data Bill or ‘Snoopers’ Charter’.

It now transpires that the UK intelligence agency GCHQ has been getting around the continuing lack of a legal basis for this kind of surveillance. It has been receiving the data it wants from the NSA in the US. This falls under a legal grey area. It seems that British data protection laws do not apply if the data of UK citizens is already in the US (e.g. Gmail, Dropbox, Facebook, Skype, Flikr, pretty much everything). This is a convenient way for a government to avoid the charge that it spies on its own citizens. Instead, another government spies on that population as foreigners, then hands the intelligence over.

Now, one of the uncertain issues in the Scottish independence debate is what kind of intelligence agencies a new Scotland would create. Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon told the Foreign Affairs Committee that an independent Scotland would create its own domestic intelligence agency, but that the Scottish Government was taking advice on establishing a foreign intelligence service like MI6. Members of the intelligence community have said that Scotland would also need some kind of ‘mini-GCHQ’ to defend against cyber attacks. Whatever the decision, an independent Scotland would not have the resources to replicate the advanced communications intelligence facilities of GCHQ. It would also be starting from scratch and so take years to establish credible capabilities.

This raises some questions. If Scotland is not going to monitor domestic communications like the UK government wants to, then will this leave an unsurveilled utopia of personal freedom north of the border? Could a would-be terrorist simply move to from London to Gretna to avoid having his or her communications monitored, then plan the next attack? And given that UK communication systems (land lines, mobile networks, internet infrastructure) are completely integrated, how would an independent Scotland implement a different legal regime for data protection and surveillance, even if it wanted to?

Here is a modest proposal. The US-UK intelligence sharing relationship shows us the way. An independent Scotland could simply allow GCHQ to spy on its citizens’ communications, then share the intelligence with the Scottish Government. This way, GCHQ would be spying on foreigners, the Scottish government could legitimately say that it does not monitor its own citizens’ electronic activities, and the UK security services would avoid the terrifying Gretna scenario.

So here are two questions for First Minister’s Question Time at the Scottish parliament: “Would the First Minister allow UK intelligence agencies to spy on the citizens of an independent Scotland? And would the Scottish government make use of the resulting intelligence?

Dr Andrew Neal is a Lecturer at the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh. He blogs at securitypolitics and tweets @andrewwneal. 

Dr. Andrew Neal, University of Edinburgh

In this piece, Dr. Andrew Neal argues that security is about the perception of threats, rendering an objective assessment of Scotland’s prospects for security impossible. However, he notes that an independent Scotland may emulate the UK’s expansive approach to secruity threats and risks or adopt a narrower approach. 

An objective analysis of the prospective security situation of an independent Scotland is impossible. There is no objective or settled meaning to the term ‘security’, even in the current governmental and constitutional arrangements of the UK. It is thus not possible to simply produce an objective and comparative list of ‘threats’ to the UK and an independent Scotland. The real question is how governments perceive threats and what they attempt to do about them. The question is therefore not whether an independent Scotland would face different threats to the rest of the UK, but how the government of an independent Scotland would perceive threats and what it would attempt to do about them.

At present, the UK government does not have a coherent approach to ‘security’, and there is no reason to think that an independent Scottish government would be any different. Governments of modern states are sprawling, complex beasts. Getting them to do anything in a coherent, unified way is extremely difficult, especially on issues that span different parts of government, maybe even all parts of government.

There are currently two interpretations of ‘security’ in play within the UK government: the narrow and the broad. The narrow interpretation adopts a traditional understanding of security, in which threats are foreign, military, and state-based. The corresponding parts of government in the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and 10 Downing Street deal with those threats. The National Security Council chaired by the Prime Minister has largely focused on traditional foreign and defence issues, such as the Libyan intervention.

At the same, an alternative broad interpretation of security is being developed elsewhere in the UK government. The UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy document (CONTEST) lists 29 departments and agencies as playing a role in this strategy. The most recent version of the National Security Strategy (NSS) goes further by shifting from ‘security’ to an encompassing list of ‘risks’. These stretch from international terrorism and overseas military crises to border transgressions by illegal immigrants and disruptions to fuel and food supplies. The manifestation of this broad interpretation of security is that security is proliferating across all areas of government, far beyond the traditional narrow remit of foreign and defence policy.

The conclusion we must draw is that there is no single meaning of security in the UK. The reality is that disparate parts of the government perceive ‘threats’ and ‘risks’ differently and develop policies to deal with them in a piecemeal fashion. Whether this is good or bad depends on ones’ view on the relative dangers of security threats on the one hand, or a unified security state on the other.

Would it be different in an independent Scotland? The Scottish government might not perceive threats and risks in the same way. Given the haphazard nature of threat perception in the UK, there is no reason to think that Scotland would independently come up with same list of threats and risks. Scottish politics has been less hostile to immigrants than Westminster politics. The Scottish government might not see immigration as part of the bundle of risks specified in the NSS that includes terrorism, organised crime and smuggling.

My current research on parliamentary security politics at Westminster analyzes this unsettled and changing state of security affairs. The uneven creep of ‘security’ across different areas of government is reflected in a larger number of parliamentary committees handling security issues. Half a dozen now do so regularly (Intelligence and Security, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Joint Committee on Human Rights, Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy). At least half a dozen more discuss security questions on a less frequent basis (e.g. Lords Committee on the Constitution, Energy, Public Accounts, Energy and Climate Change, Science and Technology, Health). If we were to take the comprehensive list of risks in the NSS seriously, we could argue that every part of government and parliament will find itself dealing with security issues at some point.

Whatever ‘security’ is, it already reaches far beyond the ‘reserved areas of government’ that Holyrood currently leaves to Westminster (e.g. foreign affairs, defence, counter-terrorism). The proliferation of ‘security’ across Westminster has in no way been mirrored in Holyrood. Even in the constitutional status quo, it is not clear that current Scottish arrangements provide adequate scrutiny and oversight of every aspect of ‘security’ that could affect Scotland. Without knowing which new ministries and parliamentary committees an independent Scotland would create, it is difficult to know how ‘security’ would play out in the new constitutional context.

And what of a Scottish House of Lords or equivalent? The House of Lords has often put a brake on the excesses of security politics at Westminster, such as extended pre-charge detention for terrorist suspects. In large part this is thanks to the many lawyers and a scattering of former security officials in its ranks. We do not even know if an independent Scotland would have an upper house of parliament, but we can be certain that it would not be an unelected body of experts and political appointees like the Lords and so would probably not have the same legal and security expertise.

Much hinges on the extent to which an independent Scotland would truly be an ‘independent’ state. If it does not free itself from the current security model at Westminster, we can expect security to be a lengthening rope pulled in several different directions at once. If it does not depart radically from the current Holyrood model, we can expect a continuing lack of scrutiny and oversight. The question of security in an independent Scotland is not a question of what objective threats it would face. It is a constitutional question. The character of security in a modern state is a product of its constitutional arrangements. Leadership, officialdom, parliament; these all shape ‘security’ in different, conflicting ways. Sometimes security shapes them.

Dr Andrew Neal is a Lecturer at the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh. He blogs at securitypolitics and tweets @andrewwneal. 

Colin Fleming, University of Edinburgh

Dr. Colin Fleming writes on the possibility of Nato membership for an independent Scotland, noting that while Scotland could exist outwith Nato, independence outside the strategic alliance would come at a political and financial cost.

This week Nato are conducting joint operational exercises off the Scottish coast, from April 15-29. This comes just after the recent trip by Alex Salmond to America and his lecture to the US think-tank the Brookings Institute where the First Minister said that Scotland’s international partnerships would remain unchanged in the event of independence. The nation’s alliances with the US and other nations would endure while Scotland would become an independent and active member of organisations, ranging from the European Union and the United Nations to Nato.

However, Nato is correct not to publically signal that Scotland would simply join the alliance, not least because to do so would be to undermine the UK state – one of its key members. Rocking the status quo is simply not something the US or Nato will do at this stage. Yet, neither is this somehow an indication that Scotland would have trouble being admitted to the alliance should the Scottish public vote Yes in next year’s referendum.

Nato provides a security guarantee which Scotland could not attain on its own. Membership would also have the added importance of plugging Scotland into regional and international security networks, something that will be expected from us by the majority of European states. Scotland could exist without Nato – there is no immediate territorial threat to the nation – but to do so would be much more costly financially and would make it far harder for Scotland to integrate with its key partners – not least the rest of the UK (RUK).

Integration is important in terms of future defence-sharing prospects with RUK, as it is for its possible future relationship with the Nordic states. Nevertheless, just as there are incentives for Scotland to join Nato, so too are there significant reasons why Nato would want Scotland to become a member of the organisation. Not least, Scotland’s geostrategic position marks it out as a pivotal player with its own strategic interests in the Atlantic.

As Scotland sits in the middle of the North Atlantic it would be odd if it weren’t welcomed into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This area is increasing important when it comes to strategic interests globally due to the potential for security concerns relating to Russia and China. Our joining existing security networks – both transatlantic and regional, such as the Nordic Defence Coperation pact – will therefore be highly desirable to Scotland’s neighbours.

We should also not undervalue the importance of existing Nato infrastructure in Scotland which Nato will want to maintain. However, perhaps more important is Scotland’s ability to fill gaps in the existing security framework. The inclusion of Scotland is more likely to enhance the security of the North Atlantic area, and we would be an important partner for regional allies as well of the Nato alliance.

Put simply, the UK’s focus towards the Middle East has resulted in a security gap in the Atlantic. This security gap has been exacerbated by ongoing MoD austerity measures which have prioritised finances on fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at the cost of a properly maintained readiness for maritime operations in the Atlantic. The early decommissioning of the Nimrod and its cancelled replacement has left a hole in intelligence and surveillance across the region which is easily exploitable for those with the know-how. Scotland could, and should, plug this gap in the event of independence. Indeed, at present this surveillance role is conducted by Nato, which currently operates Maritime Patrol Aircraft from Leuchers and Lossiemouth for this very purpose. It would be highly attractive for Nato to retain these assets post-independence. A properly conducted negotiation between Scotland and RUK, where Scotland does not try to diminish the UK’s current standing, could lead to Scotland filling an important function, which focuses north instead of south.

The SNP position, that an independent Scottish state will ban nuclear weapons from Scottish territory, reflects the mood of the Scottish public in regard its own position on nuclear weapons. However, Scotland being nuclear-free is unlikely to be a serious impediment to Nato membership. Norway and Denmark have also banned nuclear weapons and both are important members of the alliance – fulfilling key tasks in Afghanistan and Libya. Furthermore, Scotland’s refusal to host nuclear weapons on its territory – as long as it acts responsibly to the concerns of RUK – will be balanced by what it can offer elsewhere. In light of changing geopolitical interests to our north as well as south, Scotland would be a good bet for Nato.

Dr Colin Fleming is a Research Fellow in Politics and International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. This piece was originally published in the Sunday Herald on 14 April 2012.

In Washington DC last Tuesday, Alex Salmond reiterated his commitment to a nuclear-weapons-free independent Scotland.  In articulating this to an American audience, his conviction on this issue appears to be undimmed.

Salmond has recently referred to how a written constitution might help an independent Holyrood Government to achieve this.  As he recently stated: ‘Scotland is currently the home of Western Europe’s largest concentration of weapons of mass destruction. They are based on the River Clyde, within 30 miles of Scotland’s largest city. A constitutional ban on the possession of nuclear weapons would end that obscenity.’

Are his convictions justified?  Could a written constitution really help in the removal of nuclear weapons from an independent Scotland?

The short answer to this is ‘Yes’.  For those who might require convincing, there are pertinent examples we can look to.  Improbably, perhaps, Mongolia is one such example, a benchmark for how a state can enshrine nuclear weapons opposition into legislation which is then used to gain formal recognition by the international community.  The government of an independent Scotland, and those charged with scripting a written Scottish constitution, would do well to look to the Mongolian experience as an example of good – and effective – practice.

Before detailing the Mongolian experience, we might first consider the difficulties a newly independent Scotland would likely face on the nuclear weapons front, difficulties which might make the construction of a constitution all the more pressing.

One thing is certain:  London and Washington would be desperate not to undermine the Anglo-American nuclear status quo and so a newly independent Scottish Government would likely come under great pressure to retain British nuclear weapons.

Interestingly, the 1970 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) complicates things somewhat.  Since the NPT designates only five nuclear powers – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States – an independent Scotland would not be recognized as a state entitled to possess nuclear weapons.  While this will be music to the ears of many Scottish citizens, it doesn’t address what would actually happen to Scottish-held nuclear weapons in the event of a ‘Yes’ vote.  There will be no easy banishment of these weapons: the logistics are complicated and the British government has raised concerns over the financial cost of any re-siting of weapons from their current Scottish housings.

One possible – and extremely delicate – solution would be for Edinburgh and London to agree to continued ‘British management’ of the Faslane and Coulport nuclear bases; they would effectively be ‘sovereign’ UK nuclear bases on Scottish soil.

Whilst this arrangement would undoubtedly spark apoplexy throughout Scotland, it is a scenario recognised in international legislation:  under Article 1 of the NPT, a nuclear weapons state can site its nuclear weapons in a non-nuclear weapons state as long as the weapons and their housings are under full control of the nuclear weapons state.

Given the financial and logistical difficulties associated with relocating British nuclear weapons from Scotland, this arrangement may well appeal to both Downing Street and the White House.  Both would likely apply great pressure on Edinburgh to assent and various ‘attractive propositions’ would be made to the Scottish Government, ranging from generous recompense to assistance in helping Scotland through its various post-independence international negotiations.

The good news for nuclear weapons opponents is that a written Scottish constitution could effectively blunt any pressures that London and Washington might conceivably apply.  Again, the NPT is significant.

Article VII of the NPT provides a proven pathway for states wishing to establish themselves as internationally recognised nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZ).  Mongolia is just one state that has taken this path.  Significantly, written legislation played a key part in achieving this.

Addressing the UN in September 1992, the Mongolian President Punsalmaagin Ochirbat declared his newly-independent country a nuclear-weapon-free-zone.  This announcement was set against the backdrop of a collapsing Soviet Union, Russian troop withdrawals from Mongolia, and post-Communist Mongolia’s wish to normalize relations with China.  Within less than a year, Mongolia’s declaration had been officially recognised and welcomed by both China and Russia.

Between 1993 and 2000, Mongolia’s efforts to be internationally recognised as a NWFZ saw the scripting of legislation which culminated in The Law of Mongolia on Its Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status.  Inextricably tied to the Mongolian constitution, its articles clearly outlined Mongolia’s ‘nuclear position’:

Article 4. Prohibitions resulting from the nuclear-weapon-free status

4.1 An individual, legal person or any foreign State shall be prohibited on the territory of Mongolia from committing, initiating or participating in the following acts or activities relating to nuclear weapons:

4.1.1 develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons;
4.1.2 station or transport nuclear weapons by any means;
4.1.3 test or use nuclear weapons;
4.1.4 dump or dispose nuclear weapons grade radioactive material or nuclear waste.

4.2 Transportation through the territory of Mongolia of nuclear weapons, parts or components thereof, as well as of nuclear waste or any other nuclear material designed or produced for weapons purposes shall be prohibited.

These articles, formally submitted to the UN, send a clear and comprehensive message to the world and they have provided the focal point for the Mongolian Government’s subsequent – and successful – efforts to secure a deeper recognition of its NWFZ status.  In September 2012, the five officially recognised nuclear powers (including Britain and the US) signed a formal pledge to ‘respect the nuclear weapon free status of Mongolia and not to contribute to any act that would violate it’.

In the event of a ‘Yes’ vote in 2014, Scotland’s constitutional overseers would do well to look to Mongolia’s example.  It demonstrates a tested pathway towards internationally recognized NWFZ status and it shows the significance of having nuclear weapons opposition enshrined in legislation.  Indeed, Mongolia’s legislative articles might conceivably be written – almost word for word – into a Scottish constitution.

On reflection, then, it seems that several wise motives lie behind Mr Salmond’s wish to see the illegality of nuclear weapons enshrined in a written Scottish constitution.

Firstly, doing so would formally proclaim Scotland’s nuclear weapons opposition to the world.  It would ensconce this opposition within the collective consciousness of future generations of Scots, and would highlight Scotland as a progressive example for other states to follow.

Secondly, it would offer Scotland (and Scottish Governments) strong legal protection against any future requests to host – temporarily or otherwise – nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons materials.

Thirdly – and very importantly – writing ‘nuclear weapons are illegal here’ into a formal constitution would provide critical democratic weight in Scotland’s secession discussions with Downing Street and the White House over the removal of British nuclear weapons from Scotland.

Recent polls suggest that Scotland’s role as ‘nuclear weapons host’ is as unpopular with opponents of independence as it is with proponents.  Enshrining this oppositional mood into a publicly known constitution would make Scotland’s ‘nuclear stance’ crystal clear and the US and UK would find it extremely difficult to ignore the democratic will of the Scottish polity.   Precedent would also weigh heavily upon London and Washington:  having accepted Mongolia’s formally proclaimed position, it is hard to see how they could ignore Scotland’s.

Dr. John MacDonald is a political commentator and academic.  He is currently lecturing at the University of Glasgow. This article was originally published in The Scotsman on 12 April 2012. 

Dr. Daniel Kenealy, Academy of Government

Writing in response to recent discussions of the future of an independent Scotland within or outwith NATO, the University of Edinburgh’s Dr. Dan Kenealy asks whether the SNP can overcome it’s historic opposition to the nuclear alliance and ‘learn to love the bomb’ and reflects upon NATO’s possible response to a Scottish application.

This week Alex Salmond went to the United States on a paradiplomatic mission to promote cultural and trade links (not to mention the idea of Scottish independence) under the badge ‘Scotland Week’. For those of us fascinated by the external and international dimensions of Scottish independence the week was most notable for stirring the issue of NATO membership. In Washington the First Minister stated that he was ‘certain’ that NATO would accept independent Scotland’s membership of the alliance.

Unlike the issue of EU membership it seems, from a careful reading of the statements put out over recent days, that NATO is generating some consensus. As far as I can see nobody is making the claim that Scotland would automatically continue/inherit NATO membership. Where views are conflicting is on the issue of how receptive NATO would be to membership for an independent Scotland. The discussion is not about process, but rather about politics.

Let’s consider the process. The issue is actually one of the simplest ones within the independence debate. While public international law is notoriously murky concerning state continuance and succession the overwhelming body of opinion, with which I agree, is that following independence the Remainder-of-the-UK (RUK) would be considered the continuator of the UK. Scotland would be a new state (or successor state to use the legal terminology). RUK would thus continue the UK’s membership of NATO unaffected. Scotland would be required to join as a new state. This seems very clear as a matter of international law.

NATO seems to be on the same page. An alliance spokesperson remarked:

It appears widely agreed that, as a matter of law, a Scotland which was declared its independence and thereby established its separate statehood would be viewed as a new state. A new state would not be a party to the North Atlantic treaty, and thus not a member of NATO. If it were to choose to apply for NATO membership, its application would be subject to the normal procedure, as outlined in Article 10 of the treaty.

The UK Ambassador in Washington, Sir Peter Westmacott, echoed the sentiment. An independent Scotland would thus need to signal its intention to join the alliance. The North Atlantic Council would have to decide, by consensus, to invite Scotland to join. Scotland would then go through a process, which may include drawing up a Membership Action Plan, the end point of which would be accession to the North Atlantic Treaty.

It remains an outstanding issue whether the North Atlantic Council, a body representing the 28 NATO member states, would begin to consider Scotland’s membership on the day of a Yes vote to independence, or only once an independent Scottish state had actually been constituted. If the Council opted for the former – the more pragmatic approach – then Scotland’s membership of NATO would to all intents and purposes continue seamlessly. If it opted for the latter – driven by a dogmatic belief that you have to be a fully constituted state (as opposed to a nascent one) before being considered for membership – then Scotland would be outside of NATO for at least a period of time. It is worth bearing in mind that, in international politics, pragmatism often wins the day.

The more fascinating element of the issue is the politics of it. Membership of NATO is not dispensed like candy. The alliance takes seriously the defence policy of a potential member, its military budget and capabilities, and its overall strategic stance. I do not want to dwell on the possible defence and military models that an independent Scotland might adopt. Suffice it to say that there is no reason, unless its government chose to, why an independent Scotland could not pass the Council’s scrutiny in terms of spending and capabilities.

But one issue remains and it looms very large. And that is the nuclear issue. NATO, for better or worse, is a nuclear alliance. Last year, at its annual conference in Perth, the SNP leadership succeeded in overturning the party’s long-standing opposition to NATO membership. Yet the change was won in a very narrow vote (fewer than 30 votes of 760 cast) and the issue of nuclear weapons remains divisive, not only within the SNP but in Scottish society broadly.

The move in Perth by the SNP leadership was a sign of the pragmatism that often animates their political strategy. It is also part of a broader strategy to persuade voters that independence need not be feared because so much of the international context in which Scotland is currently nested would remain the same: NATO, the EU, and so forth. Anything that undermines that, or causes uncertainty about that, is to the detriment of the Yes campaign.

Yet, while the SNP managed to orchestrate a U-turn on NATO membership they remain a party, and thus a government, committed to the removal of nuclear weapons from Scottish territory. Beyond that they remain opposed, in principle, to nuclear weapons. While the first issue might be fudged in a bid for NATO membership (Denmark and Norway both refuse to base nuclear weapons on their territory), the second issue may prove more difficult for the 28 alliance members to turn a blind eye to. Membership of NATO involves, as its former Secretary-General Lord Robertson has pointed out, acceptance of the strategic concept. Updated in 2010 the concept is clear on the issues of nuclear weapons:

‘It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.’

The first part of this statement has been seized upon by the First Minister, but the second part is perhaps more important. It will only take one of the existing 28 members to take issue with Scotland’s anti-nuclear stance and things will get very tricky indeed.

There is a political deal to be done here and two sets of interests – those of the NATO alliance in aggregate and those of an independent Scotland – seem to be more convergent than divergent. Consider Scotland’s strategically important position, the likelihood that its defence and security arrangements would be closely linked with those of RUK, and the presence of strategic assets such as oil and gas in Scottish territorial waters and the case for NATO welcoming Scotland starts to become apparent. Consider Scotland’s need to ensure that its national security is defended collectively, as a small state facing an increasingly complex security environment, and the case for membership becomes apparent.

But in politics, entrenched negotiating positions and the power of long-held ideas can be the enemy of optimal decision-making. If an independent Scotland wished to remain coherent in its anti-nuclear issue it is hard to see how it can be a fully-functioning member of an alliance underpinned by the following notion: ‘the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategy nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States.’ One can go further and ask would an independent Scotland even allow nuclear submarines to navigate its territorial waters? It is also questionable to what extent NATO members will embrace the potentially disruptive removal of Trident from bases at Faslane and Coulport. Such a move could start Scotland off on the wrong foot, seeking entrance to an alliance while causing disruption to the nuclear deterrent of one its members.

The question I posed in my title, ‘Can they [the SNP] stop worrying and learn to love the bomb?’ can only be answered at present with ‘Almost certainly not’. The question for NATO members may thus become ‘Are you prepared to accept a fundamentally anti-nuclear state within your alliance?’ The answer to that question remains to be heard.

Daniel Kenealy is Deputy Director of the University of Edinburgh’s Academy of Government. He is a researcher in the Politics & International Relations subject area where he specialises in EU politics and International Relations.

Colin Fleming, University of Edinburgh

Dr. Colin Fleming reflects on the security and defence obligations of an independent Scotland, looking particularly at the implications of the Nordic models of defence and continued integration with the defence structures of the rest of the United Kingdom. 

If Scotland votes yes in 2014 there is little doubt that it will enter a relatively benign security environment. The problem for Scotland, like other independent states, would be how to plan for the unexpected. The requirement to begin defence policy discussions with a clear understanding of what threats Scotland may face is also highlighted in a recent RUSI Whitehall Report, A’ The Blue Bonnets: Defending an Independent Scotland. As the authors, Stuart Crawford and Richard Marsh, comment:

The immediate requirement is to attempt to define the strategic context in which Scotland finds itself, and also identify what are the likely risks and threats to the soon-to-be-independent state…. Despite being relatively small and sparsely populated, Scotland’s geopolitical position bestows upon it a certain geostrategic importance.

It is this geostrategic area of importance which has drawn the SNP to look to its Nordic neighbours as having legitimate defence models which Scotland could adapt to its own national interests.

Norway and Denmark are of particular interest, and have helped shape current SNP thinking on defence issues. Both have close similarities with Scotland in terms of population size, and both have national interests in oil and gas, fishing, and the emergence of the High North as an area of geo-strategic interest – as a maritime state these are areas that a Scottish Defence Force would be required to secure. As is being proposed currently, it would also be required to integrate its maritime assets with partners, particularly focusing on the security of the North Atlantic and High North. These are tasks which would also require air-policing assets. Of course, on a purely political level, Norway and Denmark provide unequivocal proof that similar sized countries make an important contribution in the maintenance of regional and international security; a fact not lost on the SNP leadership. Claims that Scotland is too small or too weak to build a meaningful military defence model with a regional – or even international – focus seem specious when juxtaposed against recent Norwegian and Danish experiences in Afghanistan.

Although the official blueprint of Scotland’s defence policy post-independence will be published in the Scottish Government’s White Paper in November 2013, the SNP has been talking to academics, policy-makers, and military personnel from Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and it is probable that Scotland’s operational capabilities would resemble a Nordic design, allowing it to become a key partner in the region. Of course, Scotland’s future military capabilities would initially be linked to its negotiations with the RUK government, but it would look to provide an operational capability able to position itself as a regional partner with its Nordic neighbours, as it would the RUK.

The Nordic countries have also had a very real effect on how the SNP sees a Scottish force operating in regional and international theatres and have helped shape an internationalist underpinning to a potential future Scottish defence structure. The party’s reversal of its opposition to NATO (but not nuclear weapons) was based on research and discussion with Nordic defence establishments; and in the event of independence, its strategic partners. The decision to change such an important policy is specifically linked to how the SNP envisages Scotland’s role as a regional actor and the importance Norway and Denmark attach to NATO membership. This change in policy is important for several interrelated reasons. It highlights a new pragmatism within the SNP in terms of its international outlook; however, perhaps more crucially, it also underlines the party’s commitment to cooperation and the integrating of defence with other independent states – not least, RUK.

The SNP has consistently highlighted its desire for Scotland to continue strong defence relationships with RUK, and has expressed a keen interest in defence sharing – particularly in intelligence, basing, and training. The idea of defence-sharing is not without criticism. For many, an independent military is equivalent to independence itself. However, and yet again, the influence of the Nordic States, in the form of Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), is plain for all to see. Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland, have had defence sharing agreements since 2009 and in the event of independence it is something which may prove attractive to both Scotland and RUK. In fact, defence-sharing looks likely to be normalised over the coming years and decades, driven in part by increased austerity and the requirement to drive down defence budgets. Defence sharing is already partly developed in the Baltic States, and only in November 2012 the Australian Minister of Defence met with New Zealand Minister of Defence to identify further practical military cooperation. NATO, the world’s most successful military alliance is now openly talking about ‘Smart Defence’ (defence sharing) among its members, as a means of allowing the alliance to continue its core roles with the most advanced kit. This requires defence cooperation amongst all of its members.

Defence-sharing between Scotland and RUK is workable, and in light of international austerity measures and the impact of ongoing cuts to the UK’s defence budgets, may also be pragmatic in the long-term. However, for such agreements to take place both governments would have to negotiate mature policy arrangements; with trade-offs and benefits for both states. Under this scenario, an independent Scotland would not require full-spectrum capabilities, but it would still require compromise and negotiation in order to gain the right mix of maritime, air and land assets able to perform roles similar to those of Norway and Denmark. For Scotland, one such trade-off may be that Trident stays on the Clyde for longer than voters expect.

Dr Colin Fleming is an Honorary Research Fellow in Politics & International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Dr. Fleming published an extended version of this piece in Holyrood Magazine on 28 January 2013.