Scotland's Referendum: Informing the Debate

Dr. Andrew Neal, University of Edinburgh

In this piece, Dr. Andrew Neal argues that security is about the perception of threats, rendering an objective assessment of Scotland’s prospects for security impossible. However, he notes that an independent Scotland may emulate the UK’s expansive approach to secruity threats and risks or adopt a narrower approach. 

An objective analysis of the prospective security situation of an independent Scotland is impossible. There is no objective or settled meaning to the term ‘security’, even in the current governmental and constitutional arrangements of the UK. It is thus not possible to simply produce an objective and comparative list of ‘threats’ to the UK and an independent Scotland. The real question is how governments perceive threats and what they attempt to do about them. The question is therefore not whether an independent Scotland would face different threats to the rest of the UK, but how the government of an independent Scotland would perceive threats and what it would attempt to do about them.

At present, the UK government does not have a coherent approach to ‘security’, and there is no reason to think that an independent Scottish government would be any different. Governments of modern states are sprawling, complex beasts. Getting them to do anything in a coherent, unified way is extremely difficult, especially on issues that span different parts of government, maybe even all parts of government.

There are currently two interpretations of ‘security’ in play within the UK government: the narrow and the broad. The narrow interpretation adopts a traditional understanding of security, in which threats are foreign, military, and state-based. The corresponding parts of government in the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and 10 Downing Street deal with those threats. The National Security Council chaired by the Prime Minister has largely focused on traditional foreign and defence issues, such as the Libyan intervention.

At the same, an alternative broad interpretation of security is being developed elsewhere in the UK government. The UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy document (CONTEST) lists 29 departments and agencies as playing a role in this strategy. The most recent version of the National Security Strategy (NSS) goes further by shifting from ‘security’ to an encompassing list of ‘risks’. These stretch from international terrorism and overseas military crises to border transgressions by illegal immigrants and disruptions to fuel and food supplies. The manifestation of this broad interpretation of security is that security is proliferating across all areas of government, far beyond the traditional narrow remit of foreign and defence policy.

The conclusion we must draw is that there is no single meaning of security in the UK. The reality is that disparate parts of the government perceive ‘threats’ and ‘risks’ differently and develop policies to deal with them in a piecemeal fashion. Whether this is good or bad depends on ones’ view on the relative dangers of security threats on the one hand, or a unified security state on the other.

Would it be different in an independent Scotland? The Scottish government might not perceive threats and risks in the same way. Given the haphazard nature of threat perception in the UK, there is no reason to think that Scotland would independently come up with same list of threats and risks. Scottish politics has been less hostile to immigrants than Westminster politics. The Scottish government might not see immigration as part of the bundle of risks specified in the NSS that includes terrorism, organised crime and smuggling.

My current research on parliamentary security politics at Westminster analyzes this unsettled and changing state of security affairs. The uneven creep of ‘security’ across different areas of government is reflected in a larger number of parliamentary committees handling security issues. Half a dozen now do so regularly (Intelligence and Security, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Joint Committee on Human Rights, Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy). At least half a dozen more discuss security questions on a less frequent basis (e.g. Lords Committee on the Constitution, Energy, Public Accounts, Energy and Climate Change, Science and Technology, Health). If we were to take the comprehensive list of risks in the NSS seriously, we could argue that every part of government and parliament will find itself dealing with security issues at some point.

Whatever ‘security’ is, it already reaches far beyond the ‘reserved areas of government’ that Holyrood currently leaves to Westminster (e.g. foreign affairs, defence, counter-terrorism). The proliferation of ‘security’ across Westminster has in no way been mirrored in Holyrood. Even in the constitutional status quo, it is not clear that current Scottish arrangements provide adequate scrutiny and oversight of every aspect of ‘security’ that could affect Scotland. Without knowing which new ministries and parliamentary committees an independent Scotland would create, it is difficult to know how ‘security’ would play out in the new constitutional context.

And what of a Scottish House of Lords or equivalent? The House of Lords has often put a brake on the excesses of security politics at Westminster, such as extended pre-charge detention for terrorist suspects. In large part this is thanks to the many lawyers and a scattering of former security officials in its ranks. We do not even know if an independent Scotland would have an upper house of parliament, but we can be certain that it would not be an unelected body of experts and political appointees like the Lords and so would probably not have the same legal and security expertise.

Much hinges on the extent to which an independent Scotland would truly be an ‘independent’ state. If it does not free itself from the current security model at Westminster, we can expect security to be a lengthening rope pulled in several different directions at once. If it does not depart radically from the current Holyrood model, we can expect a continuing lack of scrutiny and oversight. The question of security in an independent Scotland is not a question of what objective threats it would face. It is a constitutional question. The character of security in a modern state is a product of its constitutional arrangements. Leadership, officialdom, parliament; these all shape ‘security’ in different, conflicting ways. Sometimes security shapes them.

Dr Andrew Neal is a Lecturer at the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh. He blogs at securitypolitics and tweets @andrewwneal. 

Colin Fleming, University of Edinburgh

Dr. Colin Fleming writes on the possibility of Nato membership for an independent Scotland, noting that while Scotland could exist outwith Nato, independence outside the strategic alliance would come at a political and financial cost.

This week Nato are conducting joint operational exercises off the Scottish coast, from April 15-29. This comes just after the recent trip by Alex Salmond to America and his lecture to the US think-tank the Brookings Institute where the First Minister said that Scotland’s international partnerships would remain unchanged in the event of independence. The nation’s alliances with the US and other nations would endure while Scotland would become an independent and active member of organisations, ranging from the European Union and the United Nations to Nato.

However, Nato is correct not to publically signal that Scotland would simply join the alliance, not least because to do so would be to undermine the UK state – one of its key members. Rocking the status quo is simply not something the US or Nato will do at this stage. Yet, neither is this somehow an indication that Scotland would have trouble being admitted to the alliance should the Scottish public vote Yes in next year’s referendum.

Nato provides a security guarantee which Scotland could not attain on its own. Membership would also have the added importance of plugging Scotland into regional and international security networks, something that will be expected from us by the majority of European states. Scotland could exist without Nato – there is no immediate territorial threat to the nation – but to do so would be much more costly financially and would make it far harder for Scotland to integrate with its key partners – not least the rest of the UK (RUK).

Integration is important in terms of future defence-sharing prospects with RUK, as it is for its possible future relationship with the Nordic states. Nevertheless, just as there are incentives for Scotland to join Nato, so too are there significant reasons why Nato would want Scotland to become a member of the organisation. Not least, Scotland’s geostrategic position marks it out as a pivotal player with its own strategic interests in the Atlantic.

As Scotland sits in the middle of the North Atlantic it would be odd if it weren’t welcomed into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This area is increasing important when it comes to strategic interests globally due to the potential for security concerns relating to Russia and China. Our joining existing security networks – both transatlantic and regional, such as the Nordic Defence Coperation pact – will therefore be highly desirable to Scotland’s neighbours.

We should also not undervalue the importance of existing Nato infrastructure in Scotland which Nato will want to maintain. However, perhaps more important is Scotland’s ability to fill gaps in the existing security framework. The inclusion of Scotland is more likely to enhance the security of the North Atlantic area, and we would be an important partner for regional allies as well of the Nato alliance.

Put simply, the UK’s focus towards the Middle East has resulted in a security gap in the Atlantic. This security gap has been exacerbated by ongoing MoD austerity measures which have prioritised finances on fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at the cost of a properly maintained readiness for maritime operations in the Atlantic. The early decommissioning of the Nimrod and its cancelled replacement has left a hole in intelligence and surveillance across the region which is easily exploitable for those with the know-how. Scotland could, and should, plug this gap in the event of independence. Indeed, at present this surveillance role is conducted by Nato, which currently operates Maritime Patrol Aircraft from Leuchers and Lossiemouth for this very purpose. It would be highly attractive for Nato to retain these assets post-independence. A properly conducted negotiation between Scotland and RUK, where Scotland does not try to diminish the UK’s current standing, could lead to Scotland filling an important function, which focuses north instead of south.

The SNP position, that an independent Scottish state will ban nuclear weapons from Scottish territory, reflects the mood of the Scottish public in regard its own position on nuclear weapons. However, Scotland being nuclear-free is unlikely to be a serious impediment to Nato membership. Norway and Denmark have also banned nuclear weapons and both are important members of the alliance – fulfilling key tasks in Afghanistan and Libya. Furthermore, Scotland’s refusal to host nuclear weapons on its territory – as long as it acts responsibly to the concerns of RUK – will be balanced by what it can offer elsewhere. In light of changing geopolitical interests to our north as well as south, Scotland would be a good bet for Nato.

Dr Colin Fleming is a Research Fellow in Politics and International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. This piece was originally published in the Sunday Herald on 14 April 2012.

Dr. John MacDonald reflects on the possibility of a nuclear-free Scotland following independence, arguing that a recent constitutional amendment in Mongolia might serve as a model to prevent the maintenance and deployment of nuclear weapons. 

In Washington DC last Tuesday, Alex Salmond reiterated his commitment to a nuclear-weapons-free independent Scotland.  In articulating this to an American audience, his conviction on this issue appears to be undimmed.

Salmond has recently referred to how a written constitution might help an independent Holyrood Government to achieve this.  As he recently stated: ‘Scotland is currently the home of Western Europe’s largest concentration of weapons of mass destruction. They are based on the River Clyde, within 30 miles of Scotland’s largest city. A constitutional ban on the possession of nuclear weapons would end that obscenity.’

Are his convictions justified?  Could a written constitution really help in the removal of nuclear weapons from an independent Scotland?

The short answer to this is ‘Yes’.  For those who might require convincing, there are pertinent examples we can look to.  Improbably, perhaps, Mongolia is one such example, a benchmark for how a state can enshrine nuclear weapons opposition into legislation which is then used to gain formal recognition by the international community.  The government of an independent Scotland, and those charged with scripting a written Scottish constitution, would do well to look to the Mongolian experience as an example of good – and effective – practice.

Before detailing the Mongolian experience, we might first consider the difficulties a newly independent Scotland would likely face on the nuclear weapons front, difficulties which might make the construction of a constitution all the more pressing.

One thing is certain:  London and Washington would be desperate not to undermine the Anglo-American nuclear status quo and so a newly independent Scottish Government would likely come under great pressure to retain British nuclear weapons.

Interestingly, the 1970 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) complicates things somewhat.  Since the NPT designates only five nuclear powers – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States – an independent Scotland would not be recognized as a state entitled to possess nuclear weapons.  While this will be music to the ears of many Scottish citizens, it doesn’t address what would actually happen to Scottish-held nuclear weapons in the event of a ‘Yes’ vote.  There will be no easy banishment of these weapons: the logistics are complicated and the British government has raised concerns over the financial cost of any re-siting of weapons from their current Scottish housings.

One possible – and extremely delicate – solution would be for Edinburgh and London to agree to continued ‘British management’ of the Faslane and Coulport nuclear bases; they would effectively be ‘sovereign’ UK nuclear bases on Scottish soil.

Whilst this arrangement would undoubtedly spark apoplexy throughout Scotland, it is a scenario recognised in international legislation:  under Article 1 of the NPT, a nuclear weapons state can site its nuclear weapons in a non-nuclear weapons state as long as the weapons and their housings are under full control of the nuclear weapons state.

Given the financial and logistical difficulties associated with relocating British nuclear weapons from Scotland, this arrangement may well appeal to both Downing Street and the White House.  Both would likely apply great pressure on Edinburgh to assent and various ‘attractive propositions’ would be made to the Scottish Government, ranging from generous recompense to assistance in helping Scotland through its various post-independence international negotiations.

The good news for nuclear weapons opponents is that a written Scottish constitution could effectively blunt any pressures that London and Washington might conceivably apply.  Again, the NPT is significant.

Article VII of the NPT provides a proven pathway for states wishing to establish themselves as internationally recognised nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZ).  Mongolia is just one state that has taken this path.  Significantly, written legislation played a key part in achieving this.

Addressing the UN in September 1992, the Mongolian President Punsalmaagin Ochirbat declared his newly-independent country a nuclear-weapon-free-zone.  This announcement was set against the backdrop of a collapsing Soviet Union, Russian troop withdrawals from Mongolia, and post-Communist Mongolia’s wish to normalize relations with China.  Within less than a year, Mongolia’s declaration had been officially recognised and welcomed by both China and Russia.

Between 1993 and 2000, Mongolia’s efforts to be internationally recognised as a NWFZ saw the scripting of legislation which culminated in The Law of Mongolia on Its Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status.  Inextricably tied to the Mongolian constitution, its articles clearly outlined Mongolia’s ‘nuclear position’:

Article 4. Prohibitions resulting from the nuclear-weapon-free status

4.1 An individual, legal person or any foreign State shall be prohibited on the territory of Mongolia from committing, initiating or participating in the following acts or activities relating to nuclear weapons:

4.1.1 develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons;
4.1.2 station or transport nuclear weapons by any means;
4.1.3 test or use nuclear weapons;
4.1.4 dump or dispose nuclear weapons grade radioactive material or nuclear waste.

4.2 Transportation through the territory of Mongolia of nuclear weapons, parts or components thereof, as well as of nuclear waste or any other nuclear material designed or produced for weapons purposes shall be prohibited.

These articles, formally submitted to the UN, send a clear and comprehensive message to the world and they have provided the focal point for the Mongolian Government’s subsequent – and successful – efforts to secure a deeper recognition of its NWFZ status.  In September 2012, the five officially recognised nuclear powers (including Britain and the US) signed a formal pledge to ‘respect the nuclear weapon free status of Mongolia and not to contribute to any act that would violate it’.

In the event of a ‘Yes’ vote in 2014, Scotland’s constitutional overseers would do well to look to Mongolia’s example.  It demonstrates a tested pathway towards internationally recognized NWFZ status and it shows the significance of having nuclear weapons opposition enshrined in legislation.  Indeed, Mongolia’s legislative articles might conceivably be written – almost word for word – into a Scottish constitution.

On reflection, then, it seems that several wise motives lie behind Mr Salmond’s wish to see the illegality of nuclear weapons enshrined in a written Scottish constitution.

Firstly, doing so would formally proclaim Scotland’s nuclear weapons opposition to the world.  It would ensconce this opposition within the collective consciousness of future generations of Scots, and would highlight Scotland as a progressive example for other states to follow.

Secondly, it would offer Scotland (and Scottish Governments) strong legal protection against any future requests to host – temporarily or otherwise – nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons materials.

Thirdly – and very importantly – writing ‘nuclear weapons are illegal here’ into a formal constitution would provide critical democratic weight in Scotland’s secession discussions with Downing Street and the White House over the removal of British nuclear weapons from Scotland.

Recent polls suggest that Scotland’s role as ‘nuclear weapons host’ is as unpopular with opponents of independence as it is with proponents.  Enshrining this oppositional mood into a publicly known constitution would make Scotland’s ‘nuclear stance’ crystal clear and the US and UK would find it extremely difficult to ignore the democratic will of the Scottish polity.   Precedent would also weigh heavily upon London and Washington:  having accepted Mongolia’s formally proclaimed position, it is hard to see how they could ignore Scotland’s.

Dr. John MacDonald is a political commentator and academic.  He is currently lecturing at the University of Glasgow. This article was originally published in The Scotsman on 12 April 2012. 

Dr. Daniel Kenealy, Academy of Government

Writing in response to recent discussions of the future of an independent Scotland within or outwith NATO, the University of Edinburgh’s Dr. Dan Kenealy asks whether the SNP can overcome it’s historic opposition to the nuclear alliance and ‘learn to love the bomb’ and reflects upon NATO’s possible response to a Scottish application.

This week Alex Salmond went to the United States on a paradiplomatic mission to promote cultural and trade links (not to mention the idea of Scottish independence) under the badge ‘Scotland Week’. For those of us fascinated by the external and international dimensions of Scottish independence the week was most notable for stirring the issue of NATO membership. In Washington the First Minister stated that he was ‘certain’ that NATO would accept independent Scotland’s membership of the alliance.

Unlike the issue of EU membership it seems, from a careful reading of the statements put out over recent days, that NATO is generating some consensus. As far as I can see nobody is making the claim that Scotland would automatically continue/inherit NATO membership. Where views are conflicting is on the issue of how receptive NATO would be to membership for an independent Scotland. The discussion is not about process, but rather about politics.

Let’s consider the process. The issue is actually one of the simplest ones within the independence debate. While public international law is notoriously murky concerning state continuance and succession the overwhelming body of opinion, with which I agree, is that following independence the Remainder-of-the-UK (RUK) would be considered the continuator of the UK. Scotland would be a new state (or successor state to use the legal terminology). RUK would thus continue the UK’s membership of NATO unaffected. Scotland would be required to join as a new state. This seems very clear as a matter of international law.

NATO seems to be on the same page. An alliance spokesperson remarked:

It appears widely agreed that, as a matter of law, a Scotland which was declared its independence and thereby established its separate statehood would be viewed as a new state. A new state would not be a party to the North Atlantic treaty, and thus not a member of NATO. If it were to choose to apply for NATO membership, its application would be subject to the normal procedure, as outlined in Article 10 of the treaty.

The UK Ambassador in Washington, Sir Peter Westmacott, echoed the sentiment. An independent Scotland would thus need to signal its intention to join the alliance. The North Atlantic Council would have to decide, by consensus, to invite Scotland to join. Scotland would then go through a process, which may include drawing up a Membership Action Plan, the end point of which would be accession to the North Atlantic Treaty.

It remains an outstanding issue whether the North Atlantic Council, a body representing the 28 NATO member states, would begin to consider Scotland’s membership on the day of a Yes vote to independence, or only once an independent Scottish state had actually been constituted. If the Council opted for the former – the more pragmatic approach – then Scotland’s membership of NATO would to all intents and purposes continue seamlessly. If it opted for the latter – driven by a dogmatic belief that you have to be a fully constituted state (as opposed to a nascent one) before being considered for membership – then Scotland would be outside of NATO for at least a period of time. It is worth bearing in mind that, in international politics, pragmatism often wins the day.

The more fascinating element of the issue is the politics of it. Membership of NATO is not dispensed like candy. The alliance takes seriously the defence policy of a potential member, its military budget and capabilities, and its overall strategic stance. I do not want to dwell on the possible defence and military models that an independent Scotland might adopt. Suffice it to say that there is no reason, unless its government chose to, why an independent Scotland could not pass the Council’s scrutiny in terms of spending and capabilities.

But one issue remains and it looms very large. And that is the nuclear issue. NATO, for better or worse, is a nuclear alliance. Last year, at its annual conference in Perth, the SNP leadership succeeded in overturning the party’s long-standing opposition to NATO membership. Yet the change was won in a very narrow vote (fewer than 30 votes of 760 cast) and the issue of nuclear weapons remains divisive, not only within the SNP but in Scottish society broadly.

The move in Perth by the SNP leadership was a sign of the pragmatism that often animates their political strategy. It is also part of a broader strategy to persuade voters that independence need not be feared because so much of the international context in which Scotland is currently nested would remain the same: NATO, the EU, and so forth. Anything that undermines that, or causes uncertainty about that, is to the detriment of the Yes campaign.

Yet, while the SNP managed to orchestrate a U-turn on NATO membership they remain a party, and thus a government, committed to the removal of nuclear weapons from Scottish territory. Beyond that they remain opposed, in principle, to nuclear weapons. While the first issue might be fudged in a bid for NATO membership (Denmark and Norway both refuse to base nuclear weapons on their territory), the second issue may prove more difficult for the 28 alliance members to turn a blind eye to. Membership of NATO involves, as its former Secretary-General Lord Robertson has pointed out, acceptance of the strategic concept. Updated in 2010 the concept is clear on the issues of nuclear weapons:

‘It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.’

The first part of this statement has been seized upon by the First Minister, but the second part is perhaps more important. It will only take one of the existing 28 members to take issue with Scotland’s anti-nuclear stance and things will get very tricky indeed.

There is a political deal to be done here and two sets of interests – those of the NATO alliance in aggregate and those of an independent Scotland – seem to be more convergent than divergent. Consider Scotland’s strategically important position, the likelihood that its defence and security arrangements would be closely linked with those of RUK, and the presence of strategic assets such as oil and gas in Scottish territorial waters and the case for NATO welcoming Scotland starts to become apparent. Consider Scotland’s need to ensure that its national security is defended collectively, as a small state facing an increasingly complex security environment, and the case for membership becomes apparent.

But in politics, entrenched negotiating positions and the power of long-held ideas can be the enemy of optimal decision-making. If an independent Scotland wished to remain coherent in its anti-nuclear issue it is hard to see how it can be a fully-functioning member of an alliance underpinned by the following notion: ‘the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategy nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States.’ One can go further and ask would an independent Scotland even allow nuclear submarines to navigate its territorial waters? It is also questionable to what extent NATO members will embrace the potentially disruptive removal of Trident from bases at Faslane and Coulport. Such a move could start Scotland off on the wrong foot, seeking entrance to an alliance while causing disruption to the nuclear deterrent of one its members.

The question I posed in my title, ‘Can they [the SNP] stop worrying and learn to love the bomb?’ can only be answered at present with ‘Almost certainly not’. The question for NATO members may thus become ‘Are you prepared to accept a fundamentally anti-nuclear state within your alliance?’ The answer to that question remains to be heard.

Daniel Kenealy is Deputy Director of the University of Edinburgh’s Academy of Government. He is a researcher in the Politics & International Relations subject area where he specialises in EU politics and International Relations.