Neil Walker, University of Edinburgh

In a post originally published at the Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum, Neil Walker discusses the nature of interventions by the president of the EU Commission and the ramifications it might play in the debate. He argues in favour of national candor, saying ‘If any of the key players on the EU stage is opposed to Scottish membership then they should either show the courage of their convictions through a discourse of public justification linked to the interests of the Union as a whole  or, failing that,  they should at least be prepared to declare their intentions to act out of national self-interest’

Let me lay my cards on the table. I remain inclined to vote ‘no’ in September’s referendum. I put it no stronger than ‘inclined’ in part  because I believe, in  the spirit of democracy – even democracy referendum-style – that those of us who have not signed the party pledge should keep an open mind as long as possible. That, indeed, is one of the reasons  why,  18 months ago,  some of us set up the Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum  and its  accompanying blog. But my reservations are also partly because  recent  events  have fuelled my anxiety about  the climate in which the debate is taking place. They have made me wonder whether the case for independence is getting a fair crack of the whip on the international stage, and have caused  me to ponder the implications of lending my vote to a position that remains so reliant upon negative rather than positive arguments.

I am not talking about the shenanigans over a Currency Union. It may  be a minority position, but I believe both sides have been giving as good as they get on this question, and that neither comfortably occupies the moral high ground. There has always been something  both opportunistic and wishful in the nationalist stance. Sterling, once derided as a busted flush,  is reclaimed as a joint birthright. The Euro, once hailed  as the bright new  monetary dawn, is conveniently relegated to the status of a political  lifestyle choice rather than faced up to as an obligation of EU membership that can, at most, be  deferred.

 The Unionist response may be  no more elevated  than this, but is surely ranks no lower. There is an arguable case, if a far from compelling one, that it would be in rUK’s best interest to refuse the  departing Scots a Currency Union. There are certainly risks  either way, and rUK might well change tack in the cold light of a ‘yes’ vote. But Better Together is being no more narrowly strategic than the nationalists in arguing forcefully for the position that  best suits its immediate interests. It is a position that could backfire – may already be backfiring – as it allows the nationalists to play the victim card, and to point out that, as the residual sovereign in the event of post-yes-vote negotiations, rUK enjoys  the ‘bully’s’  advantage  of  being able to make promises  – or threats – that it can credibly deliver upon in self-fulfilment of  its prophecies and  prejudices. But in the final analysis, the Better Together position, like the nationalist one, is a democratically legitimate one. It is articulated by  elected politicians of various parties in favour of a constituency – the UK – whose  right to retain the decisive constitutional  voice is the very issue at the heart  of the referendum. And while nationalists may proclaim the inconsistency of Better Together’s new position with its previous self-denying ordnance against pre-specification of the terms and conditions of independence, they must also acknowledge that  the Unionist parties, by building a united front on sterling, have at least  answered another widely aired  doubt. For  once they have demonstrated their ability to get their act together and find common voice when it really matters.

The issue of democratic credentials, however,  brings me directly  to the point of my comment: namely that other awkward union, the European Union, and the position of Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, on the subject. Barroso has previously given strong indications of where he stands, so perhaps we should not be too surprised by his remarks on the BBC’s flagship Andrew Marr Show last weekend. The novelty of his latest contribution may only have been one of emphasis, but the tone was nevertheless striking. Apparently the prospects of membership for an independent Scotland, never untroubled in his perspective, are now to be assessed as  “extremely difficulty… If not impossible.”

These remarks have been well publicised. Predictably, they have been seized upon by Better Together as vindicating their long-standing scepticism about an independent Scotland’s EU future, and as further evidence of the emptiness of nationalist promises. But why should anyone listen to Barroso on this topic?  Does he have a legitimate political voice in the debate? Does he speak from a position of legal authority?  Or, regardless of his political or legal standing, does he simply have a good insider argument, and one that we should heed? The answer, on all three counts, would seem to be ‘no’. Why is this so, and why is it important to the integrity of the debate that the kind of intervention Barroso has sought fit to make should be challenged?

First, there is the question of legitimate political voice. Barroso is not an elected politician. One upon a time he was. Between 2002 and 2004 he was Prime Minister of Portugal. Since then he had done two stints and ten years as the unelected President of the European Commission. His position, which he will vacate this year, does depend upon that of two elected institutions – on the  Council ( made up of nationally elected politicians) which proposed him, and on the European Parliament which  was required to approve  his appointment.  Under new rules introduced by the recent Treaty of Lisbon, the appointment of his successor will be subject to an additional  indirect democratic check – namely the requirement that his or her nomination by the European Council should ‘take account’ of the results of the latest European Parliamentary elections. In fact, the last European elections in 2009 already saw a move towards an overtly political style of appointment, with Barroso the chosen candidate of the   European People’s Party.    But none of these developing procedures and practices can make an elected politician out of an unelected public servant. Barroso has no popular mandate, and perhaps some sense of that lay behind his protestations to Andrew Marr, rendered not a jot more credible by their repetition,  that his words did not constitute an attempt ‘to interfere’ in a matter of internal Scottish and British politics.

But even if Barroso represents no electoral constituency, does he, as head of the Commission, nevertheless possess a clear legal authority, or even a duty,  to step into the Scottish debate? The Commission certainly has an extensive legal remit. According to Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union, it ‘shall promote the general interest of the Union’.  Yet in so doing we should understand the Commission’s  role as servants of the Treaty framework rather than its master. Article 17 continues by specifying the Commission’s role in ways that reflect and confirm its status  as  the EU’s  administrative college. Its responsibilities are largely downstream. They include the monitoring of the  application of European law, the performance of various budgetary, management, executive and management functions, as well as the power to initiate ( but not decide) legislation under the Treaties. In all of this the Commissioners, including the President, like civil servants everywhere, are charged to act independently of external influence.

None of this suggests any stand-alone authority for the Commission or its President on the high political question of new membership, except insofar as this is directly specified in the Treaties. But if we look at the relevant provisions  – Article 49 on accession and  Article 48 on  the alternative route of general Treaty revision – the standing of the Commission is a distinctly modest one. As regards accession, its role is only one of consultation, with the key decision-making reserved to the European Parliament and the Council. As regards general Treaty revision, the Commission is one of a number of institutions that may make proposals, but here the decisive voice lies squarely with the national governments.

If the Commission does not command a central  legal role in these matters, should we not nonetheless be prepared to listen carefully to the views of its President simply as an expert in Union-craft –  as someone who has the knowledge and experience gained from a decade of independently ‘promoting the general interest of the Union’? Absolutely. Of course we should! The snag  here is  that the President has chosen to say nothing worth saying – nothing that would draw upon a considered sense of that general interest,  but instead restricts himself to well-worn  prognostications about what others  might do in pursuit of their particular interests. He trades on the symbolic authority of his position to do nothing more than profound than  recall that the reception of an independent Scotland into the European Union, whether through the  Article 49 route that he envisages, or through the relatively  ‘seamless’ Article 48  route that the nationalists argue for, would  require the approval of all 28 existing member states; and then to advise that this is an arithmetically formidable threshold, especially given the reservations of certain member states about independence movements in their own backyards – a caution that, as Barroso proceeds to reminds us,  has led Spain, concerned with Catalonian and Basque claims, even to refuse to permit a precedent as distant as the recognition of Kosovo as an independent Balkan state.

What is glaringly absent from the debate, both in the  knowing buck-passing of Barroso’s intervention and in the broader silence of the EU’s main movers and players on the Scottish question, is the articulation of any kind of public philosophy that would provide good reasons, rather than simply motivations of base political self interest, why an independent Scotland should or should not be welcomed with open arms. How, precisely, is the EU, still  resolved by common commitment of the member states in the preamble to the Treaty on European Union ‘ to  continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity’, to justify the exclusion of an independent Scotland? Why should  a country of 5  million citizens, who  have also been EU citizens for 40 years and who have expressed no desire to leave the European Union, be treated less  generously than the 110 million new EU  citizens – over 20% of the EU’s total population – who have joined from Central and Eastern Europe since 2004? Why should Scottish citizens instead be placed in the same category of Kosovo, or any other  potential candidate from beyond the Union’s distant borders?

The point in posing  these rhetorical questions is not to suggest that the propositions they contain will simply collapse under the weight of their own absurdity. For there  may well be a principled case to  make  against automatic and accelerated membership of an independent Scotland. We find the embryo of such a case, for example, in the analysis of Joseph Weiler, the current President of the European University Institute in Florence. He has argued, with special  reference to the Catalan case,(see http://www.ejiltalk.org/catalonian-independence-and-the-european-union/) that just as national minorities in existing member states who presently enjoy extensive forms  of individual and collective freedom have no  automatic right to secede as a matter of general international law, so, too, the  European Union in its accession policy should not be expected to indulge the independence claims of these unoppressed sub-state nations.To the contrary, the very ethos of integration, reconciliation and continental solidarity that has fed the European project from its post-War beginnings, according to Weiler, should lead  the European Union to take a dim view of any separatist impulse that seems to betray these very founding virtues. From this perspective, therefore, far from having a stronger claim than those external candidates  who have benefited from the post-Cold War Enlargement, those nations already comfortably nested in the EU’s Western European heartland  of multi-level governance should be promised no safe European haven if they insist on the path to independence.

I happen to disagree with both the specific thrust and the wider implications of the  Weiler thesis. To begin with, and most narrowly, even if Weiler’s reasoning is applicable to the situation of Catalonia, where no constitutionally permissible route to referendum and independence is presently countenanced at the level of the wider Spanish state, the Scottish case  is quite different. Here, the Edinburgh Agreement reflects the preparedness of the Uk’s flexible constitution to accommodate the prospect of independence. So for the EU to set its face against Scottish independence would be  to dismiss the significance of the member state’s own recognition of the legitimacy of secession.  Secondly, and more broadly, whether we are dealing with the  Scottish or the Catalan case or that of any other national minority, surely more store than Weiler allows should be set by an aspiring nation’s own sense of what is the constitutionally adequate vindication of its desire for collective autonomy. If nothing short of independence is deemed adequate from the perspective of the constituency in question as an affirmation of shared political identity, it is difficult to see why such a subjective  aspiration should be dismissed in favour of a supposedly objective  standard of adequate individual and collective freedom. Thirdly, even if a special case for the EU  as an entity possessing and pursuing a unique historical mission to make internal secession both unnecessary and unacceptable can  be advanced,  it seems unduly dogmatic to use this to justify a rigid policy against  continued membership of new internal states. There are, after all, other and rival views of the deeper purpose of the European Union. The priority given in the Preamble to the TEU to the principle of subsidiarity has already been mentioned, and this surely reflects an alternative  and more independence-friendly perspective. In the face of these competing narratives, should the public policy of the EU on accession not remain more agnostic?

Whether or not my arguments convince, they surely serve to demonstrate  that the EU’s accession policy is and always has been intimately linked to the deep purposes of the world’s first supranational polity, and to ongoing debate, inevitably controversial, over what precisely these deep purposes demand.  It is, therefore, a matter that  requires reasoned public argument and justification of the sort that Weiler attempts rather than a mere weighing of the strategic ‘private’ preferences of national parties. Yet all we get from Barroso is the latter. Not only is this less than we might expect from someone committed to the general interests of the Union, but it also allows the prejudices of national parties to be entered to the calculation without the embarrassment of a first person airing.

In a nutshell:  If any of the key players on the EU stage is opposed to Scottish membership then they should either show the courage of their convictions through a discourse of public justification linked to the interests of the Union as a whole  or, failing that,  they should at least be prepared to declare their intentions to act out of national self-interest. Barroso’ s intervention allows a significant oppositional note to be struck without either of these tests of public candour being met. The danger increases that our independence debate become hijacked to poorly specified and undefended external considerations. That surely is bad news for anyone interested in the referendum as a means to the long-term, widely accepted  resolution of our national conversation.

Professor Michael Keating, University of Aberdeen

In a post on The Future of the UK and Scotland, Michael Keating responds to the intervention from Commission president, Jose Manuel Barroso regarding Scotland’s future in the EU should it vote for independence. In this piece, Michael asserts that while Scotland would need to apply for membership, it would ultimately be admitted. 

The debate on whether an independent Scotland would be a member of the European Union refuses to go away, in spite of all the work put into clarifying matters. The latest intervention from Commission president, Jose Manuel Barroso merely confuses the question.

Like most people who have studied the matter, I have long argued that Scotland would need to apply for membership but that it would be admitted.

1. Under the terms of the Edinburgh Agreement, Scotland would be recognized by the United Kingdom. There is no reason for any of the other  EU members to refuse recognition. There is no precedent for a seceding state, recognized by the host state, not being recognized by others.
2. EU membership is open to any recognized European democracy that meets the Copenhagen criteria and adopts the acquis communautaire. Scotland has been within the EU/ EC for over forty years and does meet these criteria.
3. The situation is not like Catalonia, where the Spanish government has ruled out an independence referendum and the constitution forbids secession.
4. Incidentally, Barroso has got himself tied in knots with his repeated argument that an independent Catalonia would be outside the EU. The real point about the Spanish constitution is that an independent Catalonia is impossible altogether, so Catalonia could not be outside the EU. By suggesting that it would be outside the EU, Barroso has fallen into the trap of accepting that Catalonia could be independent.
5. It is in nobody’s interest to throw Scotland out of the single market – not Scotland, the rest of the UK, the other member states, business or anyone would gain from this.
6. There is no ‘queue’ to get into the EU. Applicants are admitted as and when they are ready. Turkey first tried to get in 50 years ago, so if there were a queue they would be at the head; but 22 other states have got in before them.
7. As the UK Government noted in one of its papers, the Nordic states completed negotiations in 1-2 years.  Were Iceland or Norway to change their minds and apply now, they would be in very quickly.
8. Barosso’s comparison of Scotland with Kosovo is utterly misplaced. Kosovo is not recognized by a number of EU states because it is not yet recognized by Serbia. It emerged from the last of the Balkan wars, complete with mass killing and ethnic cleansing. Comparing this process with that of the Edinburgh Agreement, which was a model for democratic ways of dealing with the issue, is dangerous and a disservice to democracy itself.
9. The role of the European Commission in the accession process for a new member state is limited to certifying that the state meets the membership requirements. If Scotland does meet those requirements, Barroso (or his successor) would be obliged to make a favourable recommendation to the European Council and not to invent new political criteria.
10. There are many questions about Scotland’s position and strategy within the EU, which the Yes side need to clarify. These include the implications of keeping the Pound, a matter on which the Yes side has recently been put on the back foot. Suggesting that Scots would be thrown out of the European Union simply for exercising their democratic rights, however, is to undermine the very basis of the European order.
11. None of this is in itself an argument for independence. Unionists can argue that Scotland is better off as part of a big EU state than as a small independent one. It is not consistent, however, to agree that Scots can vote to be an independent state but then seek to deprive them of the basic rights of any European democracy.

In this piece, originally published at the Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum, Professor Laura Cram examines how Scotland and the institutions of the European Union might behave in event of a yes vote. 

Crisis and change make for more dramatic reading than continuity. Black and white scenarios are often politically expedient. But the seasoned EU observer is more familiar with the various shades of grey which characterise the complex and multiple relationships between the EU: and its member states; its neighbouring states and even not-so-near states; and of course with applicant and accession states at various stages of membership readiness. The reality is that even for full member states of the European Union, what it means to be a member state is not identical. There is no one size fits all membership template. A panoply of individual opt-outs and special arrangements exist in an increasingly a la carte EU.

Formal EU negotiations with an independent Scotland would likely be lengthy, as complex details are agreed upon. Who would want it otherwise? Key decisions about an important relationship are at stake. Overemphasis, however, on which Treaty accession procedure will obtain and what the precise time-scale for membership will be, runs the risk of missing a key point. Scotland is unlikely to be cut off dead from the EU. There is little benefit to anyone of existing systems and relationships failing to operate in the interim.  As Sir David Edwards points out in his detailed evidence to the Scottish Parliament, such a spectre would be inconsistent with both the ‘spirit and scheme’ of EU law. For the ordinary citizen, as these complex negotiations rumble on, it is likely that little of their daily reality would change as an immediate consequence of not being an official signatory to the EU Treaty. Such a negotiating period would also be a time for an independent Scotland to establish the type of relationship that it wants to pursue with the EU, not only in substance but also in tone.

Scots are often presented as Europhiles, especially when contrasted with their English counterparts in the UK.  In reality, the Scottish electorate is perhaps better described as ‘less anti-EU’ than the electorate in England, rather than ‘more pro-EU’. This conclusion should not be conflated with the idea that there is any notable strength of Europhilia in Scotland. The Scottish Parliament Information Service (SPICE) paper, prepared for the evidence session on Scotland’s membership of the EU held by the Scottish Parliament’s European and External Relation’s Committee (16 Jan 2014), neatly summarises the current situation with regard to public attitudes to the EU in Scotland.

According to an Ipsos MORI poll published on 14 February 2013, over half of the Scottish electorate think there should be a referendum on UK membership of the EU (58%), compared with just over a third who disagree (36%). Just over half of Scots (53%) said they would vote to stay in the EU, compared with a third who said they would vote to leave (34%). This was in contrast to November 2012 data on attitudes in England, when half said they would vote to leave the EU compared with 43% who would vote to stay in (EU/S4/14/1/2).

It is useful to view the figures above in the wider EU context. There has been a generalised decline in political and public support for the EU in many EU countries. This is reflected in a rise in the percentage of citizens in key member states (France, Germany, UK, Spain, Greece and Italy) who view membership of the EU as a ‘bad thing’. Still, however, citizens of the UK as a whole remain least likely (along with Greece, both 42%) to ‘feel that you are a citizen of the EU’ (Standard Eurobarometer 80, Autumn 2013).

 Of course, as Paulo Dardanelli pointed out in his written evidence to the European and External Relations Committee, contexts can change. Attitudes to the EU amongst the Scottish electorate may also be contingent on this changing context.

Much discussion on attachment to a territorial unit, such as the national state or the EU, centres on whether such attachment is driven byidentity (sentimental) or is instrumental (rational/utilitarian) – but this distinction is often overemphasised. In practice, context is central. For example, a real and imminent threat to the current status quo, plays a significant role in shaping public attitudes. In this light, it is useful to consider the Greek ‘Grexit’ debates. Despite strong anti-EU public attitudes, and despite many rational arguments that Greece was not benefitting from EU measures, when ‘push came to shove’ and the real possibility of leaving the EU emerged, voters opted against withdrawal from the EU.

If we re-consider the statistics presented above. 53% of Scots state that they would vote to stay in the EU yet, in the same poll, 61% of Scots believe that an independent Scotland should be part of the EU (IPSOS MORi 14 Feb 2013). The prospect of a shift in status quo, a change in context with independence, appears to play a significant role in inclining citizens towards retaining EU membership.

It is important not to underestimate the extent to which the normality of being a member of the EU is embedded in the everyday lives of the electorate. This is also relevant for any impact that a decision on a UK referendum to withdraw from the EU might have on public attitudes in Scotland. As the reality/threat of non-membership of the EU becomes more salient it is likely to provoke a re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of EU membership. Indeed, hitherto taken for granted aspects of EU membership, may become recognised as goods and practices that the electorate is reluctant to give up when ‘push comes to shove’. We should neither overestimate Scots’ attachment to the EU, on the basis of the opinion poll figures, nor underestimate the attachment that might be revealed if not being part of the EU is seen to be an imminent threat in real life.

Continuing on the theme of the low-level normality or embeddedness of EU membership in the everyday lives of the Scottish electorate, it is worth reemphasising the historic adaptability of the EU and its institutions. In practice, many complex transitions have been accomplished in the EU. As a machine the EU tends to move slowly and any transition – whether via renegotiation and re-accession, or as a smoother existing-member transition process or even as a withdrawal from the EU – would likely be lengthy and complex. We would, however, expect complex agreements on new and continuing relationships to be negotiated and a less immediately radical impact to be felt than might be argued by some. Clear consensus emerged in evidence to the Scottish Parliament’s European and External Relations Committee, that transition and interim relationships would play a key role in any post-independence negotiation with the European Union. It is true that an independent Scotland may not receive all that it asks for in any new negotiations. However, any change will bring not only risk but also opportunities. Historically, the moment of accession has often been one of the most influential opportunities for new member states to achieve a shift in EU positions. In any of the possible scenarios, we might expect more continuity in Scotland’s relationship with the EU than immediately perceptible radical change.

Laura Cram is a Professor of European Politics at the University of Edinburgh.

Read the report from the ScotCen Scottish Social Attitudes event.

Christina Boswell, University of Edinburgh

Christina Boswell discusses the Scottish Government’s proposals on immigration and urges the government to launch a Commission on Immigration to enhance dialogue on migration and integration should Scotland become independence or receive further powers. 

The Scottish government recently committed itself to a more liberal approach to immigration, in the event of Scottish independence. For demographic and economic reasons, Scotland faces distinct needs in the areas of immigration. The government is also keen to adopt a more humane approach to asylum and family migration. But the big question remains: would a future independent Scottish government be able to persuade its electorate of the wisdom of a liberalised approach?

Recent surveys suggest that the Scottish public is marginally more tolerant of immigrants and ethnic minorities than the UK taken as a whole. But the difference is not significant. Moreover, Scotland currently has a foreign born population of just 7% – only half that of the 13.8% hosted by England. So it’s far from clear whether these differences would persist in the event of a marked increase in levels of immigration.

As I’ve argued recently, it’s also likely that political debate around Scottish independence would shift considerably in the event of independence. A Scottish government would be held to account for the outcomes of immigration policy, and open to challenge by opposition parties and the media. Judging by the way immigration issues are discussed in political debate and the popular media in the UK at the moment, can we really expect the Scottish debate to be more positive and progressive in its approach to immigration?

One way of trying to pre-empt such a negative turn in the debate would be to do what the German Social Democrat/Green coalition did in 2000, and launch a cross-party Commission on Immigration. The German Immigration Commission brought together the main political parties, as well as representatives of business, trade unions, religious and migrant groups and immigration experts. Its goal was to open up discussion on all aspects of immigration, and to try to build consensus around policy reform. The Commission conducted thorough analysis of Germany’s demographic and economic needs, as well as challenges related to the social impacts of immigration and immigrant integration. To be sure, not all of its recommendations were adopted by the government. The Commission’s proposal to introduce a Canadian-style points based system for recruiting migrants was ultimately rejected by the German parliament. But a number of other recommendations were taken on board over the following years, such as granting labour market access to foreign graduates, or lowering the salary threshold for skilled migrants.

Perhaps most importantly, the Commission changed the tenor of debate in Germany. It normalised the idea that Germany was, and would need to remain, a country of immigration. It replaced some of the more emotive and polemical debates around immigrant integration with more grounded and factually informed discussion.

In the event of independence – or a ‘devo-max’ settlement involving more autonomy on immigration – the Scottish Government would do well to consider launching such a commission. It would trigger a wider and better informed debate on the benefits and costs of immigration; and potentially build consensus between the main political parties on a future immigration policy. Only by building a common platform does the Scottish Government stand a chance of gaining political and media backing for a more liberal agenda. And without such backing, the odds are the debate will take the same negative course it has in the rest of the UK.

This post was originally published at Politics, Knowledge, and Migration.

Dr Juliet Kaarbo, University of Edinburgh

States’ visions of their foreign policies typically have four elements, or pillars:  protection, profits, principles, and pride.  The Scottish Government’s White Paper released last month is no exception, Juliet Kaarbo explains.

‘Protection’ (or ‘power’) concerns the key function of sovereign states – to provide security for their citizens, mainly at home but also abroad. On this pillar, the White Paper lays out the case for continued membership in NATO and its

defence priorities relating to budget allocations, maritime capabilities, numbers for regular and reserve personnel, and continued operation of current major military bases.

The ‘Profits’ element is how the state will engage with the international economy and position its domestic economy to provide economic wealth and security.  On this pillar, the White Paper clearly embraces a liberal, pro-trade economic foreign policy in its discussion of the advantages of continued EU membership, ‘focused engagement’ with the EU, and full participation in the Europe 2020 growth agenda.

‘Principles’ are the values and the projection of ‘what we stand for’ that purportedly guide a state’s foreign policy.  It is on this pillar that the White Paper seeks to put the most daylight between an independent Scottish foreign policy and its characterisation of UK foreign policy.  The White Paper, for example, emphasises the ‘different international priorities’ between Westminster and an independent Scotland and notes ‘we see that most clearly in matters of war and peace and in our relationship with the EU’ (White Paper, page 209).  The anti-nuclear argument of the White Paper is also partly based on value statements, such as “Trident is an affront to basic decency with its indiscriminate and inhumane destructive power” (p.232).  More principles are advanced when the White Paper envisions Scotland as a ‘champion for international justice and peace’ and puts forward the values of  ‘international development, human rights, climate change, and climate justice’ (page 225).  The Government boldly puts forward a ‘Do No Harm’ policy, stating: ‘As an expression of the values driving our foreign policy, this Government will ensure that other Scottish Government policies do no harm to development countries, do not undermine international development aims and ideally contribute to international development success’ (page 231).

Finally, ‘pride’ plays a place in most states’ foreign policies.  Pride often surfaces in characterisations the state’s identity, of ‘who we are,’ and of the state’s and its people’s accomplishments.  Pride may connect to values, such as human rights and climate justice.  But pride can also be projections of the nation’s self-image, such as a ‘beacon of democracy’ or a ‘cradle of a civilisation.’   In this way, the White Paper paints a picture of Scotland as “an outward facing nation, exporting goods, people, and ideas around the world…”(207) and refers to ‘’Scotland’s proud military tradition” (234).  At its most dangerous end, pride can turn negative and derogatory in tone, painting an excessively positive image of itself only in reference to excessively negative images of other.  There is none of this extreme negativity in the Scottish White Paper’s vision of its foreign policy, which is perhaps surprising for a document written by a political party with ‘national’ in its name.

The four pillars of foreign policy can stand alone in a vision statement, such as the White Paper.  In practice, however, they are not mutually exclusive.  They can work together, reinforcing each other (profits can my protection, for example), but they often come in conflict.  What happens when, for example, profits come from trade with states with human rights violations or security imperatives lead the state to act in ways counter to its self-image?   The White Paper does reflect on these potential conflicts.  It states:  “we will not allow commercial or other considerations, including military considerations, to influence our approach [to international development] improperly’ (231).  A praise-worthy goal indeed, but few states have succeeded in avoiding these trade-offs and in isolating principles from profits and protection, and Scotland would be no exception.

The White Paper rightly states that with independence, Scotland would have sovereign ability to choose the direction of its foreign affairs – to follow the pillars the Government seeks to build.  But it would quickly discover that with sovereignty comes the difficult task of deciding what to do when the pillars point a state in conflicting directions.

The international community weighs in…

Ryan Beasley and Juliet Kaarbo analyse the role that the international community can and should play in Scotland’s referendum debate.

In early 2013, the BBC surveyed EU governments, asking for their opinion on Scottish independence and on the question of Scottish EU membership. More than half of the member states responded either that it was entirely an internal matter or refused to reply.  Why the silence?  Are other countries just not interested in the outcome?  Almost certainly not.  More likely, other governments feel constrained by international norms of non-interference.  Simply put, outside actors are not supposed to intervene in free and fair democratic processes.

This can be considered an international norm, which is the  unwritten rule about appropriate behaviour that can shape and constrain states’ actions.  Indeed, international norms about democracy are strong.   Given the widespread sense that people should be free to govern themselves, and the idea that democratic governments tend to conduct both their internal and external affairs with less brutality, it is rather difficult to justify interfering in what is arguably the most significant of democratic exercises, a vote on independence.

But that is exactly what is going to happen, and actually has been for some time, albeit indirectly.  This is not unique to the question of Scottish independence, but has to do with the nature of statehood itself.  When new states are born, or seek independence, the international community has a vested interest in the outcome.  External actors attempt to shape both whether a new state will emerge and what role the state would play in the world, even before statehood.

Members of the international community have a variety of reasons for being keenly interested in the outcome.  While the United States, for example, will undoubtedly continue to profess neutrality born of respect for the right of peoples to rule themselves, it will also put its thumb on the scale in an effort to create an outcome suitable to its preferences.  And make no mistake, it has preferences.  Not only is the United States concerned about the future of the Trident submarine, but an independent Scotland potentially weakens one of its strongest allies (the UK) and independence may set a precedent for further, possibly dangerous, separatism in other parts of the world.  These concerns have been voiced in U.S.-based elite opinion pages and by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, with SNP reactions.  Norms against outside interference in democratic processes prevent blatant interference, so influence takes other forms.   States can emphasize, for example, Scotland’s small size and the challenges of security and economic viability that small states face.   States can choose or refuse to meet with Salmond in the run-up to the referendum.

It’s not just state that are seeking to limit (or grow) the  sovereignty club. Organisations with rules for both admission and conduct have a stake – and hence a say – in the possibility of new statehood.  The EU, NATO, the UN and the WTO are the most obvious. Already international organisations have weighed in on the debate, if through no other means than suggesting the ease or difficulty that Scotland might face in trying to gain (or regain) membership. The EU Commission President declared that any new state would have to apply for EU membership, despite the SNP having said an independent Scotland would be able to renegotiate its terms of membership from inside the EU.  NATO also indicated that an independent Scotland would have to apply as a new state and that membership would require unanimous agreement of all twenty-eight states in the alliance. Deciding to apply the organizational rules in this fashion can be seen as an effort to shape the debate itself, and the role Scotland might (or might not) play in the event of its independence.

Of interest is that the very thing that makes this event unique is also what gives rise to these types of efforts to influence the outcome. Scores of states have been created over the last 60 years, and many of them were also seeking to join the EU and be a part of the NATO alliance.  But this is an independence movement in the European heartland of democracy and political stability, while most recent new states have come from the process of decolonization or the break-up of empires or larger states – the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are prime examples.  And unlike most other new states, Scotland is deciding on independence through a very open political and democratic process.  This openness, however, cuts two ways.  A democratic referendum means an honest opportunity for the ‘rule of the people’ and a chance for the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’ sides to campaign and shape public opinion.  It also means giving a platform for outside actors to shape the public discourse and to define what Scotland might, and might not, be should it gain independence.  And so in September 2014, the people in Scotland will vote their fate.  But in the larger landscape, because the creation of a new state hangs in the balance, others states and organisations of the world are already part of this debate.  Far from being silent, important actors on the world stage are voicing their concerns by attempting to shape the role that an independent Scotland could play.  In this sense, democratic norms empower citizens to determine their sovereignty, but not necessarily their destiny.

Rt Hon Carwyn Jones, First Minister for Wales

Cera Murtagh reports from a major speech by First Minister of Wales the Rt Hon Carwyn Jones AM, hosted by the Academy of Government, on the implications of the Scottish independence referendum for Scotland, Wales and the UK as a whole

In the wake of his landmark speech at the University of Edinburgh last week, the Welsh First Minister’s warning that Wales would want a say on an independent Scotland joining a currency union with the rest of the UK has dominated the headlines. Provoking nationalist-unionist claim and counter-claim however, this focus distracted from what was perhaps the First Minister’s more substantive point: that the UK is in need of fundamental constitutional reform.

Delivering a speech entitled ‘Wales, Scotland and the United Kingdom’, in advance of the Scottish Government’s publication of the White Paper on Scotland’s Future, the Right Honourable Carwyn Jones approached his topic with a mixture of caution and determination. Aware that wading into the Scottish independence debate is a risky business, the First Minister stressed his respect for Scotland alone to determine the outcome of the referendum, and insisted he was not here to preach. Nevertheless, given the stakes – not only for Scotland but for the UK as a whole – he felt it necessary to present the “wider perspective”.

The Welsh premier owned that an independent Scotland could, of course, survive. The question, he argued, was whether it would be better off as an independent country or, as he believed, within a renewed Union of devolved nations.

Constitutional reform to embed devolution is the route to this new and improved United Kingdom, according to the First Minister. It is now the time to establish a “stable territorial constitution”, he urged; “a proper and durable long-term settlement for the whole of the UK”, in which the place of the devolved nations would be cemented.

“Can we see a future for the UK which is built on a fundamental acceptance that we are a territorial Union with a devolved constitution? Can we have confidence that our constitutional arrangements will be respected and transcend party politics?,” he asked.

“I believe the answer is yes. I believe it is possible to work out a full future for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, through devolution, within the wider framework of a strong UK bound together by common threads of shared history, culture and values.”

A new UK constitution must enshrine three key principles, the First Minister advanced: it should guarantee the devolved legislatures of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as permanent features of the Union; it should ensure a presumption towards devolution, wherever practical; and it should provide a consistent method for devolving powers across all parts of the UK.

Outlining a positive vision of the Union, Jones drew upon Wales’s experience of devolution and recent negotiations with the UK Government over the transfer of further powers to the Welsh Assembly in response to the Silk Commission, to demonstrate what can be achieved when the Westminster Government and devolved administrations work together constructively and respectfully.

While making the case for constitutional change, the First Minister was nevertheless forthright on the merits of maintaining the Union. He staked this argument first and foremost on trade and currency. On the Scottish National Party’s plan to remain in a currency union with the remainder of the UK post-independence, Jones raised significant doubts, and warned that, as First Minister of a devolved administration, he would “want the right to have a say” on Scotland joining such a pact.

In setting out his stall for reform, the Welsh premier demonstrated that developments north of the border can generate debates over much wider constitutional reform.

Hosted by the Academy of Government in the University’s Old College on 20 November 2013, the lecture by First Minister of Wales the Rt Hon Carwyn Jones AM was chaired by Academy Director Professor Charlie Jeffery and attended by staff, students, members of the public, as well as a host of media outlets.

Cera Murtagh is a PhD candidate in Politics & International Relations at the University of Edinburgh

Christina Boswell

Christina Boswell, Edinburgh Professor of Politics and leading authority on the politics of migration, assesses the Independence White Paper’s prospectus for asylum and immigration. She argues that public opinion, and cross-border pressures from rUK and the EU may constrain the noble aspirations of the Scottish Government toward a more liberal policy.

There are no major surprises in the Scottish Government’s plans on immigration, as set out in the White Paper on Scotland’s Future published yesterday. As expected, the paper outlines a programme for a more liberal stance on many aspects of immigration asylum policy. This is refreshing given the largely negative and defensive debate on immigration policy south of the border. But how feasible are the plans for liberalising immigration in the event of Scottish independence?

Border control. The paper proposes that an independent Scotland be part of the Common Travel Area (CTA) currently in operation between the UK and Ireland. This would imply no (or at least very limited) border controls between Scotland and the rest of the UK (rUK). This proposal seems reasonable and feasible. Whatever the current rhetoric, rUK would have a strong interest in free circulation between an independent Scotland and England.

What is less clear is the degree to which membership of the CTA would be compatible with a ‘more flexible immigration system’. To be sure, membership of the CTA does not impose formal constraints on national immigration and asylum policies. However, experience of the border-free zone between Schengen countries suggests that a number of concerns about irregular flows might kick in. Notably, the potential for third country nationals not authorised to stay or work in rUK to move across the border from Scotland. I’ll return to this point later.

Labour migration. The paper suggests introducing two main routes for labour migrants. First, a points-based system to recruit migrants who meet particular criteria. Such a system could be adapted to suit the demographic or labour market requirements of Scotland, or even particular regions within Scotland – for example, by awarding points for skills and qualifications, sector, or age. Second, it would re-introduce labour market access for foreign graduates of Scottish universities – as used to be the case under the Fresh Talent initiative, which entitled graduates to stay and look for work for up to 24 months.

Both proposals seem sensible and feasible as a means of attracting skilled migrants to address labour shortages and offset ageing populations. A points based system may not be the sharpest tool for matching workers to jobs in particular sectors/occupations. So the government might be wise to consider complementing this route with an employer-driven scheme for recruiting workers in sectors facing serious shortages. Another caveat relates to the notion that a points-based system could provide ‘incentives’ for people to live and work in ‘more remote geographical areas’. It would be difficult to enforce residency requirements for immigrants. That said, the basic ideas are sound.

Asylum. The government would continue its policy of ‘promoting the integration of refugees and asylum seekers from the day they arrive. And it would end dawn raids and limit the use of detention and forcible removals. In addition, there is a vaguely articulated aspiration to ‘address asylum seekers’ access to employment, education and accommodation’. This formulation is less developed than previous Scottish Government statements about actively promoting employment of asylum seekers to address labour shortages. But caution in this area shows political maturity. The idea of drawing on asylum seekers as a means of addressing labour shortages would set off loud alarm bells in London and Brussels. It would be seen as creating a ‘pull’ factor for would-be migrants, who might abuse the asylum system as a route to the labour market. Whether or not such concerns are well grounded, UK and EU policy circles very much buy into this narrative of asylum abuse, especially where there’s a risk that asylum seekers might travel on to other European countries. Such fears could affect plans to eliminate border controls between Scotland and rUK. If a more liberal asylum policy in Scotland were to attract greater numbers of asylum seekers, then the worry would be that they might travel across the border to seek irregular employment south of the border. Given such a scenario, Whitehall would be likely to place strong pressure on a Scottish government to stick with more restrictive treatment of asylum seekers; or else risk the re-introduction of border controls.

Finally, we should consider how the Scottish public would feel about a more liberal approach to immigration and asylum. Recent research has found that there is a lower level of hostility to immigrants and ethnic minority residents in Scotland, compared to the rest of the UK. But there are reasons for caution about relying on such findings. Firstly, the differences are marginal – a 3-6% variation between Scottish and average UK attitudes according to data from the British Social Attitudes Survey. But secondly, we might expect these dynamics to change in the scenario of an independent Scotland. If a Scottish government were to introduce a more liberal policy, it would create strong incentives for opposition parties and the populist media to score points through highlighting the adverse effects of increasing immigration and asylum. Indeed, this has been the experience of almost all immigration receiving countries in Europe since the 1990s. No single European country – with the possible exception of Spain – has been able to sustain a more liberal policy. Witness the demise of Labour’s more expansive approach to labour migration in the first half of the 1990s. European publics – including those in the UK – have proved highly susceptible to political mobilisation around immigration. Immigration offers a channel for articulating broader concerns about unemployment, inequality and declining social cohesion.

A future Scottish government keen to pursue a more liberal policy would need to think carefully about how it phased in reform, justified it, and – most importantly – how it got the media and opposition parties on board. It’s a noble aspiration. But given what we know about the politics of immigration across Europe, I can’t help feeling sceptical about its political traction.

Professor Christina Boswell is Professor of Politics at the University of Edinburgh. You can read her blog posts on Politics, Knowledge and Migration at: http://christinaboswell.wordpress.com/

Dr Luis Moreno

Luis Moreno addresses the impact that Scotland’s Referendum could have on European political culture. 

Following the anti-climax of the 1979 Referendum results, the nationalist camp viewed Scotland’s political future inexorably linked to the formation of a fully-fledged sovereign state. “Independence, nothing less” was the uncompromising demand voiced against ‘no-mandate’ UK Governments. Thatcher interpreted the outcome of the referendum as if Scotland’s aspirations for home rule were just a ‘dead duck’, which the passing of time would help bury without any special ceremony. In the 1980s, nationalist predicament was significantly modified by accepting a higher degree of gradualism in the achievement of self-government. A wider cosmopolitan view was encapsulated in the SNP’s new motto, “Independence in Europe”. The achievement of the ‘Norwegian Dream’, by which a wealthy oil-producer country could preserve a generous universal welfare state along the lines of ‘small is beautiful’, gave way to the idea of participating actively in the building of a united Europe, while maintaining the claim of independence for the running of Scottish affairs.

We certainly know that political union in the Old Continent is not to follow the American model of centralised federalism. Despite the normative insistence of the neo-functionalist school of thought, the establishment of the United States of Europe is out of the question. It is also highly unlikely that Continental Europe would follow the prescription put forward by Winston Churchill in his celebrated Zurich speech in 1946. According to his proposals, there should be a European Federation in a superpower configuration of world politics, alongside with other leading actors such as the USA (‘mighty America’), Russia and imperial Britain (and Scotland within it). Time will tell if such arrangement could ever materialise after the celebration of Britain’s referendum on Europe, as promised by the inheritors of Churchill’s views in the current UK Cabinet.

Developments around the turn of the millennium, and particularly since the 2007 financial crisis, have dramatically exposed the limitations of the nation-state as a ‘sovereign’ actor in global economics. Models of British ‘command-and-control’ majoritarian democracy, as well as of Jacobin vertical diffusionism of power, seem to be in terminal retreat. The on-going re-scaling of nation-state structures and political organization is in line with Europe’s principle of territorial subsidiarity. Processes of rescaling and ‘unbundling of territoriality’ are having a direct impact on citizens’ living standards. This crucial tenet of Europeanization establishes that policy decision-making should be located at the level closest to the citizen. In other words, the purpose of subsidiarity is to limit the power of central authorities by assuming the criteria of “proximity” and “proportionality”. Subsidiarity aims to provide a protective measure against over-expansion of European control in matters resting upon the jurisdiction and prerogatives of each layer of government in a multi-tiered Europe. It also encourages co-ordination to manage growing interdependencies.

Territorial subsidiarity goes hand in hand with the second guiding principle of Europeanization: democratic accountability. There cannot be any further development of politics in Europe if decisions are taken behind-closed-doors, as happens in our often opaque state-centred polities. Democratic participation and citizens’ involvement in public life is quintessential to the very preservation of the European social model, if this is to be preserved vis-à-vis re-commodified individualization or neo-slavery systems of economic growth.

Indeed, the holding of the 2014 Referendum on Scotland’s Independence provides a formidable opportunity to comply with both European principles. They could set the pace and the tone in the institutionalization of the European ‘political animal’. In any post-Referendum scenario, Scottish voters will be regarded as political innovators. They would make a far-reaching impact if a majority of them –or a near majority for that matter– decide to vote for independence in Europe.

Luis Moreno is the Research Professor (Spanish National Research Council, CSIC) and is currently a Honorary Fellow at the University of Edinburgh.